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In this dissertation, I examine historical and contemporary versions of the 
ontological argument for God’s existence and objections to it, focusing on versions of 
the argument that contain Linkage Premises (premises that hold there is a strong 
connection between existence and perfection or greatness).  I argue that the most 
plausible kind of objection to these and other ontological arguments is a version of the 
parody-style counterargument found in contemporary literature.  If this 
counterargument succeeds, it results in a reductio ad absurdum of the ontological 
argument.  I then examine the relationship between being and goodness found in certain 
medieval philosophers such as Aquinas, Augustine, and Boethius (also called the 
Convertibility Thesis of Being and Goodness).  I argue that this view is coherent and 
plausible.  Then, I argue that for versions of the ontological argument that contain a 
Linkage Premise to succeed, both against my counterargument and on their own terms, 
the proponent must presuppose the Convertibility Thesis of Being and Goodness.  
Finally, I argue that greater attention ought to be paid to this medieval view, not only 
for its positive results related to the ontological argument, but also because of its 




Chapter 1: Ontological Arguments and the Structure of the Project 
 In this chapter, I will examine several ontological arguments, both recent and 
historical.  With the exception of Anselm’s argument in Proslogion II, all are modal 
ontological arguments.  I will also explain the purpose of the dissertation as a whole by 
giving a precis of each chapter and its relation to the other chapters of the dissertation.   
Section I. Introduction 
 The ontological argument occupies a strange and interesting role in the history 
of philosophy.  First proposed by Anselm of Canterbury, the ontological argument 
moves from considerations regarding the concept or definition of God and the kinds of 
properties or essential features required for Godhood to an argument that gives us 
reason to think that God exists.  Throughout modern Western intellectual history, a 
number of important philosophers have proposed their own ontological arguments for 
the existence of God, and just as many philosophers have taken the argument to task.  
Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and Hume all had something to say about the ontological 
argument, whether they thought it to be successful or unsuccessful.  The development 
of new modal logics resulted in a return of the ontological argument in 20th century 
analytic philosophy.  Taking Anselm as giving a central insight into the nature of God’s 
existence as necessary, a number of 20th century philosophers attempted to refine and 
further develop the ontological argument with the newly developed resources at their 
disposal.  Even now, ontological arguments and various objections to those arguments 
figure prominently in contemporary journal articles and scholarly monographs.   
 All of this is sufficient to demonstrate that the ontological argument has a well-
worn history, but I find it to be philosophically important for one other major reason.  In 
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the ontological argument there are a number of important metaphysical, modal, and 
moral concepts at play, and any attempt to work through the argument will require 
grappling with a host of fundamental philosophical positions.  What does it mean for 
something to exist?  Can there be anything that necessarily exists?  What is it for 
something to be possible?  Do our own thought processes and patterns of reasoning give 
us any justification for modal knowledge?  What does it mean for something to be 
good?  How, if at all, are greatness and goodness related?  These are just some of the 
questions, utilizing concepts, found at the heart of traditional and contemporary 
ontological arguments.  The ontological argument serves an important role for general 
metaphysical issues regarding theism and atheism as well.  In addition to being a 
deductive argument, the ontological argument if it is valid and sound can serve to 
undercut or undermine the problem of evil and all other atheological arguments.  In fact, 
if the argument works it shows that there are no possible worlds where God fails to 
exist.  All of this shows that the argument, stretching backwards and history and 
forward into the future, is truly worth considering.    
Section II. The Proposal  
 As a whole, this dissertation aims to make three primary arguments.  First, that a 
central and common objection to the ontological argument is actually significantly 
weaker than many philosophers have thought.  Second, that a style of objection often 
taken to be the least viable and least troublesome is actually the most powerful 
objection to the ontological argument.  Finally, that the ontological arguments I’ll 
discuss here require the convertibility thesis of being and goodness to be true for their 
success.  In some cases this requirement is explicit and conceptual, whereas in other 
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cases I will argue that the defenders of the ontological argument are at least practically 
committed to the truth of the convertibility thesis of being and goodness.  The 
dissertation progresses through five chapters. 
 The first chapter contains a standard form preparation of each of the ontological 
arguments that I focus on in later chapters, especially chapter five.  I will not try to 
explicate these arguments in any great detail in this chapter, since the most relevant 
sections of these arguments receive much greater scrutiny in the final chapter.  This 
chapter also contains a preview of the dissertation.   
 The second chapter explores different views of what it means to say that an 
object exists.  The current orthodox view and its historical predecessors are examined in 
some detail.  I also examine alternative concepts of existence.  The purpose of this 
chapter, like the next, is in part conceptual mapping.  I desire to know what we need to 
assume or commit ourselves to for the ontological argument to be a viable, sound 
argument, at least as regards the nature of existence.  I finally conclude that 1) 
ontological arguments are upheld if existence is a first-order property, since there are 
alternative accounts of the existence predicate and whether or not it applies to objects, 
and that 2) ontological arguments are upheld if existence is not a first-order property, in 
the style of Malcolm and Plantinga.  Any way the objection is lodged, this most famous 
and global critique of the argument has little to recommend it – ontological arguments 
may proceed regardless of the nature of existence.   
 The third chapter takes up the idea of developing a parody style objection to 
ontological arguments.  In this chapter, I present a modified taxonomy of parody style 
objections, and I give an argument that parody style objections are the most powerful 
4 
 
objections against ontological arguments.  I also give an argument for preferring one 
particular style of parody objection over others, which I call the AntiGod objection.  I 
give an example of this kind of objection and consider a rebuttal that all parody style 
arguments must fail.  At the end of the chapter, if I have succeeded I will have shown 
that AntiGod parody objections are not only not destined to fail, but are the most 
powerful stumbling block to ontological arguments – particularly in comparison to the 
two previous objections discussed in chapters two and three.   
 The fourth chapter focuses on developing the convertibility thesis of being and 
goodness.  In this chapter I briefly examine the historical pedigree of the doctrine before 
giving an in-depth analysis of what I take to be the best contemporary form of this 
thesis.  In explaining the convertibility thesis of being and goodness, I take care to 
defend it against the objections that it is no longer suitable as a 
metaphysical/metaethical theory of our reality.  I show that the convertibility thesis of 
being and goodness can be used to analyze goodness in a variety of forms.  I also show 
that the convertibility thesis of being and goodness, in at least one form, does not 
require God’s existence – that a philosopher could develop this view without being a 
theist.  This goes part of the way to show that the convertibility thesis can still be 
effectively and faithfully utilized in contemporary philosophy.  In the course of 
defending the convertibility thesis, it will not be enough to simply show that we can 
make sense of the contemporary world by adopting that lens.  The single most 
persuasive objection to the convertibility thesis of being and goodness is that it entails 
the privation theory of evil, that all evil can be analyzed as a privation, or absence, or 
lack.  And the single most powerful counterexample to the privation theory of evil is the 
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example of pain.  In order to defend the convertibility thesis, in this chapter I focus on 
defanging the objection from pain, and show that pain does not constitute a sufficient 
obstacle to rule out the privation theory of evil, and in turn, the convertibility thesis of 
being and goodness.     
 The fifth and final chapter gives my own, multi-stage argument that each 
version of the ontological argument covered in this chapter is committed to the truth of 
the convertibility thesis of being and goodness.  In that chapter I demonstrate the 
grounds for thinking that the ontological arguers in fact require this thesis, as well as 
giving an argument that the convertibility thesis of being and goodness is superior to 
any alternative theory of greatness or greatmaking properties on offer.  The idea that 
this is required as a background for most ontological arguments is either completely 
accepted without mention in contemporary discussions of the ontological argument, its 
importance has been widely overlooked if accepted, or most people have not noticed 
this until now.  If my argument is correct, it will no longer be possible to develop 
ontological arguments of a certain type without taking into account the need for the 
convertibility thesis of being and goodness.  The convertibility thesis is not simply 
superior to the other great-making theories offered by ontological arguers, but for wider 
ontological application.  As this is the final chapter, I also summarize the results of the 
dissertation.   
Section III. Notes on Formulating the Arguments 
 In the following sections I give versions of ontological arguments by Anselm of 
Canterbury, Rene Descartes, Alvin Plantinga, Kurt Gӧdel, Norman Malcolm, Robert 
Maydole, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.  I examine these arguments because I believe 
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that, although this list is not exhaustive, it is a good cross-section of ontological 
arguments that have occurred at various times throughout history.  If my main argument 
in chapter five is correct, then the charge I level there will apply to each of these 
arguments.  If it applies to each of these arguments, then this opens up the possibility 
that it will also apply to other kinds of ontological arguments.  Concerning myself with 
these arguments gives the project a substantive base from which to draw further 
conclusions.   
 My primary focus in this chapter is not to lay out exact, nuanced versions of 
each argument listed.  For any of the arguments given, numerous philosophers have 
given their own interpretation of the premises, or the text, or the logical structure of the 
argument, or even the conclusion, and they all argue for the supremacy of their own 
version.  This is far beyond what is realistic for my own project.  Instead, I try to 
formulate a version of the argument that does not do significant damage to the text it is 
drawn from, and that captures a basic but correct version what is going on in each 
argument.  If the versions of arguments given in this chapter are basically accurate, then 
even if there is room to debate finer, nuanced points of interpretation or precision, it is 
unlikely to have any effect on my final argument.  The main work of diving into each 
text to rigorously support my final argument will occur in the fifth chapter.   
Section IV. Anselm’s Argument 
 Anselm’s argument is the first ontological argument, and it is probably the 
simplest to state.  In what follows I’ll present my own interpretation of Anselm’s 
argument in Proslogion II and III.   
 Anselm’s argument in Proslogion II is given in short fashion as follows.   
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Therefore, 0 Lord, You who give understanding to faith, grant me to 
understand—to the degree You know to be advantageous—that You 
exist, as we believe, and that You are what we believe [You to be]. 
Indeed, we believe You to be something than which nothing greater can 
be thought. Or is there, then, no such nature [as You], for the Fool has 
said in his heart that God does not exist?  But surely when this very same 
Fool hears my words “something than which nothing greater can be 
thought,” he understands what he hears. And what he understands is in 
his understanding, even if he does not understand [i.e., judge] it to exist. 
For that a thing is in the understanding is distinct from understanding 
that [this] thing exists. For example, when a painter envisions what he is 
about to paint: he indeed has in his understanding that which he has not 
yet made, but he does not yet understand that it exists. But after he has 
painted [it]: he has in his understanding that which he has made, and he 
understands that it exists. So even the Fool is convinced that something 
than which nothing greater can be thought is at least in his 
understanding; for when he hears of this [being], he understands [what 
he hears], and whatever is understood is in the understanding. But surely 
that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be only in the 
understanding. For if it were only in the understanding, it could be 
thought to exist also in reality—something which is greater [than 
existing only in the understanding]. Therefore, if that than which a 
greater cannot be thought were only in the understanding, then that than 
which a greater cannot be thought would be that than which a greater can 
be thought! But surely this [conclusion] is impossible. Hence, without 
doubt, something than which a greater cannot be thought exists both in 
the understanding and in reality. (Anselm 2000a, pp. 8-9, bracketed 
phrases from the translator) 
 
 The general strategy most reflective of Anselm’s argument here is the reductio 
ad absurdum.  In standard form, the argument would proceed as follows. 
1. God is defined as “the being than which nothing greater can be 
conceived.” (Definition) 
2. God exists in the understanding but not in reality.  (Atheist’s 
Assumption)  
3. It is greater to exist in reality and the understanding than it is to exist 
in the understanding alone.  (Anselm’s Principle) 
4. It is possible to conceive of a being greater than the God in premise 
2, namely a God that exists in both understanding and reality. (2, 3) 
5. If 4, it is possible to conceive of something greater than the being 
than which nothing greater can be conceived.  (Contradiction, 1, 4) 




 There are numerous ways one might approach or attack this argument.  A great 
degree of scholarly work has been spent trying to figure out how to correctly and 
accurately map out this argument.  For our purposes, as long as my translation does not 
do some considerable injustice to Anselm, this will suffice.   
 It is fairly easy to see how the argument goes.  One begins with the Atheist’s 
Assumption for the purpose of reductio.  Armed with this assumption, the definition of 
God as the greatest conceivable being, and the principle that existing in reality and the 
understanding is greater than existing in the understanding alone, we can easily generate 
a contradiction.  As Anselm says, we accept 2 and 3, we can show that there could be 
something greater than the Atheist’s God, a God which exists both in reality and in the 
understanding.  But if that is true, it looks like we can conceive of something greater 
than God – something than which nothing greater can be conceived.  Since this is 
contradictory, we must reject one of the previous assumptions.  The definition of God 
seems rather straightforward, and for reasons I will present later Anselm has good 
reason to hold that the principle linking greatness to existence is true.  If all of this is 
right, then we must reject the Atheist’s Assumption.  If we do, we have left two options 
– that God does not exist in the understanding or reality, or that God exists in both 
reality and in the understanding.  The first is false since even for the Atheist, God exists 
in the understanding.  Therefore, God must exist in both the understanding and reality.  
Therefore, God exists. 
 The argument given in Proslogion 3 is quite a bit different.  I quote the full 
section below. 
Assuredly, this [being] exists so truly [i.e., really] that it cannot even be 
thought not to exist. For there can be thought to exist something which 
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cannot be thought not to exist; and this thing is greater than that which 
can be thought not to exist. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot 
be thought could be thought not to exist, then that than which a greater 
cannot be thought would not be that than which a greater cannot be 
thought—[a consequence] which is contradictory. Hence, something 
than which a greater cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot even 
be thought not to exist. And You are this [being], 0 Lord our God. 
Therefore, 0 Lord my God, You exist so truly that You cannot even be 
thought not to exist. And this is rightly the case. For if any mind could 
think of something better than You, the creature would rise above the 
Creator and would sit in judgment over the Creator—something which is 
utterly absurd. Indeed, except for You alone, whatever else exists can be 
thought not to exist. Therefore, You alone exist most truly of all and thus 
most greatly of all; for whatever else exists does not exist as truly [as do 
You] and thus exists less greatly [than do You]. Since, then, it is so 
readily clear to a rational mind that You exist most greatly of all, why 
did the Fool say in his heart that God does not exist? —why [indeed] 
except because [he is] foolish and a fool! (Anselm 2000a pp. 9) 
 
 This is the argument that Hartshorne and Malcolm rediscovered as a modal 
ontological argument.  Below is my own interpretation of the argument in standard 
form. 
1. God is defined as “the being than which nothing greater can be 
conceived.”  (Definition) 
2. It is possible to conceive of a necessarily existent being (a being that 
cannot be thought to not exist).  (Assumption) 
3. Necessary existence (beings that are unable to be thought to not 
exist) is greater than contingent existence (beings that are able to be 
thought to not exist).  (Modified Anselm’s Principle) 
4. God exists only contingently and not necessarily (assumption for 
reductio).   
5. It is possible to conceive of a being greater than the God in 4, namely 
a God that exists necessarily.  (3, 4) 
6. If 5, it is possible to conceive of something greater than the being 
than which nothing greater can be conceived.  (Contradiction, 1, 5) 
7. Therefore, God necessarily exists.   
 
 As before, this argument starts out with the definition of God as the being 
greater than which none can be conceived.  It then moves quickly into consideration of 
whether or not it is possible to conceive of a being that is necessarily existent.  In 
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Anselm’s terms this is a being that “cannot be thought to not exist” but I think this 
captures our own notion of a necessarily existent being quite well.  In another (for 
Anselm) noncontroversial move, he adopts a modified version of the previous principle 
that states that this kind of existence (where an entity cannot even be thought to not 
exist) is better than the other kind (where an entity can be thought to not exist).  We 
again have an assumption for reductio, which is that God might be thought to only 
contingently exist.  Just as in the last argument, this leads us to a contradiction.  Anselm 
gives up the idea that God might only contingently exist instead of the other premises.  
If this is correct, then God not only exists, but exists necessarily. 
Section V. Descartes’ Argument 
 Descartes has several arguments for the existence of God in the Meditations, but 
his version of the ontological argument occurs in the Fifth Meditation and the 
Principles of Philosophy, and is further fleshed out in the Replies and Objections and 
personal correspondence (Descartes 2008).  I will reproduce what I take to be one 
version of the argument here, taken from the Fifth Meditation. 
1. I have the idea of God in my mind. (Assumption) 
2. God is defined as the supremely perfect being. (Definition) 
3. A supremely perfect being must possess all perfections in all ways.  
(Definition) 
4. God cannot lack any perfection.  (2, 3) 
5. Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true. (Clarity and 
Distinctness Principle) 
6. I clearly and distinctly perceive necessary existence to be one among 
God’s perfections.  (Assumption) 
7. Necessary existence is one of God’s perfections. (5, 6) 
8. Therefore, God necessarily exists. 
 
 There are undoubtedly other ways to give the form of this argument – some 
presentations focus on the essence-existence or attribute-concept distinctions in 
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Descartes’ argument, whereas others might forego the role of clear and distinct 
perceptions in coming to know that necessary existence is a perfection.  Since this work 
is not primarily about historical scholarship, and since the argument given above does 
not unduly distort or damage Descartes’ own ontological argument, we can be 
comfortable in proceeding. 
 Like Anselm’s, Descartes version of the ontological argument flows directly and 
smoothly to its conclusion.  Premise 1 is just the definition of God as the supremely 
perfect being, not dissimilar to Anselm’s own phrase “the being than which none 
greater can be conceived.”  This sets the stage for the remaining arguments.  Premise 2 
seems to be an implication of 1, that a being supremely perfect would not lack any 
perfection in any way (on the pain of it not then being supremely perfect).  Premise 3 
just substitutes the proper name “God” for the phrase “a supremely perfect being” and 
rephrases “must have all possible perfections” to “cannot lack any perfection.”  Premise 
4 states that necessary existence is a perfection.  Descartes grounds this by referring to 
clear and distinct perceptions, but he also spends a significant amount of time in the 
Meditations developing what is very similar to the convertibility thesis of being and 
goodness in order to further support this point.  If this argument is correct, God 
necessarily exists.   
Section VI. Plantinga's Argument 
 I will present the argument that Plantinga gives in The Nature of Necessity 
(Plantinga 1974).  I will add two implications I take his argument to have, but that do 
not appear in the original form.  I will use these terms just as Plantinga does; for 
example, “W*” denotes some possible world, and “E*” denotes some essence.    
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1. The property has maximal greatness entails the property has maximal 
 excellence in every possible world. 
2. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral 
perfection. 
  3. Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified. 
4. There is a world W* and an essence E* such that E* is exemplified in 
W* and E* entails has maximal greatness in W*. 
5. For any object x, if x exemplifies E*, then x exemplifies the property 
has maximal excellence in every possible world  
6. E* entails the property has maximal excellence in every possible 
world.  
  7. If W* had been actual, it would have been impossible that E* fail to be 
  exemplified.  
8. What is impossible and what is necessary do not vary from world to 
world. 
  9. There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every world. 
  10. So God exists.        (Plantinga 1974, 214 – 215) 
 
 Premise 1, 2, and 3 give us the initial conditions of the argument.  1 and 2 are 
simply definitions Plantinga gives of the relevant terms “maximal greatness” and 
“maximal excellence.”  3 is just the possibility premise.  It merely states that it is 
possible that maximal greatness is exemplified or instantiated.  Premise 4 is an 
implication of Plantinga's view about the exemplification of properties; for some 
property P to be possibly exemplified, is just for there to be an essence E in a world W 
where essence E entails has P in W.  So 4 is just a more precise statement of 3.  In 
premise 5, Plantinga suggests that if W* had been the actual world, then 5 would be 
necessarily true.  However, what is necessary does not change from world to world, and 
5 is necessary.  If 5 is necessary, then we can restate what essence E* entails in 6.  
According to Plantinga's view of how properties are exemplified, for a being to possess 
a property in a world W requires that it exist in world W.   If E* entails “has maximal 
excellence in every possible world,” then it must also entail “exists in every possible 
world.”  But if E* is exemplified in W*, then it must be exemplified by some entity or 
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other in W* and in all other worlds.  All of this implies 7.   Again, since what is 
necessary or impossible do not change from world to world, from premise 8, we find 
that it is impossible that E* fail to be exemplified in any world.  But if that is right, we 
get 9.  Of course, an implication of 9 is that there exists a maximally excellent being in 
our world, the actual world.  So, God exists.   
Section VII. Gödel's Argument 
 I will follow Graham Oppy's presentation of the argument (in Oppy 1995).  I 
will also follow Oppy in taking Anderson's emendations to Gödel's argument as the best 
way to present it (in Anderson 1990).  Sobel has shown that Gödel's initial formulation 
of the argument implies modal collapse – that is, every truth becomes a necessary truth, 
and all existent objects become necessarily existent (in Sobel 1987 and Sobel 2003).  
With Anderson's slight alterations in the formulations of the definitions of “essence,” 
“God-likeness” and Axiom 1, we get the following argument that does not imply modal 
collapse. 
Definition 1.  x is God-like iff x has as essential properties those and 
only those properties which are positive. 
Definition 2.  A is an essence of x iff for every property B, x has B 
necessarily iff A entails B.   
Definition 3.  x necessarily exists iff every essence of x is necessarily 
exemplified. 
   
  Axiom 1.  If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive. 
Axiom 2.  Any property entailed (= strictly implied by) by a positive 
property is positive. 
  Axiom 3.  The property of being God-like is positive. 
  Axiom 4.  If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive. 
  Axiom 5.  Necessary existence is positive. 
 
Theorem 1.  If a property is positive, then it is consistent (=possibly 
exemplified). 
  Corollary 1.  The property of being God-like is consistent. 
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Theorem 2.  If something is God-like, then the property of being God-
like is an essence of that thing. 
Theorem 3.  Necessarily, the property of being God-like is exemplified. 
(Oppy 2016) 
 
 While it is beyond the scope of this project to attempt to fully explicate or justify 
Gödel's axioms, I will make some effort to explain what I take to be going on at each 
point, to aid the reader in understanding this version of the proof.  I take more time with 
this proof than most of the others since I think it is the least clear and the most in need 
of unpacking. 
 Definition 1 is Gödel's definition of what it is to be God-like.  If something is to 
be God-like, then Definition 1 tells us that that entity must essentially exemplify all and 
only those properties judged to be positive in the appropriate sense.  Definition 2 is just 
the Anderson-altered, Gödelian view of essences and their relationship to different 
kinds of properties.  If there are properties that are accidental as well as essential, then 
an acceptable account of essence will give us this difference.  Definition 2 states that 
something is an essence for some entity, if and only if, for every property, the entity 
necessarily exemplifies that property if and only if the essence entails that property.  
Definition 3 is an account of necessary existence; what it means for something to exist 
necessarily is just for every essence of that thing to be exemplified.  Gӧdel’s definition 
of necessary existence here is stronger than the normal conception of necessary 
existence, in part because his concept of an essence is different than in other cases.  An 
essence, on Gӧdel’s view, is some property that entails or necessitates each of the actual 
properties of the object (Koons 2005, Look 2006).  Any object that existed necessarily 
would have all and only its essential properties necessarily, and none of them 
contingently.  However, we usually think that there is a distinction between the 
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accidental properties of an object and the essential properties of an object.  This is not 
true for Gӧdel’s concept of an essence, and so his version of necessary existence is also 
stronger, as it requires that for the essence of an object to necessarily exist will mean 
that the object has all and only necessary properties – none of its properties could be 
contingent.   
 Axiom 1 states a certain view of the relationships between positive properties, 
and their negations.   Gödel states in his notes that a positive property can be positive in 
either the “moral-aesthetic sense” or in a sense of “pure attribution.”  Is this true?  Let 
us take omniscience as a test case.  If omniscience is a positive property, then Axiom 1 
tells us that its negation is not positive, again in the “moral-aesthetic sense” or “pure 
attribution” sense.  Is this true?  A lack of omniscience would not be positive in either 
of these senses.  Thus, the property of “not being omniscient” or “lacking omniscience” 
is not itself a positive property.  But since this is what Axiom 1 says, it is not a 
surprising result.  This is perhaps the strangest part of the argument as a whole.  Since 
there is so little to go off of in interpreting this argument, it is hard to know what counts 
as a positive property for Gӧdel, and exactly why he thought the two senses (moral-
aesthetic and pure attribution) were connected.  It is also difficult to know how to 
interpret “moral-aesthetic” and “pure attribution” as Gӧdel’s notes give no additional 
information to work with.  The “moral-aesthetic” seems to be the one most of us are 
familiar with when we talk about goodness in terms of the character of persons or 
objects of art.  The sense of “pure attribution” sounds similar to an account where 
positivity is some substantive, existence quality, and a negative property is not itself a 
separate and opposite quality but the absence of some positive property.  This is a vague 
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and preliminary sketch, but Gӧdel’s notes tell us little.  I will treat Gӧdel as if he is 
carrying on a project in the spirit of Leibniz, and so we can see positive properties as 
analogous to perfections in Leibniz.  Several commentators have taken Gӧdel to be 
carrying on a project in the style of Leibniz, so this interpretation is standard (Koons 
2005, Look 2006, and Sobel 2003). 
 Axiom 2 states that any property entailed by a positive property is itself positive.  
Axiom 3 simply states that the property of being God-like is a positive property.  
Surely, this is unobjectionable even to the most strident atheist.  Axiom 4 is an assertion 
about the modal status of positivity in properties.  If a property is positive, this is not the 
case contingently; it won't turn out that a property is positive, but might not have been 
so, or that a property could be positive in one possible world and not in another.  If one 
is a robust realist about morality, then this axiom seems fairly intuitive.  If one were to 
hold a different view about morality, then this axiom may be less convincing.  Anderson 
also points out that what the proof really requires is the necessitation of this axiom.  
That is, “that a property is positive entails that it is necessarily positive.”  He also notes, 
though, that “probably no one who accepts the axioms will shrink from asserting all 
their necessitations,” (Anderson 1990, footnote 4). 
 Axiom 5 is, in at least some way, one part of the argument opponents will reject.  
It states that necessary existence is a positive property.  From Definition 1, we know 
that for something to be God-like, it must essentially exemplify all and only positive 
properties.  If necessary existence is a positive property, then God will turn out to be (at 
the end point of the argument) necessarily existent.  Which will mean that God exists, 
or better, that something that is God-like exists.   
17 
 
 Theorem 1 is generated by Axioms 1 and 2.  Suppose some property P is 
positive.  If it is positive, then it entails the property of self-identity (since every 
property entails self-identity).  Then the property of self-identity is positive, by Axiom 
2. If that is so, then the negation of self-identity, self-difference, is not positive by 
Axiom 1.  But if P were inconsistent, it would entail the property of self-difference, 
since in classical logic an inconsistent property entails any property.  But this is 
impossible, from Axiom 2.  So every positive property is consistent.  Theorem 1 
combined with Axiom 3 gives us Corollary 1 – the property of being God-like is 
consistent.  This provides a unique way of resolving the issue over what I take is the 
major premise of any ontological argument – whether or not the concept of God is a 
consistent, coherent concept.   
 Theorem 2 is generated by Definitions 1 and 2, and Axioms and 4.  Suppose x is 
God-like, and necessarily has property P.  Property P must be positive, from Definition 
1.  If P is positive, then necessarily anything that is God-like will have that property, 
from Definition 1.  From Axiom 4, we know that P is necessarily positive.  If this is 
true, then the property of God-likeness essentially includes P.  We can now substitute 
property P and God-likeness for the general placeholders in Definition 2.  So, we get 
Theorem 2 — if something is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an 
essence of that thing.  Theorem 3 is proven by Definitions 1 and 3, Axiom 5, Corollary 
1, and Theorem 2.  Some x is a God-like being, then it will have every positive 
property, from Definition 1.  From Axiom 5, necessary existence is positive, so from 
Definition 1 and Axiom 5, necessary existence will be a positive property a God-like 
being has.  Definition 3 states that x necessarily exists only if every essence of x is 
18 
 
necessarily exemplified.  Theorem 2 states that for any God-like being, God-likeness is 
an essence of that being.  So God-likeness is necessarily exemplified, from Definition 3 
and Theorem 2.  If it is possible that something is God-like, then it is possible that 
something is necessarily God-like.  But Corollary 1 shows us that it is possible that 
something is God-like.  So Theorem 3 is shown to be true.  Something God-like 
necessarily exists. 
Section VIII. Malcolm’s Argument 
 Norman Malcolm’s contribution to the recent literature on the ontological 
argument came in two forms.  First, he was interested in showing that the actual 
arguments of Anselm were more complex and nuanced than most philosophers had 
taken them to be.  Second, in “Anselm’s Ontological Arguments” he sees himself as 
“trying to expand the argument of Proslogion III,” (Malcolm 1960, pp. 48).  This 
suggests that in addition to historical scholarship, he is proposing his own formulation 
of an ontological argument.    
1. God is defined as the greatest of all beings.  (Definition) 
2. The greatest of all beings must be unlimited – were it limited, it 
would not be the greatest of all beings.  (Definition of greatest and 
unlimited) 
3. An unlimited being could not depend on anything for its continued 
existence or its coming into existence – if it did so, it would be 
limited. (Definition of limited vs. unlimited) 
4. Either God’s existence is necessary or God is necessarily impossible.  
(Implication of 1, 3) 
5. There is no reason to think that the concept of God is internally 
contradictory or otherwise necessarily impossible.  (Assumption) 
6. The concept of God is possible.  (From 5) 
7. God necessarily exists.  (from 4, 5, 6) 
 
 Implicit in premise 1 through 3 is an idea about the relationship between 
necessary existence and greatness.  He gives an example of two sets of dishes, one 
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being fragile and the other being necessarily existent is supposed to generate a value 
judgment in the reader of one set of dishes being greater than the other (Malcolm 1960, 
pp. 47).  We would make the same judgment about God – anything that plays that role 
could not be dependent and thus inferior, or it would not be the greatest of all beings.  
Malcolm also draws on God’s being unlimited in order to support the idea of a 
necessary connection between the concept of God and necessary existence.  For 
something to exist contingently suggests, according to Malcolm, some limitedness in 
the entity or object.     
 Malcolm draws on this insight to argue that whatever the fact of the matter about 
God’s existence, the very nature of the being would not allow a contingent mode of 
existence (an argument previously developed by Hartshorne).  God could not depend on 
something else for His continued existence or its end, nor could God’s existing in the 
first place be a contingent matter.  On Malcolm’s view, it is all or nothing – either the 
concept of God is possible and God necessarily exists, or the concept of God fails to 
exist in every world due to its logically contradictory nature.  Since no one has 
successfully demonstrated that the concept of God is internally logically contradictory, 
we are well within our epistemic rights to assert God’s possibility.  Therefore, God 
exists.   
Section IX. Maydole’s Argument 
 Maydole’s argument draws on considerations familiar to (and previously 
explored by) Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz, and Gӧdel.  His argument in its simplest form 
proceeds as follows. 
1. A property is a perfection only if its negation is not a perfection. 
2. Perfections entail only perfections.   
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3. Supremity is a perfection.   
4. A supreme being is a being that it is impossible for there to be 
something greater than and impossible for there to be something else 
than which it is not greater.   
5. It is possible that a supreme being exists. 
6. There exists a being who is possibly supreme. 
7. Therefore, a supreme being (God) exists. 
 
 This is a simplification, as in different works Maydole proves the argument to be 
valid in 32 steps (Maydole 2003) and 16 steps (Maydole 2009).  It is similar to both 
Descartes and Anselm’s arguments because the notion of perfection plays a significant 
role.  It is similar to both Gӧdel and Leibniz’s arguments because it attempts to 
demonstrate that the concept of God (in this case, a supreme being) is possible in 
addition to demonstrating God’s existence.   
 Maydole’s argument is not that much different from other modal ontological 
arguments, though the formal logical statement of his argument is much more rigorous 
than that given by many others.  There is a move from it being possible that a supreme 
being exists to a supreme being existing, and the rest of the argument is in service to 
showing that a supreme being is possible.   
 There is one other difference worth mentioning.  Maydole’s argument does not 
set out to prove that God necessarily exists, just that God exists.  This is different than 
most modal ontological arguments since most modal ontological arguments aim for 
God’s necessary existence – indeed, that is one of the defining features of the class of 
modal ontological arguments.   
Section X. Leibniz’s Argument 
 The most straightforward version of the ontological argument given by Leibniz 
is in “Two Notations for Discussion with Spinoza,” (Leibniz 1970).  As with all of our 
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other authors, there are a number of interpretations of exactly how to formulate and 
analyze the arguments given, and many look to a number of other works in Leibniz to 
get a full grasp of the ontological argument.  For the purposes of this chapter, we will 
examine primarily the argument found in the Two Notations.  The argument proceeds as 
follows. 
1. A perfection is a simple quality that is positive and absolute. 
2. God is defined as a being possessing all perfections.   
3. Existence is a perfection.   
4. All perfections are compossible (they can all be possessed at the 
same time).   
5. God is possible.   
6. If the concept of God is possible, then it exists (since the concept 
contains the perfection of existence).   
7. Therefore, God exists. 
 
  If a perfection is simple, then it cannot be demonstrated to be incompatible with 
another perfection, since any demonstration will require analysis of the perfection and a 
simple is, by definition, unanalyzable.  If that is true, then all perfections are 
compossible.  That is merely another way of saying that God is possible.  Since 
existence is a perfection, then as long as the concept of God is possible, then God will 
exist.  So God exists.   
 Leibniz also gives a version of the argument focusing on necessary existence 
instead of simply existence.  After demonstrating that all perfections are compossible 
and that existence is a perfection, Leibniz attempts to ensure that the kind of existence is 
necessary existence.  He does this by attempting to show that what we mean for a being 
to necessarily exist is just for existence to belong to the essence of a being.  “Again, a 
necessary being is the same as a being from whose essence existence follows. For a 
necessary being is one which necessarily exists, such that for it not to exist would imply 
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a contradiction, and so would conflict with the concept or essence of this being.” 
(Leibniz 1992).   
Section XI. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have forecast each later chapter of the dissertation and 
explained the structure of the dissertation as a whole.  I have examined a number of 
important versions of the ontological argument, both historical and contemporary.  Each 
of these arguments is committed to what I will call a Linkage Premise, which is a 
premise that there is some tight connection between goodness, or greatness, or 
perfection, and existence (either existence in general or necessary existence).   My 
central argument is that any ontological argument that requires a Linkage Premise is 
committed, either explicitly or implicitly, to the convertibility thesis of being and 
goodness.  In order to evaluate this claim, we will need to examine the convertibility 
thesis of being and goodness in some detail, which occurs in chapter 4.  However, we 
will also need to evaluate whether or not these arguments require any particular account 
of existence in their Linkage Premise, as Kant and others have argued.  This issue is 
taken up in the next chapter.    
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Chapter 2: Senses of Existence 
Section I. Introduction  
A major concern for any philosopher engaging with the ontological argument 
for the first time is the nature of existence.  How do we understand phrases such as 
“existence is a perfection,” “existence is a property” or their denials?  What does it 
mean to say that God necessarily exists?  How does this relate to other fundamental 
distinctions in philosophy, such as that between accidental and essential properties, or 
between substances and attributes?  This chapter will not attempt to answer all of those 
questions.  In this chapter, I will begin by discussing the Kantian line of critique that the 
ontological argument commits a mistake by supposing that existence is a predicate or 
property.  I will examine a very common, contemporary view of existence, most 
appropriately traced back to the works of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell in support 
of this critique.   Then, I will consider alternative accounts of existence that allow for 
existence, in some way, to apply to individuals and objects, as found in the works of 
Terence Parsons and Peter Geach.   After this, I will discuss Norman Malcom’s 
contribution that “existence” and “necessary existence” differ in their ontological 
import, and thus modal versions of the ontological argument need not worry about this 
traditionally Kantian line of resistance.  This chapter is important as it ends with two 
important considerations.  First, that on some of these alternative views of existence, it 
is not incorrect to say that existence can be a property of an object – so the critique that 
existence is not a property or at least not a property of objects full stop (the Kantian 
critique) is no longer a viable objection to the ontological argument.  Second, that even 
if existence itself is not a predicate, this does not harm the ontological argument, 
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whether because of some significant difference between necessary and contingent 
existence, or because of alternative modal formulations of the argument that do not 
require that existence be a property of objects.  The upshot is that in any case, 
ontological arguments can proceed without requiring one to adopt a specific position on 
the intricate, abstract, and opaque debate regarding the nature of existence.   
Section II. Existence Is Not a (First-Order) Predicate or Property 
 In order to see how the Kantian critique is supposed to apply to the ontological 
argument, it is important to explicate what is meant by the sentence “existence is not a 
predicate.”  Although this is the most popular way to word the critique, it is imprecise.  
The critique is best understood as “existence is not a first-order/first-level/real predicate 
or property.”  What this means takes on slightly different characters in different writers, 
but all agree with something like the following.  The notion of existence is captured by 
the existential quantifier in propositional logic.  Because of this (or by giving a certain 
gloss of this), existence is not a property of individual objects and cannot be applied, as 
a predicate, to individual objects.  To think of or consider a concept is to already 
consider it as if it were existing – we determine which things exist by restricting or 
expanding the scope of our domain of discourse.   
To understand the import of this conception of existence in the contemporary 
philosophical world, I examine Frege and Russell‘s contributions to this discussion.  
Since Frege’s view of existence is carried on in a slightly different way by Russell, the 
views on existence I will discuss in this section are broadly Fregean, although there are 
some slight differences in the two views.  I also point out that since the heavy lifting is 
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done by Frege’s initial formulation of this thesis, I will spend less time explicating 
Russell’s views. 
II.A Frege  
 Frege’s account of existence can be best understood by examining Frege’s 
understanding of concepts as related to objects and to other concepts.  In an atomic 
sentence, such as “God is omnipotent” we have a subject, “God,” and the first-order 
concept “omnipotent,” which tells us about or applies to the subject, the individual 
object “God.”  So far, this view has similarities with other traditional accounts of the 
relationships between subjects and predicates or entities and their attributes.  For Frege, 
“omnipotence” does not itself entail some object or existent entity within the world, but 
describes some other thing, the subject to which it applies.  So far, then, we have 
individual objects, and first-order concepts that can be rightfully said to apply to or 
describe or tell us about those objects.1   
 In addition to first-order concepts, we also have second-order concepts.  Second-
order concepts apply to first-order concepts.  Both the concept of existence and 
numerical concepts are second-order concepts according to Frege.  For example, when 
thinking of the number one, Frege has the following to say; 
If, for example, we collect under a single concept all concepts under 
which there falls only one object, then oneness is a component 
characteristic of this new concept.  Under it would fall, for example, the 
concept “moon of the Earth,” though not the actual heavenly body called 
by this name.  In this way, we can make one concept fall under another 
higher or, so to say, second-order concept.  This relationship, however, 
should not be confused with the subordination of species to genus. (Frege 
1960, p.65) 
                                                 
1 There is a wrinkle here.  Singular expressions name or refer to objects, but are not themselves objects.  
So “God” is a singular term, a naming term, that refers to or a picks out the individual object God.  Since 
this additional detail does not affect my representation of Frege’s view (or at least the point I am 




This can also be brought out by considering another of Frege’s remarks.  He writes  
Further confirmation of the view that number is assigned to concepts is to 
be found in idiom; just as in English we can speak of ‘three barrel,’ so in 
German we speak generally of ‘ten man,’ ‘four mark’ and so on.  The use 
of the singular here may indicate that the concept is intended, not the 
thing.  The advantage of this way of speaking is particularly noticeable in 
the case of the number 0.  Elsewhere, it must be admitted, our ordinary 
language does assign number not to concepts but to objects; we speak of 
‘the number of bales’ just as we do of ‘the weight of the bales.’  Thus on 
the face of it we are talking about objects, whereas really we are 
intending to assert something of a concept.  This usage is confusing.  
The construction in ‘four thoroughbred horses’ fosters the illusion 
that ‘four’ modifies the concept ‘thoroughbred horse’ in just the 
same way as ‘thoroughbred’ modifies the concept ‘horse.’  Whereas 
in fact only ‘thoroughbred’ is a characteristic used in this way; the 
word ‘four’ is used to assert something of a concept. (Frege 1960, p. 
64, emphasis mine) 
 
Although we can consider “thoroughbred” a first-level predicate that applies to the 
object “horse,” we cannot understand the numerical concept “four” to apply in the same 
way.  We may be tempted to think that numbers apply to individual objects, as do first-
order concepts, but in understanding the relationship between numbers and other 
concepts, we find that numbers actually apply to concepts and not to objects, and 
therefore that numbers are second-order concepts.   
 What do we mean when we talk about existence?  For Frege, interestingly 
enough, this question can be answered not only by considering the role of existence in 
relation to atomic and complex sentences, but also by considering the relationships 
between existence and the number one, and nonexistence and zero, or the number 
nought (this is Frege’s terminology).  Just as the concept of the number one is a second-
order concept under which we may organize or classify first-order concepts (or in 
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Frege’s language, under which first-order concepts fall), so too with existence and its 
relationship to other first-order concepts.  Frege writes  
…the proposition that there exists no rectangular equilateral rectilinear 
triangle does state a property of the concept ‘rectangular equilateral 
rectilinear triangle’; it assigns to it the number nought.  In this respect 
existence is analogous to number.  Affirmation of existence is in fact 
nothing but the denial of the number nought.  Because existence is a 
property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God 
breaks down. (Frege 1960, p. 65)   
 
Since existence is a property of concepts, a second-order concept, then it cannot be 
applied to individual objects, in the same way that numerical concepts cannot apply to 
individual objects.   
 In summary, Frege understands existence to be a second-order concept, and thus 
is plainly inapplicable when predicated of an individual object, whether that individual 
object is Rob Byer, the computer in front of me, or God.2  The concept existence says of 
the first-order concept it is applied to that there is at least one object that is a member of 
that concept set or class; another way to put it (perhaps unhelpfully) is that at there is at 
least one instantiation of the first-order concept.  Again, then, existence applies to first-
order concepts, and not individual objects.  It is nonsense on Frege’s view to say that an 
individual object does or does not exist.   
Hence, what is here asserted about a concept can never be asserted about 
an object...  I do not want to say it is false to assert about an object what 
is asserted here about a concept; I want to say it is impossible, senseless, 
to do so.  The sentence ‘there is Julius Caesar’ is neither true nor false 
but senseless… (Frege 1980a, p. 175) 
 
II.B Russell 
                                                 
2 Frege explicitly explains that he takes this distinction to illuminate a fallacy committed by the 
ontological argument in Frege 1960 and Frege 1980b.   
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 Initially, Russell does seem to countenance two senses of existence; one that is 
used in philosophical questions and in everyday life, and the other that is used by 
logicians in the form of the existential quantifier (Russell 1905, 398).  During later 
formulations of his views, though, Russell uses the logician’s sense of existence to the 
exclusion of the everyday conception.   
 Russell’s view is really a development of Frege’s view, and as such shares the 
same basic positions on the question of existence.  He phrases things differently; 
existence is a matter of whether or not a propositional function can be said to be true.  
“When you take any propositional function and assert of it that it is possible, that it is 
sometimes true, that gives you the meaning of existence.  You may express it by saying 
that there is at least one value of x for which that propositional function is true,” 
(Russell 2010, 195).  For Russell, then, existence is to be understood by fleshing out 
some account of modal and logical terms.  If what it means for something to exist is that 
for the propositional function being considered, there is some assignment of values that 
makes the statement true.  For example, he writes, “One may call a propositional 
function necessary, when it is always true; possible when it is sometimes true; 
impossible when it is never true,” (Russell 2010, 193 and 195).  We’ve already seen 
from the earlier statement that the matter of existence is about the truth value of a 
propositional function when considering all, or some variables.  He states it most clearly 
by saying “Existence is essentially a property of a propositional function.  It means that 
the propositional function is true in at least one instance,” (Russell 2010, 195).   
 Now that we have sketched Russell’s account of existence, we can ask how, if at 
all, he differs from Frege in determining what kinds of entities the concept “existence” 
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applies to.  In short, we find that he adopts the exact same position as Frege; existence 
can be said of a class of things, or of a set of things, but never of individual things.  He 
expresses this similarity best in the following passage, which I quote at length. 
Therefore when you say ‘Unicorns exist,’ you are not saying anything 
about any individual things and the same applies when you say ‘Men 
exist.’  If you say that ‘Men exist, and Socrates is a man, therefore 
Socrates exists,’ this is exactly the same sort of fallacy as it would be if 
you said ‘Men are numerous, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is 
numerous’ because existence is a predicate of a propositional function, or 
derivatively of a class.  When you say of a propositional function that it 
is numerous, you will mean that there are several values of x that will 
satisfy it… If x, y, and z all satisfy a propositional function, you may say 
that that proposition is numerous, but x, y, and z severally are not 
numerous.  Exactly the same applies to existence, that is to say that the 
actual things that there are in the world do not exist, or, at least, that is 
putting it too strongly because that is utter nonsense.  To say that they do 
not exist is strictly nonsense, but to say that they do exist is also strictly 
nonsense.  It is of propositional functions that you can assert or deny 
existence… If I say ‘The things that there are in the world exist’ that is a 
perfectly correct statement, because I am there saying something about a 
certain class of things; I say it in the same sense in which I say ‘Men 
exist.’  But I must not go on to ‘This is a thing in the world, and therefore 
this exists.’  It is there the fallacy comes in, and it is simply, as you see, a 
fallacy of transferring to the individual that satisfies a propositional 
function a predicate which only applies to a propositional function. 
(Russell 2010, 196-197)    
 
Russell’s main point in the passage quoted above is exactly the same as Frege’s point in 
both Frege 1960 and Frege 1980a regarding applying the concept of existence to 
individuals; it is simply an incorrect usage of the predicate “existence.” 
 For Russell then, as for Frege, the slogan “existence is not a predicate” amounts 
to the idea that existence is only applicable to classes of things, or propositional 
functions.  Applying the concept to individual objects or entities is to misunderstand the 
notion of existence.  It is just as much nonsense on Russell’s view to say “Alvin 
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Plantinga exists” as it is to ponder the question of whether or not God exists.  Existence 
is simply not a concept or a property that can apply to individual things. 
II.C Commonalities 
 When I refer to common, contemporary views of existence related to Frege and 
Russell, I do not mean that every contemporary metaphysician accepts Frege’s view 
about concepts and objects exactly, or Russell’s view about definite descriptions and 
paraphrases, I only mean that, whatever else is required when discussing existence and 
what it means, I believe that many contemporary accounts of existence follow this form.  
In particular and with respect to the central concern of the dissertation (the ontological 
argument), I believe that this exact style of reasoning is used when philosophers give 
arguments against using existence as a predicate or property of God in the ontological 
argument.   
On both views, a) existence is something that can only be predicated of either 
first-order concepts or propositional functions or classes of things, and cannot apply to 
individual objects or entities, and b) existence is univocal, including any supposed 
distinction between “being” and “existence.”  If we understand by “God” an individual 
object, with its own identity conditions and thus distinct from other objects or from the 
world as a whole, then it is a mistake to talk of predicating “existence” of God in just 
the same way as it would be a mistake to talk of predicating “numerous” or “one” of 
God.  In other words, the ontological argument rests upon a category mistake.  Of 
course, on the views given above, any ordinary talk about an object’s existing will be 
equally meaningless and equally rest on a category mistake, which means that this is not 
a problem unique to God.  This kind of view would really rule out all ordinary 
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assertions about the existence of objects (or at least require them to be suitably 
rephrased).   
The other commonality that this view shares with other common contemporary 
views of existence is that existence is univocal, that there is no distinction between 
“being” and “existence” or different senses of the word “exists.”3  Even in cases of 
other disagreements, such as whether or not existence can apply to objects (van 
Inwagen for example thinks that it can), these views all deny a distinction between 
either “being” and “existence” or different senses of the word “exists.”  This is 
important because the alternative accounts offered below do treat existence as if it can 
have different meanings, and it is an open question whether or not we should treat 
existence and being as if they are simply synonyms from some other carry-over of 
language or if they express different, if related, notions.   This would give us a second 
direct conflict between the accounts listed above and those listed below.   
Section III. Existence Is a (First-Order) Predicate/Property   
 The strategy in this section of the chapter is to outline two different theories of 
existence that either allow for existence to be used as a first-order predicate and to be 
applied to individuals, or allow existence to be used differently than in the Fregean 
tradition.  Outlining these systems responds to the two major commonalities discussed 
above; that existence cannot be applied to individual objects or entities, including God, 
and that the concept of existence is univocal.  Proponents of the systems given above 
(including contemporary philosophers) have often taken it to be the case that the 
ontological argument fails because it utilizes an incorrect notion of existence; 
philosophers of religion and theologians who promote the ontological argument are just 
                                                 
3 This is true of Quine 1948 and van Inwagen 2014.   
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confused about how the term “existence” works.  If either of the systems given below is 
an accurate account of existence, then critics of the ontological arguments need to 
rethink the Kantian line of critique.  I will first examine Parson’s account of existence, 
and then Geach’s.  Finally, at the end of this section I examine the remarks of Norman 
Malcolm in “Anselm’s Ontological Arguments” about necessary existence as opposed 
to mere existence.  The upshot here is twofold: either a system that allows “existence” 
to be used as a first-order predicate, or to apply to individual objects, or a suitable 
distinction between the applicability of the concepts of “existence” and “necessary 
existence” can allow a successful ontological argument. 
III.A Parsons    
 In Nonexistent Objects (Parsons 1980), Terence Parsons argues for and develops 
a Meinongian theory of objects that allows us to talk about and discuss nonexistent 
objects and fictional objects without falling into the trap of the negative existential 
proposition, and that preserves some straightforward ways of talking about these 
objects.  Parson distinguishes between what is meant by existential quantification and 
what is meant by saying that something exists.    Strictly speaking, then, Parson’s does 
not distinguish two different uses of the term “exists” as does Geach, but rather 
differentiates statements of the form “There is a table” (the quantification statement) 
and statements of the form “A table exists,” (the existence as a property statement).  
Parsons framework allows us to separate the existential quantifier from the notion of 
existence, and elements of his view support the idea that existence, in some important 
sense, can apply to individual objects.   
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 As with Frege, and Russell, it is beyond the scope of this paper to do a full and 
thorough analysis of the whole of Parsons’ system.  Luckily we need not dig into 
Parsons detailed treatments of fictional and mythical objects, or the application of his 
theory to monads in order to bring out the features of the theory that repudiate the 
Fregean views given above.  For our purposes, it will be enough to discuss the 
distinction between nuclear and extranuclear predicates and corresponding nuclear and 
extranuclear properties, the distinction between “being existent” and “existing” (or 
between statements of the form “There is a table” and statements of the form “A table 
exists”), and Parsons’ remarks on the applicability of his system to the ontological 
argument.   
 First, we must distinguish nuclear and extranuclear predicates, and the easiest 
way to proceed is to give examples and then analyze them.  Nuclear predicates are those 
predicates we normally think of as specifying a property that applies to individual 
objects in an appropriate way.  For example Parsons lists the following as examples of 
nuclear predicates: “is blue,” “is tall,” “kicked Socrates,” “was kicked by Socrates,” 
“kicked somebody,” “is golden,” and “is a mountain,” (Parsons 1980, 23).  These are all 
predicates that represent a set of properties had by some objects.  Extranuclear 
predicates, on the other hand, do not apply to individual objects.  Extranuclear 
predicates fulfill one or another function in Parsons’ system and in ordinary discourse, 
depending upon the extranuclear predicate.4   Examples of extranuclear predicates 
                                                 
4 Concerning whether or not there are such things as extranuclear properties, Parsons writes “I think it is 
not very important whether you say that extranuclear predicates stand for a special sort of property—
extranuclear properties—or whether you say that they do not stand for any properties at all.  In the theory 
I sketch, I will assume that there are extranuclear properties; this allows me a freedom of exposition I 
would not otherwise have.” Parsons 1980, 26.  I will assume, along with Parsons, that there are such 
things as extranuclear properties. 
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include the following categories and corresponding examples: the ontological predicates 
such as “exists,” “is mythical,” “is fictional,” the modal predicates such as “is possible,” 
“is impossible,” the intentional predicates such as “is thought about by Meinong,” “is 
worshipped by someone,” and the technical predicates such as “is complete,” “is 
incomplete,” “is logically closed,” (Parsons 1980, 23).5  Parsons is less than clear about 
what exactly nuclear predicates and extranuclear predicates are, but he does discuss a 
decision procedure by which we distinguish nuclear and extranuclear predicates and 
how this distinction relates to the Fregean views discussed above.  Concerning the 
distinction between nuclear and extranuclear predicates, he writes 
Our historical situation yields a very rough kind of decision procedure for 
telling whether a predicate is nuclear or extranuclear.  It is this: if 
everyone agrees that the predicate stands for an ordinary property of 
individuals, then it is a nuclear predicate and stands for a nuclear 
property.  On the other hand, if everyone agrees that it doesn’t stand for 
an ordinary property of individuals (for whatever reason), or if there is a 
history of controversy about whether it stands for a property of 
individuals, then it is an extranuclear predicate and it does not stand for a 
nuclear property. (Parsons 1980, 24) 
 
Concerning the relationship of the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear 
predicates and Fregean views, he writes 
I’d like to emphasize that this division of predicates into nuclear and 
extranuclear is not peculiar to Meinong at all; it’s an old and familiar 
one.  People such as Frege and Russell distinguish predicates that stand 
for properties of individuals from those that don’t.  The extranuclear 
predicates listed above are mostly ones that Frege and Russell have been 
telling us all along do not stand for properties of individuals. (Parsons 
1980, 23-24) 
 
 So far, this view does not immediately lend itself to a different view of existence 
than those espoused by Frege and Russell, especially as Parsons classifies “existence” 
                                                 
5 The last two examples of technical predicates are my addition, but allow us to flesh out the category of 
technical predicates further. 
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as an extranuclear predicate and states that extranuclear predicates do not stand for 
properties that can be applied to individual objects.  In order to see if this system allows 
for even the possibility of an ontological argument, we must examine Parsons’ 
discussion of “being existent” as opposed to “existing” or put another way, the 
difference between “is” and “exists.”   
 In considering Russell’s criticisms of Meinong, Parsons considers whether there 
is any difference between “being existent” and “existing.”  For example, if we have the 
concept of “the existent golden mountain,” does this mean the golden mountain exists?  
According to Parsons, the answer to this question is a simple “No.”  The golden 
mountain “is existent” but does not “exist.”  If this is the case, though, it seems that the 
predicate “being existent” can apply to individual objects, and if this is correct, it is a 
nuclear predicate and stands for a nuclear property, unlike “exists,” (Parsons 1980, 42).  
The important question that arises at this point is “what is the relationship between 
‘being existent’ and ‘exists’?”  Parsons argues that at least some extranuclear properties 
have watered-down nuclear versions (Parsons 1980, 44).  “Being existent” is the 
watered down nuclear version of the extranuclear property “exists,” (Parsons 1980, 43-
44).  If the foregoing is correct, then “being existent” can apply to individuals, and thus 
to God.  Is this helpful?  It depends on what it is we are talking about when we talk 
about “being existent.”  Parsons writes  
Given that there are nuclear properties true of all existing objects, are any 
of them denoted by ‘being existent’?... since the controversy over 
whether existence is a property uses the word ‘existence,’ and since both 
sides of the dispute seem to have some claim to plausibility, it seems 
reasonable to hold that the reason the dispute goes on is that both sides 
are in some sense right.  And this would be explained if ‘exists’ or its 
cognates were ambiguous, standing for both a nuclear and an 
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extranuclear property, neither of which alone exhausts the way in which 
we use the word. (Parsons 1980, 43-44)  
 
If this is correct, then there is a sense of “existence” that stands for a nuclear property 
that can be said to hold of objects, in addition to the extranuclear or second-order sense 
of “existence” as discussed by Frege and Russell.   
 But what does this mean for the ontological argument?  Parsons allows that it is 
possible for God to exist in his system.  He writes “The present system is so rich in 
objects that one might suspect that God would be found among them.  That depends on 
what is meant by God… If ‘God’ means, say, ‘the existing deity of the Bible,’ then 
there may or may not be such an object, and the quoted definite description may or may 
not refer…” (Parsons 1980, 212).  He goes on to say that the argument will probably 
“rely on fallacious reasoning… The only support it receives from the theory of objects 
is the vindication of the coherence of reasoning about a thing without prejudice as to 
whether or not that thing exists,” (Parsons 1980, 215).  Though Parsons does not find 
the argument convincing, I think there is another way in which the theory of objects 
outlined by Parsons supports the possibility of an ontological argument.  In considering 
reasons to reject the argument, he discusses the Fregean criticism as follows.   
According to Frege, existence isn’t a property of individuals, but rather a 
property of concepts; existence is not properly represented in a language 
by a predicate but rather by a quantifier.  However, there certainly is a 
property of individuals represented by the complex predicate ‘being 
something such that there exists such a thing’, and the arguments 
can all be rephrased (though perhaps clumsily) in terms of this 
predicate. (Parsons 1980, 216, emphasis mine) 
 
Since there is a version of the predicate “existence” that is a nuclear predicate, and 
represents a nuclear property that can be applied to individuals, then it seems we can 
apply such a predicate to God.  It also seems that Parsons recognizes, in the bold section 
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of the above quote, that in his system there is a way to re-phrase the argument such that 
it is an open question of whether or not God exists (clumsy though he thinks it might 
be).  If the foregoing is true, then the Kantian inference is blocked. 
III.B Geach 
 I start this section by noting that although Geach does think that there are two 
senses of existence, one corresponding to the orthodox Fregean view given above, and 
another that can properly be said to be predicated of individuals, at times he does not 
think the latter sense is what is under consideration when we say “God exists,” (as in 
Geach 1955).  However, in other cases there is a sense of existence, suitably predicated 
of individuals, that does apply to God (as in Geach 1968).  I will try to explain these 
different views by explaining how Geach understands the different senses of existence 
in both “Form and Existence” (Geach 1955)6 and in “What Actually Exists” (Geach 
1968).   I will end by arguing that if Geach is correct, the Kantian inference is blocked.     
In Geach 1955, Geach denies that individual usage of the term (in C propositions 
as discussed in the next paragraph) can apply to God, and it is beyond the scope of this 
section to argue with Geach on this matter.  For this section, I am only concerned to 
show that against Frege and Russell, existence can be said to apply to individuals.  At 
least at the most basic, conceptual level, it seems straightforward to say that if existence 
can be properly said of individuals, and if God is an individual, then it is possible to 
predicate existence of God, and contra Geach, the ontological argument is not a 
“fallacy,” (Geach 1955, 268) 
                                                 
6 In this paper, Geach is giving an explanation of a view developed by Aquinas, but based on his 
discussion in it and in Geach 1968, I believe it is fair to treat this as Geach’s view as well.   
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In discussing different kinds of existential propositions, Geach uses negative 
existential propositions to bring out the difference in the kinds of existential 
propositions (Geach 1955, 262 – 264).  Geach says that of existential propositions, there 
are three kinds: A propositions, such as “Cerberus does not exist,” B propositions such 
as “Dragons do not exist,” and C propositions such as “Joseph is not (or Joseph does not 
exist),” (Geach 1955, 264).  Of the first kind of existential proposition, Geach says that 
“in A propositions, ‘exists’ or ‘is real’ is not a predicate, not even of the word 
‘Cerberus.”  In the subsequent discussion, Geach states that in A propositions, existence 
seems to be predicated of a named subject.  Uses of “existence” and the denial of it in A 
propositions always apply to singular, named individuals.  When we deny that 
something, like Cerberus exists in this sense, we are saying that the word fails to refer at 
all.  As Geach puts it,  
“To show the real force of the parent's reassuring "Cerberus does not 
exist", and how it is about the word "Cerberus", we cannot content 
ourselves with writing "(The word) 'Cerberus' does not exist", but must 
completely recast the sentence, say as follows: "When I said ' Cerberus ' 
in that story, I was only pretending to use it as a name" (Geach 1955, p. 
264) 
 
In B propositions, existence is meant only to say that a thing is predicated (of a 
class of objects).  In relation to B propositions, he writes “’an F exists’ is true if and 
only if ‘F’ is truly predicable of something or other… in predicating ‘God exists’ we are 
not predicating something of God, but predicating the term ‘God’ itself; ‘God exists’ 
means ‘something or other is God.’” (Geach 1955, p. 266).  It looks as if on Geach’s 
account, in both A and B existential propositions, existence is not a predicate that 
applies to individual objects, but something closer to a second-order concept in the 
Fregean sense.  It is important to note that Geach also says that when we speak of the 
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claim “God exists” we are using the B proposition, and not either of the two others 
(Geach 1955, p. 266).  This is why he believes the ontological argument to rest on a 
fallacy.  Since B propositions do not allow existence to be predicated of individuals, and 
if B propositions are how we are to understand the claim that “God exists” then it 
appears that we do not predicate existence of God when we claim that “God exists,” we 
are instead asserting something like “The unit-set God is not empty.”7  And if this is all 
we do when we argue that God exists in the ontological argument, we are in double-
trouble – the concept we seem to be applying to an object cannot do that job, and the 
true meaning of the phrase is to simply beg the question that the argument is purporting 
to answer.   
 In considering C propositions, Geach seems to understand existence as 
predicable of individuals.  “We have here a sense of ‘is’ or ‘exists’ that seems to me to 
be certainly a genuine predicate of individuals; the sense of ‘exist’ in which one says 
that an individual came to exist, still exists, no longer exists, etc.,” (Geach 1955, 266 – 
267)  On this view, C propositions do express ‘existence’ as being predicable of 
individual objects.  In this kind of proposition, “existence” always involves duration.  
The idea here is that in some cases of asserting that an entity exists we are locating it 
temporally.  The examples he gives are, as stated above, “Joseph is not and Simeon is 
not,” (Geach 1955, 266).  In this case, we are talking about an object’s either possessing 
some property (existence in C propositions) or lacking it.  However, this seems to relate 
to existence at a time or in time.  In discussing whether or not existence in C 
propositions could be uttered or denied of God, Geach suggests that  
                                                 
7 I thank Neal Judisch for this way of phrasing Geach’s statement. 
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Some people may not easily see the difference between "God exists” 
(sense B) and “God is” (sense C). But in the contradictories the 
difference is apparent. "God is not" (sense C) would have to be construed 
like "Joseph is not " ; it would then suitably express the supposition that 
perhaps the world was made by an old superannuated God who has since 
died (a suggestion of Hume's). This is quite different from the atheist's 
“there is no God” (sense B). One would indeed wish to say that 
everlasting existence is part of the concept of a God; of Hume's senile 
creator one would wish to say that since he is dead now he never was 
God when he was alive. But saying this does not commit us to the fallacy 
of the Ontological Argument. It belongs to the concept of a phoenix that 
it should never die by accident and should ward off old age with a bath 
of flames at regular intervals; so a dead phoenix is a contradiction in 
terms. But this does not mean that there must be a live phoenix. If there 
is a God, then he lives for ever; but we cannot determine from this 
whether there is a God. (Geach 1955, p. 268) 
  
What, exactly, is the sense of existence here?  There are at least two things 
going on: 1) that C-existence is about time and continued or continuing existence, and 
2) that this sense of existence comes very close to capturing the idea of being alive, and 
its denial of being dead.  Although this does not help the ontological argument by itself, 
as Geach suggests, it does serve to undermine the Kantian objection.  It looks like in 
this sense C, Geach defends a two-sense view of existence; we can predicate 
“existence” of individuals!8 
 When we talk about God’s existence, according to Geach 1955, we are using the 
B sense of existence.  Recall, the B sense of existence is whether or not some predicate 
can be appropriately applied at all.  To say, along with Geach, that it is true that “An F 
exists” is just to say “Something or other F’s,” (Geach 1955, p. 266).  If this is what we 
mean when we talk about God, it will be inapplicable as described above.  On the other 
hand, in “What Actually Exists” (Geach 1968) the matter becomes a bit more 
complicated.  Geach there distinguishes between the classical Fregean notion of 
                                                 
8 In this section, Geach explains that “God” is not supposed to be a logically proper name, but instead a 
“descriptive, predicable, term,” in Geach 1955, p. 266. 
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existence as a second-order concept, and existence as actuality.  He writes “Existence in 
the sense of actuality is several times over emphatically distinguished in Frege’s works 
from the existence expressed by ‘there is a so-and-so’… Actuality is attributable to 
individual objects; the existence expressed by ‘there is a—‘ is not,” (Geach 1968, 7).  
To clarify what is meant by actuality, Geach writes “x is actual if and only if x either 
acts, or undergoes change, or both; and here I count as ‘acting’ both the inner activities 
of mind, like thinking and planning, and the initiation of changes in things,” (Geach 
1968, 7).  If we think of this sense of existence in relation to the existence expressed by 
C propositions, we may have two forms of existence that can be applied to individuals: 
existence as a tensed predicate of their coming to be, or not existing, etc., and existence 
as actuality, where to predicate actual existence or actuality of a thing it is sufficient to 
hold that “x either acts, or undergoes change, or both.”  I do not know if Geach holds 
that these two senses of existence are distinct, but nothing he says indicates that he 
thinks of them this way.  However, Geach thinks that we can rightfully apply existence 
as actuality to God (Geach 1968, 15 – 16).  If this is true, then there is a sense of 
existence as a predicate that applies to individual objects, which can indeed apply to 
God.   
So, is there a sense of existence that applies to individual objects and that would 
thereby apply to God?  As noted above, in Geach 1968 the answer is yes.  For the 
purposes of this section, I have primarily concerned myself with showing that for 
Geach, existence can be properly predicated of individuals.  This is important since the 
major driving force behind the Kantian critique, and supported by the more recent views 
of existence of Frege and Russell, is that the ontological argument rests on a category 
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mistake about whether it is even possible for existence to be a property of an individual 
object.  Insofar as Geach’s answer is positive, this will remove the viability of this 
overarching criticism.   
Although I pushed back against this, our immediate prior section on Parsons 
ended with Parsons suggesting the ontological argument would get no or little help from 
his system; there, as with my remarks on Geach in this section, I am primarily focused 
on whether or not the resources of the system block the Kantian critique, and I believe 
that both Parsons’ and Geach’s systems offer the resources to do just that. 
III.C Malcolm 
 In defending the modal version of Anselm’s argument, Malcolm examines the 
familiar Fregean line of critique and some of its progeny.  Malcolm attempts to buttress 
the viability of the argument against these critiques by discussing the difference 
between “existence” and “necessary existence,” and how we think these terms apply.  
Whether or not we can predicate “existence” of God, Malcolm argues that that we can 
certainly predicate “necessary existence” of God.   
 What does it mean to say that “God necessarily exists?”  For Malcolm, it can be 
brought out by considering God’s unlimited nature.  Malcolm links our understanding 
of inferiority, dependence, and contingency and similarly examines the relationships 
between superiority, independence, and necessity (Malcolm 1960, 46 – 48).   
God is usually conceived of as an unlimited being. He is conceived of as 
a being who could not be limited, that is, as an absolutely unlimited 
being. This is no less than to conceive of Him as something a greater than 
which cannot be conceived. If God is conceived to be an absolutely 
unlimited being He must be conceived to be unlimited in regard to His 
existence as well as His operation. In this conception it will not make 
sense to say that He depends on anything for coming into or continuing 




I think this is the correct way to approach the question of whether or not we can 
predicate existence of God.  Malcolm rightly notes that some philosophers think it is 
nonsense to talk about necessary existence at all.  We may freely speak of necessary 
properties of other kinds, such as the necessary property of “being an unmarried male” 
when discussing the term “bachelor” or that “a triangle necessarily has three sides.”  
But existence is not the kind of property (if it is a property at all—recall Frege and 
Russell’s remarks) that can be said to have the modal status of “necessary.”  Can we 
predicate necessary existence of God?  Malcolm answers in the affirmative.9   
…The view that logical necessity merely reflects the use of words cannot 
possibly have the implication that every existential proposition must be 
contingent. That view requires us to look at the use of words and not 
manufacture a priori theses about it. In the Ninetieth Psalm it is said: 
‘Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the 
earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.’ 
Here is expressed the idea of the necessary existence and eternity of God, 
an idea that is essential to the Jewish and Christian religions. In those 
complex systems of thought, those "languages-games," God has the 
status of a necessary being. Who can doubt that? Here we must say with 
Wittgenstein ‘The language game is played!’ (Malcolm 1960, 53-55) 
 
 I think it is established that a proponent of the argument can predicate necessary 
existence of God; any proponent of contemporary modal ontological arguments will 
affirm this.  I think that this cuts to the heart of the matter most fantastically.  Whether 
or not we can apply the concept of existence to God, there seems to be no trouble 
applying the concept of necessary existence to Him.  Even critics of the argument say 
that proponents can do so, but they disagree with those same proponents about the 
                                                 




import of such predication.10  With regards to whether or not when we say “God 
necessarily exists” we mean something like “If God exists, then He necessarily exists,” 
I am inclined to agree with Malcolm. 
I think that Caterus, Kant, and numerous other philosophers have been 
mistaken in supposing that the proposition ‘God is a necessary being’ (or 
‘God necessarily exists’) is equivalent to the conditional proposition ‘If 
God exists then He necessarily exists.’ For how do they want the 
antecedent clause, ‘If God exists,’ to be understood? Clearly they want it 
to imply that it is possible that God does not exist. The whole point of 
Kant's analysis is to try to show that it is possible to ‘reject the subject.’ 
Let us make this implication explicit in the conditional proposition, so 
that it reads: ‘If God exists (and it is possible that He does not) then He 
necessarily exists.’ But now it is apparent, I think, that these philosophers 
have arrived at a self-contradictory position. I do not mean that this 
conditional proposition, taken alone, is self-contradictory. Their position 
is self-contradictory in the following way. On the one hand, they agree 
that the proposition ‘God necessarily exists’ is an a priori truth; Kant 
implies that it is ‘absolutely necessary,’ and Caterus says that God's 
existence is implied by His very name. On the other hand, they think that 
it is correct to analyze this proposition in such a way that it will entail the 
proposition ‘It is possible that God does not exist.’ But so far from its 
being the case that the proposition ‘God necessarily exists’ entails the 
proposition ‘It is possible that God does not exist,’ it is rather the case 
that they are incompatible with one another! Can anything be clearer than 
that the conjunction ‘God necessarily exists but it is possible that He does 
not exist’ is self-contradictory? Is it not just as plainly self-contradictory 
as the conjunction ‘A square necessarily has four sides but it is possible 
for a square not to have four sides?’ In short, this familiar criticism of the 
ontological argument is self-contradictory, because it accepts both of two 
incompatible propositions. (Malcolm 1960, 57 – 58) 
 
This seems to me to be the most powerful part of Malcolm’s defense of Anselm.  I think 
many contemporary philosophers understand the phrase “God necessarily exists” as 
being translatable to “If God exists, He necessarily exists.”  Further, at least in the 
Anselmian tradition we must speak of God as a necessary being, and even figures such 
as Oppy and Findlay are comfortable speaking this way.  They claim that for different 
                                                 
10 For example, see Oppy’s remarks regarding the proper discharging of operators in modal ontological 
arguments involving necessity in Oppy 1995, 72-74, and his “General Objection” in 114-118. 
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reasons, the argument fails to establish the existence of God, much less the necessary 
existence of God, but they are comfortable in talking about the conception of God as a 
necessary being.  In a certain sense they should be so comfortable; Hartshorne and 
Malcolm both affirm that God’s modal status is necessary, and thus that either God is 
necessarily existent, or necessarily nonexistent, and thus impossible.  One need not be a 
fanatical theist to understand the concept of God in this way, but when opponents of the 
argument admit this much, it brings out the exact self-contradiction that Malcolm is 
talking about in the lengthy passage given above.  Ultimately, I think that Malcolm is 
right when he says “once one has grasped Anselm's proof of the necessary existence of 
a being a greater than which cannot be conceived, no question remains as to whether it 
exists or not, just as Euclid's demonstration of the existence of an infinity of prime 
numbers leaves no question on that issue,” (Malcolm 1960, 52).  I do not mean to say 
that no one can consider Anselm’s argument, or better, a modal ontological argument 
without becoming convinced that there necessarily exists a God.  But I do think that it 
leads us to the proposition expressed by Malcolm and Hartshorne, that God’s existence 
is either necessary or impossible.  Failing a good reason to think that the concept is self-
contradictory or metaphysically impossible for some other reason, and if we indeed 
think that the concept is possible, then there is no longer any question on the matter.11 
Section IV. Concluding Dilemma and Concluding Argument 
                                                 
11 This is, to put it mildly, a contentious and difficult issue.  There has been a range of interesting work 
done on the relationship between conceivability and possibility, but it would push us too far afield to 
consider this issue at this point.  I am interested in pursuing this matter in later research, as I believe that 
ultimately an important consideration of many philosophical arguments, including the ontological 
argument, is the gap between conceivability and possibility, and different models of the relationship 
between these concepts.  Interested readers should refer to the essays in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002a, 
especially Chalmers 2002, Gendler and Hawthorne 2002b, Yablo 2002, as well as articles outside of that 
collection including Chalmers 1999, Chalmers 2006, Vaidya 2015, van Inwagen 1998, Yablo 1993, and 
Yablo 1999.  This is far from a complete or representative list of the vast and exploding literature on this 
topic, but I have found these articles to be helpful in developing my own understanding of the topic. 
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 I conclude this chapter by giving a dilemma.   
1. Either existence is a property of objects, or it is not a property of 
objects (whatever else it may be a property of).   
2. If existence is a property of objects, then the Kantian objection is 
false. 
3. If the Kantian objection is false, then ontological arguments will not 
fail for that reason alone. 
4. If existence is not a property of objects, ontological arguments may 
still be made without engaging in any fallacious reasoning specific to 
whether or not existence is a property of objects. 
5. So, whether existence is a property of objects or not, the ontological 
argument will not fail on the basis of considerations of the nature of 
existence by itself.   
Premise 1 is simply an exhaustive and exclusive disjunction.  Either existence is 
a property of objects, or it is not.  No significant defense needs to be made in service of 
this premise. 
Kant and others have expressed the idea that the ontological argument must fail 
because it treats existence as a property of objects when it is no such thing.  Though the 
critique is usually aimed at the ontological argument, any philosophical argument 
seeking to establish that existence is a property or predicate of objects would fall prey to 
the same claim.  However, because the claim is stated as a universal, it is subject to the 
method of counterexample.  If existence is a property of objects, then the Kantian 
critique alone will not suffice to block the ontological argument’s success.  Since there 
are alternative accounts of existence such that existence is applicable to objects, if the 
ontological arguer adopted one of these accounts, then the Kantian objection is rebutted.  
Other reasons aside from the Kantian critique may result in the ontological argument’s 
failure – a gap in conceivability and possibility (as in van Inwagen 1998), or that certain 
modal logics used by ontological arguers are not the appropriate modal logics for 
metaphysics (as in Salmon 1989), or some other global objection (as in Oppy 1995).  
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But it will not be because existence is not a property of objects.  These considerations 
support premises 2 and 3. 
Premise 4 is more difficult to support, but if we examine recent versions of the 
ontological argument, we note that they are made without any requirement that 
existence be a property of objects.  Malcolm 1960 allows that existence is not a property 
of objects, but argues that necessary existence could be, and if this is the case then the 
ontological argument can be made without requiring existence be a property of objects.  
Plantinga 1974 and 1977 both contain modal ontological arguments that do not depend 
on the idea that existence be a property of objects.  Maydole 2003 and 2009 also contain 
modal ontological arguments that do not require that existence be a property of objects.  
As before, this is not enough to say that these arguments themselves are valid and 
sound, as there may be some other substantive objections made to them.  But it does 
show that if these arguments fail, it will not be because they cannot treat existence as a 
property of objects.   
Premise 5 is supported by the foregoing considerations.  Whatever the case may 
be with regard to existence applying to objects or not, the ontological argument fails or 
succeeds independently of these considerations alone.12  
Section V. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have examined two influential and contemporary views that 
existence is not a predicate or property of objects.  I have examined two contemporary 
                                                 
12 An additional argument for the conclusion (5) is given in Oppy 1995 against the Kantian critique and 
its variations.  In Chapter 10 of Oppy 1995, he argues that in order to establish the Kantian critique in any 
of ways in which it has been thought to debunk the ontological argument, the critic would be required to 
engage in a serious and entrenched debate about the nature of existence.  However, Oppy argues that as 
long as existence is a predicate of objects in the most minimal and vague sense, they will be able to 
respond to the Kantian argument.  I do not wish to fully explain Oppy’s position here – I note it only to 
suggest that one major critic of the ontological argument finds the Kantian objection to be significantly 
undermined as a route of derailing the ontological argument.    
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views that existence is a predicate or property of objects.  I have explained an additional 
view, given by Malcolm, that even if a philosopher were to accept that existence is not a 
predicate this still might not give sufficient reason to reject the modal ontological 
argument, for there could be relevant differences between the concepts of “existence” 
and “necessary existence.”  Finally, I have given an argument that, whether or not 
existence is treated a property of objects, the ontological argument can still succeed, or 
rather that if the ontological argument fails it will not have anything to do with the 
difficult question of the nature of existence.  In the next chapter, I examine the efficacy 
of parody arguments.    
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Chapter 3: Parody Objections and AntiGod 
Section I. Introduction     
 Perhaps the earliest objection to Anselm’s ontological argument is found in his 
contemporary, Gaunilo of Marmoutiers.  Gaunilo suggests that one can use Anselm’s 
strategy to prove the existence of an island “that is more excellent than all other 
lands...” (Anselm 2007, 104).  Of course, there is no such island, and because of this, 
Gaunilo thinks that the ontological argument for God fails.  In the subsequent years, 
philosophers have taken to calling such objections parody objections, since they 
essentially parody the ontological argument by keeping the same form and substituting 
some other concept for the concept of God (Oppy 1995).  In this chapter, I will first 
motivate the claim that parody arguments are the strongest objections to the ontological 
argument.  Then, I discuss one way of categorizing parody-style counterarguments 
based on the object that they purport to prove.  After distinguishing different parody 
arguments in this manner, I adopt and examine Oppy’s taxonomy of parodies (Oppy 
1995, 162 – 183).  Then, I argue that one kind of parody argument, the ontological 
argument for a necessarily existent, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly morally evil 
entity, is a more effective objection than other kinds of parody arguments.  I also 
suggest some dialectical considerations about naming, especially about using the term 
“devil” to refer to this kind of entity.  I conclude by examining Yujin Nagasawa’s 
contention that all parody arguments directed against the ontological argument must fail 
(Nagasawa 2010).  I argue that he fails to prove this point.   
Section II. Motivating Parody 
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 My argument in this section is brief.  In short, I argue that parody objections are 
the most powerful kinds of objections to the ontological argument.  What does it mean 
to say one objection is “better” or “more powerful” than another?  Although this notion 
is not exactly familiar, I think that the point can be brought out by considering the ways 
that different objections target a given argument.  
 Some arguments focus on issues associated with or presumed in an argument.  
For example, the Kantian critique discussed in chapter 2 is an example of this kind of 
objection.  The Kantian critique suggests that an important part of the argument rests 
upon a mistaken understanding of the predicate “exists.”  This objection doesn’t out-
and-out deny a premise, but rather suggests that some concept or idea or thesis involved 
in a premise is in need of clarification or correction.  Similarly, the conceivability 
objection focuses on a thesis involved in a premise.  These kinds of critique do 
eventually entail that one should reject a certain premise, at least as it is interpreted by 
proponents of the argument, but not by outright rejecting the premise, or giving a reason 
to reject the entirety of a premise.  Rather, they focus on something involved or 
associated with a premise, show that the proponent of the argument is either using this 
(whatever is involved or associated with the premise) incorrectly, or that it doesn’t 
apply as the proponents think, and thus show that the premise is objectionable via this 
route.  Arguing that “existence” is not a perfection is another critique of this form. 
 Another kind of critique is to give a more general reason to think that a premise 
ought to be rejected.  Arguably, objections of circularity are of this form; they give one 
a reason to reject the premise outright, not to suggest that it be modified or altered.  If 
one is antecedently convinced that the problem of evil rules out the existence of God, 
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then it could apply as a reason to reject the first premise of any ontological argument, 
which is that “It is possible that God exists.”  Any kind of Moore shift is an example of 
this kind of rejection-of-a-premise objection.13 
 Both of these kinds of objections to arguments rely on a disagreement between 
the proponents and opponents of the argument about some important matter; an 
inappropriate view of existence, an inappropriate view of the relationship between 
conceivability and possibility, or a complete rejection of a premise via some kind of 
Moore shift.  In both of these cases, the opponent of the argument bases the critique in a 
denial of one or another premise of the argument, and this opens the way to the 
proponents’ suitably replying by altering or modifying the premises involved. 
 On the other hand, parody objections proceed in a very different way than the 
previous two kinds of objections discussed above.  Parody objections, if they are 
successful, act as reductiones ad absurdum.  That is, they allow the proponent of the 
argument all of the kinds of controversial theses and ideas involved in the previous two 
kinds of critique.  In this case, a reductio arguer says “I am not going to deny that 
conceivability entails possibility, or that existence is a predicate, or any  other supposed 
assumptions of the argument—in short, I will allow you all that you need to make the 
argument successful.”  For another way to put this, the parody arguer argues against the 
argument on its strongest terms.  It grants the proponents of the argument all that they 
need to make the argument successful, and they then show that if the argument works 
for x, it can be reproduced to work for y (or in some cases ~x) and this results in a 
contradiction.   
                                                 
13 By Moore shift I mean the saying “One’s person’s Modus Ponens is another person’s Modus Tollens.”  
This move was famously used by G.E. Moore in one of his commonsense arguments against skepticism. 
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 My view that one objection is “more powerful” than another is based on an idea 
that we are all familiar with.  The problem with a straw-man version of an argument is 
that it makes the argument weaker than it needs to be.  I think something similar, 
although not fallacious, is going on with the first two kinds of critiques discussed above.  
I am not saying that those critiques are examples of the straw-man fallacy, but that like 
the straw man fallacy, they attempt to weaken the argument and thereby show that it 
fails.  Parody-style objections, since they are examples of the reductio ad absurdum 
strategy, do not attempt to weaken the argument and show that it fails, but allow the 
argument to be as strong as possible, and still show that it fails.  In this way, parody 
objections are more powerful than many other kinds of objections to the ontological 
argument.  They allow the argument to be stated in a way that it succeeds, at least 
initially, and then show that similar styles of argument also succeed, thereby rendering 
the argument strategy unsound.   
Section III. A Two-Pronged Taxonomy of Parody-Style Counterarguments 
 There are as many styles of parody as there are styles of ontological argument.  
In this section, I use a two-level classification system to examine different kinds of 
parody objections.   
III.A The Taxonomy 
 The first way to analyze parody objections is by examining certain attributes of 
the objects or entities they are supposed to prove exist.  All parody arguments either 
conclude that a) a physical object or entity of a certain kind exists, or b) an immaterial 
object or entity of a certain kind exists.  Examples of the former are Gaunilo’s island 
objection, Caterus’ existent lion, and Tooley’s maximal solvent and maximally 
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insoluble substance (in Anselm 2007, Descartes 2008, and Tooley 1981).  On the other 
hand, Henle’s “Nec,” Kane’s LPNs, and the devil of Haight and Haight are all examples 
of the second kind of entity or object; immaterial, nonphysical entities (in Henle 1961, 
Kane 1984, and Haight and Haight 1970).  One way, then, to logically map the different 
kinds of parody is to classify them according to whether they attempt to show the 
existence of a physical object or entity on one hand, or a nonphysical, immaterial object 
or entity, on the other.       
 An immediate question that arises is “Why classify parody arguments this way?  
Why is this taxonomy useful?”  At the end of this section, I argue that one can dispose 
of all parodies that attempt to prove the necessary existence of physical objects or 
entities.  If the argument is successful, then by classifying parodies in this way we can 
eliminate that class of arguments entirely.   
 Once we have this distinction in place, we can adapt Oppy’s taxonomy of 
parody objections to fit under either attempts to prove the necessary existence of a 
physical object or entity, or attempts to prove the necessary existence of immaterial 
entities.  Oppy characterizes parody objections as falling under one of the following 
kinds: parodies of the form “beings of kind k than which no greater beings of kind k can 
be conceived,” parodies of the form “most perfect beings of kind k,” parodies of the 
form “necessarily existent beings of kind k,” parodies of the form “actually existent 
beings of kind k,” parodies of the form “maximal beings of kind k,” and parodies that 
“purport to establish the existence of different kinds of devil,” (Oppy 1995, 162 – 183).  
It should be noted that a single kind of parody can fall under more than one of these 
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categories, especially devil parodies.  However, in general these categories do 
distinguish one kind of parody objection from another.   
 Parodies that rely on the locution “beings of kind k than which no greater beings 
of kind k can be conceived” attempt to adopt this phrase from Anselm’s argument and 
then substitute a concept other than God for the subject of the initial possibility premise.  
An obvious example of this is the island parody.  It follows the form of the ontological 
argument except that instead of “a being than which none greater can be conceived” the 
entity involved in the argument is “an island than which none greater can be 
conceived.”  If the argument works in the case of God, then the parodist suggests it 
works as well for an island, or for any other kind of thing.  There is nothing special 
about using an island in this way, as the parody admits of generalization.  Presumably 
“a tree than which none greater can be conceived,” “a basketball player than which none 
greater can be conceived,” and “a motorcycle than which none greater can be 
conceived” would prove the same point that the island does.  One need not limit oneself 
to physical entities in this kind of critique, although the examples often discussed in 
relation to this critique frequently are physical entities.  Since this kind of parody 
involves the notion of greatness, then questions about greatness or various definitions of 
greatness will need to be answered or settled to not only see if the original argument 
works, but also to see if these parodies can apply at all.  We will come back to the 
notion of greatness and questions about it in a later chapter.   
 Parodies of the form “most perfect beings of kind k” are quite similar to the first 
kind of parody discussed in the preceding paragraph.   The primary difference, at least 
in the eyes of some philosophers, is the distinction between greatness and perfection.  
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Robert Brecher, for example, argues that Anselm did not use “greatness” and 
“perfection” interchangeably, but that considering God’s greatness is different than just 
considering God’s perfection (Brecher 1974).  If this is true of Anselm’s argument, then 
there is no reason that contemporary arguments that utilize the terms “perfection” and 
or “greatness” cannot hold the same thesis.  Whether or not there is a significant 
difference between perfection and greatness, since this kind of parody uses the term 
“perfection,” then just like the parody discussed in the preceding paragraph, any 
questions about perfection or various definitions of perfection will need to be answered 
or settled to see if both the original argument works and to see if the parody-style 
critiques can even get off the ground.   
 Parodies of the form “necessarily existent beings of kind k” are, in some ways, a 
bit more artificial than the two kinds of parodies just sketched above.  It might be 
thought that God’s essence implies necessary existence, but how does that show the 
viability of just any old concept constructed to contain the property “necessary 
existence?”  For a theist, such constructions will seem unnecessarily artificial and ad 
hoc, but the atheist or agnostic may have a different view on just how organic the 
concept of “God” is in the first place.  If the concept of “God” and the concept of “a 
being that, among its properties, has necessary existence” are either equally 
controversial or equally ad hoc, then the parodist can proceed with the argument.  Of 
course, it may be the case that the parodist needs to argue for this parity, and it need not 
be the case that every theist must agree that the concepts are on par in this respect.  
What we can show initially is just that there is no logical reason to rule out “necessarily 
existent beings of kind k” at the outset.  Henle and Kane both adopt this parody 
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strategy, although how they go about making their respective parodies is a bit different 
(Henle 1961 and Kane 1984).  A crucial question to ask for this kind of parody (and for 
this kind of ontological argument) is “What kinds of things can even possibly possess 
necessary existence?”  The answer to this question is not at all obvious but proponents 
of both parodies and ontological arguments that use this feature need to have an account 
of it.  It will be in the interest of proponents of the ontological argument to provide a 
properly motivated account of necessary existence that involves a principle that shows 
that necessary existence can only be properly predicated of God.  It will be of equal 
interest to parodists to develop an account of necessary existence that shows that it can, 
indeed, be properly predicated of at least one other entity than God.  One thing that will 
be true of any account of necessary existence is the relationship between necessary 
existence and possible worlds; something exists necessarily if and only if it exists in all 
possible worlds.   
 Parodies of the form “actually existent beings of kind k” are, as those posited 
necessary beings given in the previous section, more artificial looking than some of the 
other parody objections discussed.  The parody of this form suggests that, given 
Descartes ontological argument (and more broadly, any Cartesian style ontological 
argument) one can prove the existence of any kind of thing, or one can prove the 
existence of any kind of thing that only exists contingently, and therefore could have 
failed to exist (Oppy 1995, 173 – 179).  The second form of this critique is found in 
Caterus’ reply to Descartes.  Caterus supposes that, in the same way Descartes moves 
from examining the concept of God to proving that God exists, one can contemplate the 
concept “existent lion” and move from the contemplation of this concept to the 
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existence of this concept.  Objectors of this sort will insist that just as some kinds of 
ontological argument for the existence of God smuggle the concept “actual existence” 
into the concept “God,” one can include the concept “actual existence” into any kind of 
thing, including contingent objects, and thereby prove their existence.  The problem 
here is that one can prove, a priori, the existence of some contingent thing—and 
presumably, we should need to do some investigation before we settle the question of 
the existence of something that either could or could fail to exist.  If this parallels the 
ontological argument, then it seems that the argument strategy is simply reifying the 
concept of God, and is not to be given serious intellectual consideration.  The first form 
of this critique as discussed above can be found in the work of Rowe.  After analyzing 
and laying out a version of Anselm’s argument, Rowe writes 
We shall say that the term ‘magician’ may be applied both to Houdini 
and Merlin, even though the former existed whereas the latter did not. 
Noting that our friend has used ‘existing’ as part of his definition of 
‘God’, suppose we agree with him that we can define a word in any way 
we please, and, accordingly, introduce the following words with the 
following definitions: ‘a magican’ is defined as an existing magician, ‘a 
magico’ is defined as a non-existing magician. Here we have introduced 
two words and used ‘existing’ or ‘nonexisting’ in their definitions. Now 
something of interest follows from the fact that ‘existing’ is part of our 
definition of ‘a magican’. For while it’s true that Merlin was a magician 
it isn’t true that Merlin was a magican. And something of interest 
follows from our including ‘non-existing’ in the definition of ‘a magico.’ 
For while it’s true that Houdini was a magician it isn’t true that Houdini 
was a magico. Houdini was a magician and a magican, but not a magico; 
whereas, Merlin was a magician and a magico, but not a magican. What 
we have just seen is that introducing ‘existing’ or ‘nonexisting’ into the 
definition of a concept has a very important implication. If we introduce 
‘existing’ into the definition of a concept it follows that no non-existing 
thing can exemplify that concept.  And if we introduce ‘non-existing’ 
into the definition of a concept it follows that no existing thing can 
exemplify that concept. No nonexisting thing can be a magican, and no 




Rowe argues that if we can form the concept of God as including “existence” then we 
can do the same for any other concept.  It need not be a magican, an “existing 
magician,” but can be generalized, as Oppy and Rowe note.  For any possible object, 
simply create a new or altered concept that is the concept of that possible object plus 
“actual existence” or just “existence.”  Rowe claims that this shows that in the case of 
the ontological argument, just as in the case of a “magican,” only that “God” or 
“magican” cannot be identified with any non-existent object, not that “God” or a 
“magican” must be identified with some existent object (Rowe 1976, 428 – 429).  I take 
it that this kind of parody is supposed to show that since the theist (and anyone in their 
right mind) will not countenance such a move for magican or a similar concept, then 
they should also reject the strategy as it applies to God.  This form of the parody comes 
to the same conclusion as the other form of this parody, which is that this argument 
strategy is simply reifying something into existence, and this is a serious flaw.   
 Parodies of the form “maximal beings of kind k” are directed at Plantingian 
ontological arguments.  Recall that Plantinga’s ontological argument introduces the 
concept of maximal greatness and maximal excellence.  He defines maximal excellence 
as “omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection” and maximal greatness as “having 
the property of maximal excellence in every possible world,” (Plantinga 1974, 218).  
Although Oppy, following Tooley, states that “x is maximally p iff x exists in all 
possible worlds, and is p in every world,” this seems to be a slight misunderstanding of 
Plantinga (Oppy 1995, 179, and Tooley 1981, 424).  It is true that the property 
“maximal greatness” does follow the form Oppy suggests, but the property “maximal 
excellence” does not.  This is a minor point, as at least some kinds of maximality do 
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entail necessary existence, but it is worth getting clear on definitions used in a major 
philosophical argument.  We can assume for the rest of this section that the sense of 
maximality in question is the one Plantinga applies to greatness, and is as Oppy 
suggests.  Tooley gives an ingenious argument for two maximal objects, both of which 
are necessarily existent, and the existence of both in the same world creates a logical 
contradiction.  Consider the property “maximal universal solvent” where that means “x 
is a maximal universal solvent iff x exists in every world and is a universal solvent in 
every world, where something is a universal solvent in a given world if and only if it is 
capable of dissolving anything in that world.” (Tooley 1981, 424).  Let us also consider 
the property “maximally insoluble” where that means “x is maximally insoluble if and 
only if x exists in every world and is insoluble in every world,” (Tooley 1981, 424).  
Tooley argues that we can parody Plantinga’s argument by using the same argument 
form, but by arguing for the instantiation of the property “maximal universal solvent” 
and  by arguing for the instantiation of the property “maximally insoluble” instead of 
the property of “maximal greatness” in either case.  But surely this is incorrect; if 
something in a world is capable of dissolving anything in that world, there cannot be a 
maximally insoluble object.  Alternately, if something in a world is maximally insoluble 
and, by definition, cannot be dissolved by anything in that world, then nothing in that 
world can have the property of being a maximal universal solvent.  If a modified 
version of these objects were shown to exist in some worlds but not others, we would 
hardly have a problem.  If “universal solvent” is instantiated in a given world, then 
“insoluble” cannot be, and vice versa.  The problem is caused by the “maximal” 
predicate.  If maximal greatness is possibly instantiated, then it exists in every possible 
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world, and the same is true of maximal universal solvents and maximally insoluble 
objects.  Of course, we may want to reject the possibility premise in the modal 
arguments for maximal universal solvents and maximally insoluble objects, but this 
same attitude can be taken by the atheist or agnostic as regards the possibility premise 
in the modal argument for God.  What the theist needs is a principled reason to reject 
the possibility premises involved in Tooley’s parody arguments, but that does not rule 
out the possibility premise of the modal ontological argument.  The proponent of the 
parody will want to provide grounds to reject this distinction.  Here, then, is a 
straightforward case of a reductio aimed at the argument style evinced by modal 
ontological arguments.  If we can use this argument style to prove the necessary 
existence of two objects that are not compossible, something has gone terribly wrong. 
 The final category of parody arguments is arguments that attempt to establish 
the existence of some kind of devil or another.14  This kind of argument is often of the 
form of one of the previous style of parodies we have examined above.  This category 
of parody arguments is better understood, not as classifying a different form of parody, 
but as classifying certain parodies by reference to the type of object they are supposed 
to prove.  There are many examples of arguments that mirror the ontological argument 
but substitute an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly morally evil entity in the place of an 
omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly morally good entity; a number of philosophers have 
all given ontological parody arguments for the existence of some kind of devil or 
similar entity (Chambers 2000, Cock 1918, Gale 1993, Haight and Haight 1970, Haight 
1974, Johnson 1965, Millican 1989, Millican 2004, Millican 2007, Richman 1958, 
                                                 




Richman 1960, and Wilbanks 1973).  I will compare this kind of parody to other styles 
of parody at length in section IV, so I will not do so here.  The common feature running 
through this category of parody arguments is that they all attempt to show that a devil, 
or some kind of omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly evil entity, can be shown to exist in 
the same way that the ontological argument proves the existence of God.    Since the 
proponents of these parodies, unless they are Zoroastrians or Manicheans, do not 
endorse the existence of such a being, the purpose of these parodies is to show that the 
ontological argument is not a sound argument strategy.  This proceeds via the familiar 
reductio ad absurdum strategy.  This could be done at least one of two ways; first, by 
showing that the necessary existence of two omnipotent deities of any kind implies a 
logical contradiction, and second, by showing that the necessary existence of two 
omnipotent, omniscient entities with exactly opposite moral compasses implies a logical 
contradiction.  Either way, the original argument conjoined with the parody for a devil 
results in a contradiction, and therefore the ontological argument fails. 
 With all of this in mind, we can give a taxonomic tree of parody-style 
arguments.  In order to do so, I have shortened the names of the forms of the parodies as 
follows: parodies of the form “beings of kind k than which no greater beings of kind k 
can be conceived,” I will label “Anselmian”; parodies of the form “most perfect beings 
of kind k,” I will label “perfect,” parodies of the form “necessarily existent beings of 
kind k,” I will label “necessary,” parodies of the form “actually existent beings of kind 
k,” I will label “actual,” parodies of the form “maximal beings of kind k,” I will label 
“maximal,” and parodies that “purport to establish the existence of different kinds of 




III.A Disregarding Physical Object Parodies 
 Earlier I answered the questions “Why classify parody arguments this way?  
Why is this taxonomy useful?” by promising to give an argument that will allow us to 
dispose of any counterargument that attempts to deduce the existence of a physical 
object via an ontological parody.  I do so here. 
 The key premise in this argument is alternately “No physical object is 
necessary” or “No physical object exists necessarily” or “Every physical object is 
contingent,” or “Every physical object contingently exists.”15  If this premise holds true, 
then we can make the following argument. 
1. Every physical object is contingent.   
2. Ontological arguments, including parody-style ontological 
arguments, are a priori arguments. 
3. Some set of parody arguments either show the a) actual existence of 
a physical object, or the b) necessary existence of a physical object. 
4. But b is impossible, from 1.   
5. An a priori argument cannot deduce the existence of a contingent 
object, since for any contingent object, the world could be such that it 
does not exist.   
6. Since finding out whether a contingent object exists requires us to go 
out and examine the world in which we live, showing the existence 
of such an object requires a posteriori methods. 
7. So a parody argument for a requires an a posteriori method of 
argument. 
8. So a parody argument for a is not an a priori argument. 
9. Therefore, it is impossible to parody the ontological argument by 
giving a parody argument for b since there is no such thing as a 
necessary physical object, and it is impossible to give a parody 
argument for a since it will not be an a priori argument, which is 
ruled out by 2. 
10. So any ontological parody argument for a physical object of any kind 
fails. 
 
                                                 
15 While I argue for this later, for another defense of such a principle, especially in connection with 
certain kinds of parodies, see Mann 1976. 
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Since premise 1 does a lot of the heavy lifting in the argument just given, it requires 
defense. 
 What is a physical object?  I take it that a physical object is an object composed 
of the entities given in various levels of physics.  For any physical object, we can 
imagine that it not exist; indeed, we know that there are specific combinations of matter 
and energy that allow for the fading out of existence for such an object.  If I am a purely 
physical object, then there are many conditions under which I would cease existing, 
such as being in a room completely devoid of oxygen, or being immersed in a stream of 
lava.  Further, this is true of any physical object.  Coconuts, islands, books, stars, 
galaxies, molecules, and particles all have conditions that are required for their 
continued existence and all have conditions under which they cease to exist, or are 
destroyed.  This point deserves emphasis.  A coconut can be smashed into smithereens, 
islands can be eradicated by earthquakes or a meteor impact, books can be burned or 
shredded, stars go through various stages of life culminating in their eventual 
destruction, and so on, and so on.  If all physical objects are composed of the 
elementary particles found in physics (governed by appropriate laws and subject to 
appropriate forces) and these elementary particles themselves can be destroyed or can 
fail to exist, then any object composed of these particles can be destroyed, or fail to 
exist.  This point is especially salient when we realize that an object can be destroyed in 
at least two ways; first, by destroying all of the articles that compose it, and second, by 
rearranging the elementary particles in suitable ways.  If, through some amazing, 
natural law-governed process, all of the particles that compose me change in such a way 
that I turn into a viscous slime, or a large clock, then it seems correct to say that I am no 
64 
 
longer.  Since every physical object we can conceive of can be thought to not exist or 
can be shown to have conditions under which they either continue to or fail to exist, 
then talking about a necessary physical object is simply nonsense. 
 Suppose, though, that my interlocutor claims I have done the argument an 
injustice.  “I can conceive of a necessary fork; what I mean by this is that in every 
possible world, this fork exists.  What is contradictory about such an imagining?”  In 
this case, we need to ask if the fork is a purely physical object, to which my interlocutor 
surely agrees.  Then, we need to ask, as I did at the beginning of the preceding 
paragraph, “What is a physical object?”  If the answer is the one I gave (and I can think 
of no reason my opponent would deny such an answer) then it looks like there could be 
conditions under which the fork ceases to exist; it is melted down, or chopped into a 
fine dust, or some other set of conditions under which it ceases to exist.  How can my 
interlocutor reply?  To simply say that these conditions are impossible is to say that 
either a) this fork is not a purely physical object, and thus has some ethereal quality or 
qualities that preserve its existence through the changes described above, or b) that it is 
a physical object composed of physical entities, by which we mean something very, 
very different than the physical objects and the entities that compose them in our world.  
The first horn of this dilemma just rejects that it is a purely physical object, which is the 
only thing I am interested in considering in terms of these parodies.  The second horn 
may seem more promising, but now we must ask for an account of this wildly different 
physics by which something like a fork can be necessarily existent.  If it is too 
divergent, as I think it must be, then we are no longer talking about physical objects 
properly conceived, but physical’ objects, or physical’’ objects that have only the 
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scantest relationship to our physical objects.  In summary, there is no good reason for 
thinking that any physical object can be a candidate for necessity, and there are good 
reasons to think that for every physical object, we can give an account for what is 
needed for its continued existence and the conditions under which it would cease to 
exist, thus making premise 1 justified.   
 The second part of the argument, showing that parodies that attempt to prove the 
actual existence of physical objects, also requires some explanation.  A hallmark of 
ontological arguments (including ontological parodies) is that they are a priori.  This is 
a complex and often murky philosophical notion, and I will defend no particular 
account of it here.16  Instead, I rely on the judgment of myself and the reader that a 
priori is understood as a proof that proceeds from purely conceptual and logical 
grounds, without certain kinds of reference to empirical investigation into the world.  If 
an object is contingent, then it could fail to be, and only an examination of our world 
will show that the object does not exist, or that it does in fact exist.  If we use these 
grounds, then our parody is no longer a parody of the ontological argument, but rather 
an a posteriori argument that some physical object exists.  So a parody cannot prove a 
priori the actual existence of physical (and from premise 1, contingent) objects.   
 If the argument in this section is correct, then we can leave unexamined any 
parody for the existence, actual or necessary, of physical objects.  Gaunilo’s island, 
Tooley’s maximal universal solvent and maximally insoluble substance, and Caterus’ 
lion can all safely be rejected by the proponent of the ontological argument. 
Section IV. Angra Mainyu, the Devil, and AntiGod 
                                                 
16 For a good overview of different conceptions of “a priori” and the different ways the term has 
historically been used, see Moser 1987. 
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 In this section, I first discuss some concerns about the usage of the term “devil” 
in these parodies.  Then, I argue that of all parodies that deduce the existence of 
immaterial objects, the class of parodies that attempts to prove the existence of an 
omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly morally evil entity is a stronger kind of parody than 
other parodies that attempt to prove the existence of immaterial objects.  Recall that 
since parodies of this kind can be of different forms, for example “a being than which 
no worse can be conceived,” “a most perfect demon/devil/etc.,” “that maximal 
malevolence be instantiated,” the argument in the second subsection of this section will 
argue against other kinds of immaterial entities such as Henle’s Nec or Kane’s LPNs.  
Finally, in the last sub-section of this section I briefly examine the argument given by 
Haight and Haight 1970 since this is the most direct form of the argument.  Interested 
readers are referred to Millican 2004 and Chambers 2000 for more recent versions of 
this kind of parody.17   
IV.A Terminology and Connotation 
 Although it is common to call these kinds of parodies arguments for the 
existence of a devil or devils, I think that this can impede clear consideration of the 
topic.  Perhaps little hangs on this point, but even if the reader is not as convinced as I 
am of the seriousness of this problem, I hope she will at least take this discussion under 
consideration. 
                                                 
17 I developed a version of the ontological parody argument for the existence of AntiGod independently 
of the authors I’ve mentioned in the summer of 2005 at the Colorado Summer Seminar in Philosophy at 
the University of Colorado, Boulder.  Since I think that the central insights in my version of the parody 
argument are essentially the same as those contained in other parodies given by Haight and Haight 1970, 
Chambers 2000, and Millican 2004, among others, I will not produce another version of this objection 
here.   
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 First, the devil in the Christian tradition is not omnipotent, omniscient, and 
perfectly morally evil.  As a fallen angel, the entity is neither omnipotent nor 
omniscient.  While this seems like an obvious point, I think arguments for the existence 
of a devil hold a connotation that the being in question is substantially lesser than God, 
even if this is not formally the case. 
 Second, strong emotional responses are evoked by usage of the term “devil.”  
For many Christians, the devil is not a humorous horned figure from pop culture 
wearing red tights and exhibiting a sinister mustache, but a significant contributing 
factor to the fallen state of nature and a figure that is constantly tempting humans with 
the goal of corrupting their immortal souls.  Are we, as professional philosophers, 
immune to such an emotive association?  The answer is almost certainly no.  I do not 
mean to suggest that one must view the devil in this way if one is a Christian, only that 
the contingent facts of the matter are such that many people in fact do.  I also note that 
this point is true of the term “God.”  Many atheists have very strong negative emotive 
associations with the term “God,” and I think this can explain some of the psychological 
hesitance to endorse something like the ontological argument.  It is obvious that in the 
case of the ontological argument, proponents will have no desire to change the name of 
the entity under consideration in order to level the emotional playing field between 
atheists and theists.  In the case of devil parodies, though, nothing save our 
entrenchment in natural linguistic practices constitutes a reason to continue using a term 
that has these connotations.   
 I am suggesting that because of the historical conceptual web surrounding the 
term “devil” both in a sense that there is a connotation of inequality, and in the sense 
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that there is a negative evaluative connotation, we should replace the term with 
something less controversial that captures the meaning we desire to capture.  In 
Manichean ontology, there is a King of Darkness that is the opposite figure of the 
Father of Greatness, but these conceptions rest on a gnostic view which is itself the 
subject of much emotive association.  In addition, the phrase is simply not short enough 
to be useful in this context.  Angra Mainyu, the evil entity or principle that opposes 
Ahura Mazda in Zoroastrian religion is closer to this meaning, although as Angra 
Mainyu is not exactly the equal of Ahura Mazda, and since only in some traditions is 
Angra Mainyu seen as an entity rather than a principle, this will probably not do either.  
Millican’s “AntiGod” is probably the least controversial artificial name for such a 
being, although adding the prefix “anti-“ to another thing may strike one as simply 
contrarian or childish.  In short, we have to choose between using a name we are all 
familiar with, that has certain historical baggage, but that people will likely take 
seriously, and a name that is stipulated, thereby free from historical baggage, but that 
may appear to be too playful or artificial to be taken very seriously.  Since the aim of 
parodies of this kind is to make the theist take seriously this parallel argument and to 
contemplate it with as open a mind as possible, it is in the interest of the parodist to use 
a term that is not too playful or artificial to be taken seriously, but that also avoids the 
connotations that may subconsciously influence the appraisal of such an argument.   
 I confess that I would prefer to use an artificial term, and be accused of 
jocularity in the face of a serious argument, than use an existent historical term with 
unhelpful connotations.  Although Millican’s “AntiGod” is a bit more playful than I 
would prefer, I cannot think of another short, pithy alternative.  Throughout the rest of 
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the section and the rest of the dissertation I refer to devil parodies as AntiGod parodies 
or as parodies for the existence of AntiGod, but the reader should note that I do not 
mean this in a way that is playful or cavalier.  I take this objection, as I hope the reader 
does, with the utmost seriousness and sincerity.  I also note that the taxonomic tree 
developed above would be slightly different in terms of the appropriate labels. 
IV.B The Supremacy of AntiGod Parodies 
  Since, in section III.B I argued against the need to consider parodies that deduce 
the existence, of any kind, of physical objects, then that leaves only the parodies that 
attempt to prove the existence of immaterial objects as the subject of our consideration 
as possibly successful parodies.  Since I am primarily concerned in this project with 
contemporary modal ontological arguments, then I leave aside parodies of the form 
“actually existent beings of kind k” as applied to immaterial entities.   
 My argument in this section has less to do with the forms of various parodies for 
the existence of immaterial objects, and more to do with the kind of immaterial object 
proven to exist.  It can be summarized as follows. 
1. For any immaterial object purportedly proven by an ontological 
parody, it is either AntiGod, or it is something else.   
2. AntiGod has advantages x, y, and z (to be spelled out below) over 
other immaterial parody objects. 
3. We ought to present the parody objection in the strongest form 
possible. 
4. Therefore, if we argue against the ontological argument by parody, 
we ought to argue for the parody of AntiGod. 
 
We now move to consideration of AntiGod as compared to Henle’s Nec brethren, and 
Kane’s LPNs.  These are, aside from AntiGod parodies, the best kind of immaterial 
object parody to modal ontological arguments.  If I show that AntiGod has advantages 
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over these kinds of immaterial objects, it can be concluded that any other immaterial 
object parodies also fail to be as good as or better of an objection than AntiGod.   
 In order to compare AntiGod to other kinds of necessarily existent immaterial 
beings proved via parody, it will be important to lay out the features of both Henle’s 
Nec brethren and Kane’s LPNs.  Since both Henle and Kane utilize an almost identical 
strategy in enumerating the different necessary beings that each think can be proven 
with a parody argument, I will examine each view briefly before considering them in 
tandem.   
Henle argues that, in much the same way Malcolm argues for a modal 
ontological argument for the existence of God, one can adapt the argument to prove the 
necessary existence of other beings.  He introduces Nec, NEc, and NEC.  Henle writes 
Let us designate by ‘Nec’ a certain being who has necessary existence 
but who is otherwise less remarkable.  He has a certain amount of 
knowledge, though nothing extraordinary, and certain power, although 
he is unable to cause motion.  As a necessary being, of course, Nec’s 
nonexistence is inconceivable and he does not depend on anything… 
Even though Nec’s existence precludes that of an omnipotent being, it is 
perfectly compatible with that of other beings having necessary 
existence.  Nec has a big brother, NEc, who also exists necessarily but 
who can cause uniform rectilinear motion and is a little wiser than Nec.  
There is another brother, NEC, who can cause acceleration, and only 
typographic inadequacies prevent me from enumerating a spate of others. 
(Henle 1961, 102 – 103) 
 
 Similarly, Kane argues that accepting the appropriate principles of modal logic 
and modal systems (such as S5, or perhaps Brouwer) that the modal ontological 
argument relies on, one can use these same principles and systems to deduce the 
necessary existence of a class of beings, called “less-than-perfect necessary beings,” or 
LPNs for short.  He writes 
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Let us consider the possible existence of what might be called ‘less-than-
perfect necessary beings’ (LPN’s).  I mean beings whose essence or 
definition is such that, if they exist, then necessarily they exist, but which 
lack some other attributes of perfection, e.g., they are less than 
omniscient or not omnibenevolent.  Are LPN’s possible in the broadly 
logical sense?  Is it self-contradictory to say that a being has necessary 
existence but is not all good or all knowing?  If the answer is negative, 
then there might be an indefinite number of such beings, e.g., one which 
commits at least one act in every possible world, one whose acts are 
always evil (a perfect devil? An evil god?), one which knows certain 
things, but not others, and so on.  Furthermore, it would be possible to 
use the principles of the modal OA [ontological argument] to derive the 
actual existence of any such possible LPN.  If the B-principle holds, and 
if an LPN exists in some possible world relative to the actual world, then 
it exists in the actual world.  Moreover, the LPN would necessarily exist 
in the actual world because it is such that, in every world in which it 
exists, it necessarily exists. (Kane 1984, 344 – 345) 
 
Now that we have laid out the relevant concepts in the authors’ own respective words, 
we can examine the similarity in the approach of both kinds of parody arguments for the 
existence of necessary immaterial entities.   
 Both Henle and Kane’s parody arguments have the same structure.  Take the 
modal ontological argument, and alter slightly certain properties involved in the concept 
of God, keep necessary existence as a constant, and change the properties such as 
omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence or moral perfection.  Tinker with 
various combinations of these concepts to produce fleshed out concepts of Nec, an 
LPN, and their ilk.  Oppy has an excellent discussion of how to produce a large number 
of these kinds of entities, which I quote in full.   
It seems that we can generate infinite numbers of LPNs.  For 
convenience, the following discussion will presuppose that omniscience, 
omnipotence, and omnibenevolence are the only relevant attributes of 
God.  It seems to me that this presupposition is harmless in the present 
context.  First, suppose that we can quantify benevolence using real 
number percentages.  If we make the assumption that moral properties 
are not necessarily linked to knowledge and power—that is, any kind of 
moral property is compatible with omniscience and omnipotence—then, 
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for each 0 < r < 100, there is an LPN that is omniscient, omnipotent, and 
possess benevolence to degree r.  Of course, God possesses benevolence 
to degree 100—that is, in the form of omnibenevolence.  And if we deny 
the assumption that moral properties are not necessarily linked to 
knowledge and power—on, say, the grounds (i) that there is, properly 
speaking, moral knowledge, and (ii) that moral knowledge is intrinsically 
(or internally, or necessarily) linked to moral motivation—we can still 
maintain that there is an LPN that is all but omniscient, all but 
omnipotent, and that possesses benevolence to degree r.  Second, we can 
suppose that there is a hierarchy Oi of omniscient, or all but omniscient 
(and omnibenevolent, or all but omnibenevolent) LPNs that are also all 
but omnipotent in the following way: For each i, Oi is limited only by Oj, 
for all j > i.  Thus, for example, O2 can do things O1 cannot do, but not 
vice versa.  When it comes to a competition between O1 and O2 in which 
there is a winner, the winner is always O2.  This hierarchy can extend 
into the transfinite, if we wish.  Third, we can suppose that there is a 
hierarchy of all but omnipotent (and omnibenevolent, or all but 
omnibenevolent) LPNs that are also all but omniscient in the following 
way: For each i, Oi knows everything about things outside the hierarchy 
and also everything about beings below it in the hierarchy—that is, about 
Oj, for all j < i—but does not know some things about itself and beings 
above it in the hierarchy—that is, about Oj, for all j ≥ i.  That is, these 
beings are omniscient about worldly matters of fact, but ignorant about 
some things to do with themselves.  In this discussion, I have supposed 
that omniscience is a consequence of omnipotence.  This might be 
denied; but, since an omnipotent being ought to be able to answer every 
question correctly, it does seem that only an omniscient being can be 
omnipotent. (Oppy 1995, 171 – 172) 
 
I think Oppy’s construction of these various LPNs, and his specifications that allow us 
to create more and more of them, gives us a good idea how to adopt this procedure.  
Notice also that Nec, NEc, and NEC can be categorized under the rubric given above.      
 The primary similarity, then, between Henle’s Nec, NEc, and NEC and Kane’s 
LPNs is that in both cases, the proponent of the ontological parody argument develops 
the concepts of these immaterial entities by first taking the concept of God and then 
tinkering with various degrees of power, knowledge, or some moral quality given in 
that concept to produce a host of immaterial beings with varying degrees of potency, 
epistemic acumen, and good or evil.   
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 I believe that this similarity is the point of attack for someone who, like this 
author, thinks that AntiGod objections are superior to objections that prove the 
necessary existence of Nec and LPNs.  I do not mean that one cannot use the procedure 
described above to develop a conception of AntiGod, but only that one need not use 
such a procedure.  I contend below that the ontological parody argument for AntiGod is 
superior to arguments for LPNs for two reasons; that they are more natural, and less 
artificial, than proofs for Nec and other LPNs and that they have a greater similarity to 
the ontological argument for God than do arguments for Nec and other LPNs. 
 First, the concept of an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly evil being is a more 
natural concept than the concept of Nec or other LPNs.  I am not sure how to give an 
exact definition of the ways I am using natural and artificial, but some examples may 
help to bring out this distinction.  Natural concepts include: blue, lion, human, and 
(arguably) God and AntiGod (“the devil” is a better historical name for this natural 
concept, but, as stated above, I do not use such a label here).  Artificial concepts, in 
contrast to the list just provided, include: grue, chimera, Swampman, and (arguably) 
McEar, Nec and LPNs.  Natural concepts have the two features, then, having a place in 
the everyday conceptual schemes of human beings, and they do not involve ad hoc 
stipulations concerning their attributes.  Artificial concepts do not usually have a role in 
the lives of everyday persons, and often suffer from some ad hoc stipulating about their 
attributes.  Why would we think AntiGod is a natural and not artificial concept?  
Humans have, quite often, viewed the world as a place subject to the grip of both 
benevolent and malevolent forces.  Further, in the case of many historical mythologies, 
there is a set of entities that are good and affect and influence the world, and a set of 
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entities that are evil and affect the world.  This pattern occurs in Manichean, 
Zoroastrian, Greek, and Norse mythologies, as well as in the contemporary religious 
traditions of (some kinds) of Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam.  On the other hand, 
grue, chimera, Swampman, and McEar, Nec, and other LPNs are examples of highly 
tinkered concepts that are mostly developed in order to relate to specific conceptual 
schemes or thought experiments.  This does not mean that these concepts ought to be 
rejected out of hand, nor does this mean that they cannot do important philosophical 
work.  But I argue below that in certain cases, natural concepts have a dialectical 
advantage, and so if we have two arguments available against a position, and one 
involves natural concepts while the other involves artificial concepts, the former is 
preferable.   
 Even if the foregoing is granted, and it needs further argument, why would 
natural concepts be thought to have any advantage?  I think natural concepts of the kind 
sketched above are in a better position than artificial concepts for two reasons.  First, I 
think they are simply more dialectically efficacious because they are concepts that we 
are all, in some hazy, inchoate way, familiar with.  Thus, it is psychologically easier for 
us to conceive of such beings and to take them seriously as articles of philosophical 
contemplation.  Second, I think the highly specified and ad hoc way that many artificial 
concepts are produced opens them up to a host of objections that do not 
straightforwardly apply to natural concepts.  Arguments about how to understand 
Swampman in the light of evolutionary, teleological accounts of words and concepts do 
not arise for the concept of human.  Concerns about whether grue is really a kind of 
property, and how it should be understood, do not arise in the consideration of the color 
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blue.18  And the same holds true for McEar, Nec, and LPNs as compared to God and 
AntiGod.   
 AntiGod parodies also have an advantage of similarity or parity with not only 
the ontological argument, but also with the more general concept of God that Nec and 
LPNs lack.  First, they have greater parity with the ontological argument because while 
Nec and LPNs can only be a part of parody of the form “necessarily existent being of 
kind k” AntiGod parodies can, much like ontological arguments, be formulated in 
different ways as e.g., “a being than which none worse can be conceived” “a most 
perfect evil being” “that maximal malevolence be instantiated” “actually existent 
AntiGod” and “necessarily existent AntiGod.”  Since AntiGod parodies are classified 
by the subject they purport to prove, and not of a certain form of parody, they can be 
adapted, with greater or lesser levels of success, to every form of parody given, whereas 
Nec and LPNs cannot.  Just as the ontological argument for God may be formulated in 
various ways, so too with the ontological parody argument for AntiGod.   
Second, the concept of AntiGod is a fairly natural mirror to the concept of God, 
as both hold omniscience, omnipotence, and necessary existence, but have diametrically 
morally opposed plans for the world.  Because of this similarity, we can mirror many 
theological issues with AntiGod in ways that make little sense with regard to Nec and 
LPNs.  Here are a host of arguments related to God that can be paralleled cleanly by 
AntiGod parodies, but that do not obviously or immediately apply to Nec and LPNs;  
the Cosmological Argument, the Teleological Argument, arguments from religious 
experience (both cosmological and teleological arguments can show the existence of 
                                                 
18 Grue refers to a mixed predicate used in Goodman 1973 in order to illustrate the new riddle of 
induction.  Swampman, a molecule-for-molecule clone of Davidson created by a freak lightning strike, is 
first mentioned in Davidson 1987 in order to illustrate an issue regarding consciousness and meaning. 
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God as well as the existence of AntiGod, and presumably one can have an experience, 
not of unity and transcendence, but of discord and horror), The Problem of Evil (and 
related Problem of Good), concerns about whether God must create the best world 
(must AntiGod create the worst world?), free will’s value in the context of creation (if 
freely chosen love of and relationship with God is the more significant, then isn’t freely 
choosing to do evil and harm also more morally significant?), free will as a defense 
against the problem of Evil and/or Good (if free will is valuable as suggested above, 
then there is both a reason for God and AntiGod to allow it to be a feature of humanity), 
and others.    
Having shown the superiority of AntiGod parodies compared to other parodies 
that prove the existence of immaterial objects, we now turn to presentation of the 
AntiGod ontological parody. 
IV.C Haight and Haight 
 In this subsection, I present the arguments of Haight and Haight for an AntiGod 
(or as Haight and Haight refer to the entity, the devil).   
The argument of Haight and Haight is as follows. 
  Anselm’s first argument, roughly, is as follows: 
1. I have a concept of something ‘than which nothing greater can be 
conceived. 
2. If that ‘something’ did not actually, or in fact, exist, it would not be 
‘that than which none greater can be conceived,’ for something could 
always be conceived to be greater, viz., something that actually 
exists. 
3. This ‘greatest something’ is, by logical equivalence, or definition, 
‘God.’ 
4. God exists. 
An ontological argument for the devil, by analogue of reason, goes as 
follows: 




2. If that ‘something’ did not actually, or in fact, exist, it would not be 
‘that than which nothing worse could be conceived,’ because 
something could always be conceived to be much worse, viz., 
something that actually exists. 
3. This ‘greatest something’ we shall call the Devil. 
4. The Devil exists. 
This second ontological argument, by parity of reasoning with the first, 
seems sound, if indeed, the first is.  Is it not conceivable that not only do 
we have an idea of something that is the worst possible thing, but that it 
would have to exist if it truly were the worst possible thing?  Hence, the 
very possibility of the Devil implies his actuality, just as the very 
possibility of God implies his existence.  The logic is the same, in both 
cases: a devil would not be the Devil unless he existed and was therefore 
the most awful thing, just as a god would not be God unless he existed 
was therefore the greatest thing. (Haight and Haight, 1970, 218 – 219) 
 
 Haight and Haight’s version of the argument is the most intuitive formulation of 
the AntiGod parody.   Haight and Haight make an important point when they say “Is it 
not conceivable that not only do we have an idea of something that is the worst possible 
thing, but that it would have to exist if it truly were the worst possible thing?” (Haight 
and Haight 1970, 219).  The idea runs parallel to Anselm’s argument, that if we imagine 
the most perfect good being, a being with all of the same characteristics would be 
greater if it existed than not, presumably at least for reasons of efficacy.  Isn’t the same 
true of the most perfect evil being?  It could presumably be a more significant evil if it 
were existent and efficacious rather than not.  Surely I would prefer to be the object of 
hatred and stalking of a nonexistent perfectly evil being than one that hates and despises 
me but that is also existent.  Haight and Haight also evince a point I made above about 
AntiGod parodies, which is that they are capable of being employed in any form of 
parody that mirrors the suitable formulation of the ontological argument, whether it is 
based on Anselm or Plantinga or Gödel’s reasoning.   
Section V. Must Parody Arguments Fail? 
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 In the final section of this chapter, I examine Yujin Nagasawa’s persuasive and 
forcefully argued “The Ontological Argument and the Devil,” (Nagasawa 2010).  
Nagasawa not only claims that both the AntiGod objection of Peter Millican and the 
extreme-no-devil corollary of Timothy Chambers fail to appropriately parody the 
ontological argument, but also that any parody whatsoever is required to fail as 
compared to the ontological argument.  He argues that all parody objections fail for at 
least one of the following two reasons: that parody arguments fail to be structurally 
parallel to the ontological argument, or that parody arguments fail to be dialectically 
parallel to the ontological argument (Nagasawa 2010, 91).  To illustrate these cases, I 
will present Nagasawa’s arguments against both Millican’s AntiGod, Nagasawa’s own 
devil argument, and the island objection of Gaunilo.   
V.A The Global Challenge to Parody 
 Prior to going on the offensive, Nagasawa expresses great appreciation for the 
power of parodies.  He notes that it is often the case that the parody objection 
(presumably this means any kind of parody) is seen as just an odd consequence of the 
argument, or a “second-class supplementary objection,” (Nagasawa 2010, 77).  He 
writes that “Few critics regard it as something that could constitute a serious objection 
to the ontological argument,” (Nagasawa 2010, 77).  However, Nagasawa thinks that 
parody objections deserve to be appraised at a higher value than this.  The two primary 
strengths of parody objections that he considers are also strengths that I have discussed 
earlier.  First, he regards the fact that parody objections accept all of the controversial 
metaphysical assumptions of the ontological argument as a virtue.  This is in line with 
what I argued earlier was a strength of parody objections, namely that parody objections 
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face the argument in its strongest form, without getting involved over queries about the 
nature of existence or the relationship between conceivability and possibility.   
Second, he notes (rightly) that parody objections are to be taken seriously 
because they can be modified and adapted to a wide variety of versions of the 
ontological argument.  Many other objections to the ontological argument are only 
objections to specific kinds of ontological argument.  Thus, Norman Malcolm argues 
that the version of the ontological argument given by Anselm in Proslogion II is 
“fallacious because it rests on the false doctrine that existence is a perfection,” 
(Malcolm 1960, 44).  However, he thinks that Kant, and all of his defenders in the 20th 
century have failed to show that the same is true for necessary existence.  Similarly, 
objecting to the Cartesian version of the ontological argument does not, at least 
immediately, turn into an objection to Anselm’s argument, or any contemporary version 
of the argument.  In fact, part of the reason for the resurgence of the ontological 
argument, aside from sociological conditions in academia, is the development in the 
early 20th century of various modal logics, and the possible world semantics often 
associated with these logics.  The development of modal logic and semantics for it, 
according to people like Malcolm, Hartshorne, and Plantinga, allow us to rescue and 
reformulate some version of the ontological argument.  So modal arguments are 
hermetically sealed off from certain kinds of criticisms because of their different 
structure and their usage of a system that allows us to be more precise about necessity, 
possibility, and the like.  Note, though, that there are not only parody objections to 
definitional or conceptual ontological arguments, but also parody objections to any of 
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the modal arguments.19  Parody objections, then, are suited to just about any version of 
the ontological argument, and this breadth of applicability is one reason to evaluate 
them more highly than has been historically the case.  In fact, this is one of 
considerations I argued for in section IV.2 regarding the supremacy of AntiGod 
parodies to other kinds of parody.  There is certainly no hint of a straw man in 
Nagasawa’ presentation; like proponents of parody arguments, he wants to take on the 
rival view on its strongest terms.   
 In order to discuss Nagasawa’s critique of Millican’s parody, we must examine 
both Millican’s formulation of Anselm’s argument, as well as his parody.   
 Millican’s version of Anselm’s argument is as follows. 
1. The phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought’ is 
clearly understood by the Fool, and apparently makes sense. 
2. Hence, we can take the phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-greater-
nature-can-be-thought’ as successfully denoting some specific nature. 
3. A nature which is instantiated in reality is greater than one which is 
not. 
4. So, if a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought were not 
instantiated in reality, then it would be possible to think of a nature that 
is greater. 
5. But this would be a contradiction, since it is obviously impossible to 
think of a nature that is greater than a-nature-than-which-no-greater-
nature-can-be-thought.   
6. Therefore, a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought 
must indeed be instantiated in reality. (Millican 2004, 457 – 458) 
 
Millican’s parody argument contains the following two substitutions for 
Anselm’s argument.   
1a. The phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-more-effectively-evil-nature-
can-be-thought’ is clearly understood by the Fool, and apparently makes 
sense. 
2a. Hence, we can take the phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-more-
effectively-evil-nature-can-be-thought’ as successfully denoting some 
specific nature. (Millican 2004, 461) 
                                                 




 The parody moves straightforwardly from this point.  Since it parallels the 
ontological argument, it is supposed to prove the existence of AntiGod just as well as 
the ontological argument proves the existence of God.  But there is no such being as 
AntiGod (for either theists or atheists).  So the ontological argument must be fallacious.   
 Nagasawa contends that in order for this parody to be successful, Millican also 
needs to substitute the following premise for 3 in his formulation of Anselm’s 
argument.  “3a. A nature which is instantiated in reality is more effectively evil than one 
which is not,” (Nagasawa 2010, 80).  However, this is open to several immediate 
counterexamples.  To use Nagasawa’s own, an existent morally perfect being would be 
more effectively evil than any nonexistent being.  To make the substituted principle 
stronger, Nagasawa suggests it be altered to “3b. An evil nature which is instantiated in 
reality is more effectively evil than one which is not,” (Nagasawa 2010, 80).  This 
change requires Millican to alter premises 4 and 5 of the original argument to the 
following, which allows us to get to the conclusion directly presented. 
4a. So if a-nature-than-which-no-more-effectively-evil-nature-can-be-
thought were not instantiated in reality, then it would be possible to think 
of a nature that is more effectively evil (for example, any evil nature that 
is in fact instantiated in reality). 
5a. But this would be a contradiction, since it is obviously impossible for 
think of a nature that is more effectively evil than a-nature-than-which-
no-more-effectively-evil-nature-can-be-thought. 
6a. Therefore, a-nature-than-which-no-more-effectively-evil-nature-can-
be-thought must indeed be instantiated in reality. (Nagasawa 2010, 80 – 
81) 
 
 According to Nagasawa, these changes make the argument formally valid at the 
cost of losing both its structural and dialectical parallels with the ontological argument.  
Regarding its structure, Nagasawa argues that the theory of natures that underlies the 
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original argument is concerned with greatness, not effective evilness.  Regarding its 
dialectical efficacy, Nagasawa suggests both that no proponent of the ontological 
argument would find it reasonable to accept 3b, and that the argument is explicitly 
question-begging in ways the original argument is not.  This is because Nagasawa 
thinks that the use of the term “effective” already includes an instantiation requirement, 
whereas greatness does not.  So Millican’s argument fails to be either structurally or 
dialectically parallel to Anselm’s argument.20   
   Nagasawa also presents a version of the devil argument that he holds to be 
better than Millican’s AntiGod argument in regards to structure and dialectic.   
1c. The phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-worse-nature-can-be-thought’ is 
clearly understood by the Fool, and apparently makes sense. 
2c. Hence, we can take the phrase ‘a-nature-than-which-no-worse-
nature-can-be-thought’ as successfully denoting some specific nature. 
3c. A nature which is instantiated in reality is worse than one which is 
not. 
4c. So if a-nature-than-which-no-worse-nature-can-be-thought were not 
instantiated in reality, then it would be possible to think of a nature that 
is worse (for example, any nature that is in fact instantiated in reality).   
5c. But this would be a contradiction, since it is obviously impossible to 
think of a nature that is worse than a-nature-than-which-no-worse-
nature-can-be-thought. 
6c. Therefore, a-nature-than-which-no-worse-nature-can-be-thought 
must indeed be instantiated in reality. (Nagasawa 2010, 81 – 82) 
 
 This argument is “clearly structurally parallel: it merely replaces the phrase 
‘greater’ in the original argument with ‘worse’,” (Nagasawa 2010, 82).  Nagasawa 
thinks that even though this parody objection is closer to the structure of the ontological 
argument than Millican’s, it still fails in that it is not dialectically parallel.21  The devil 
                                                 
20 It is not clear to me why the argument being question-begging is a dialectical infelicity, as opposed to a 
structural one, but this hardly matters. 
21 This is not how Nagasawa himself characterizes this problem.  However, he says immediately before 
this that the argument is “clearly structurally parallel” and since the only other failure he mentions is 
characterized as failing to be dialectically parallel, this seems to be the appropriate label.   
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argument given above would not threaten a proponent of the ontological argument 
because 3c is inconsistent with 3.  I am not sure why Nagasawa thinks that this removes 
the devil argument from consideration by proponents of the ontological argument.  
While it is true that 3c is inconsistent with 3, the end result of either argument will be 
inconsistent with the conclusion of the other.   
 One way to understand what Nagasawa is saying here is to interpret him as 
charging the devil argument with an absence of dialectical parallel.  The proponent of 
the ontological argument may simply feel no reason to accept 3c, given their previous 
commitment to 3.  And perhaps this is correct.  If I am antecedently convinced of A, 
and a premise in one of your counterarguments implies ~A, then of course I am likely to 
see you as simply begging the question against my argument.  So, whether it is 
structurally infelicitous to have a premise that is inconsistent with the parodied 
argument, it may very well be dialectically inappropriate.   
 Finally, let us consider Nagasawa’s analysis of Gaunilo’s Island objection 
(Nagasawa 2010, 88).  He suggests that its rejection by proponents of the argument 
(both historical and contemporary) is illustrative of two common problems with parody 
objections.  For one thing, the Island fails because its scope is inappropriately narrow.  
Instead of being concerned with the entirety of possible entities, the island objection is 
concerned only with possible islands.  On Nagasawa’s view, this is evidence of 
Gaunilo’s objection failing to be structurally parallel to the ontological argument.  For 
another, the Island objection is committed to an assumption that proponents of the 
ontological argument are not committed to.  While proponents of the argument are 
committed to there being some intrinsic maxima (i.e. upper limit or bound) about the 
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properties traditionally associated with God, they are not so committed to the idea that 
properties associated with islands also have an intrinsic maxima.22  
 Finally, we get a more determinate sense of what exactly the phrases 
“structurally parallel” and “dialectically parallel” amount to.  Nagasawa’s analysis of 
the various parodies discussed above always results in the parodies’ failure – either by 
failing to be structurally parallel, or by failing to be dialectically parallel.   
These observations suggest the following hypothesis.  The parody 
objection always fails because any parody argument is such that either (i) 
it is not structurally parallel to the ontological argument (typically 
because its scope is too narrow), or (ii) it is not dialectically parallel to 
the ontological argument (typically because it makes extra assumptions 
to which the proponents of the ontological argument are not committed). 
(Nagasawa 2010, 91) 
 
While these remarks are helpful in determining the content of the phrases “structurally 
parallel” and “dialectically parallel” the next paragraph shows us just how far Nagasawa 
takes these notions! 
To circumvent (i) and (ii), proponents of the parody objection need to 
revise either the no-devil argument or no-devil corollary, by eliminating 
the assumptions which proponents of the ontological argument do not 
endorse, while keeping the structure parallel to that of the ontological 
argument.  However, ironically, once an instance of the parody argument 
is modified in this way, it is no longer a parody: it is the ontological 
argument itself.  Of course one cannot undermine the ontological 
argument by advancing the ontological argument itself. (Nagasawa 2010, 
91) 
 
 For Nagasawa, then, an argument being structurally parallel to the ontological 
argument means at least having the same scope as the ontological argument (all possible 
beings).  There are other conditions, but these are very unclear.  For example, Millican’s 
argument is charged with failing the test of being structurally parallel because it 
                                                 
22 As in note 7, this is not how Nagasawa himself characterizes this failure of the Island objection.  But 
when we see how he discusses what “not being dialectically parallel” refers to, my interpretation will be 
confirmed.   
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replaces the property of “greatness” with “effective evilness,” (Nagasawa 2010, 80 – 
81).  But the devil argument given by Nagasawa is said to be “clearly structurally 
parallel” and the reason cited for this is that it “merely replaces the phrase ‘greater’ in 
the original argument with ‘worse’,” (Nagasawa 2010, 82).  We will come back to this 
point.   
 An argument fails to be dialectically parallel when it either contains a 
commitment that is not held by the proponents of the paralleled argument, or when it 
contains circular reasoning not present in the paralleled argument (Nagasawa 2010, 81, 
91).   
 According to Nagasawa, all parody objections necessarily fail, either by not 
being structurally parallel or by not being dialectically parallel.  Finally, we should in 
fairness note that Nagasawa proposes this as a hypothesis, although his final statement 
evinces a higher level of certainty than hypothesizing would permit.   
V.B Gaunilo’s Revenge 
 While I find parts of Nagasawa’s article persuasive, I think that both notions of 
“structurally parallel” and “dialectically parallel” are problematically defined.  First, I 
think that the notions of “structurally parallel” and “dialectically parallel” are too vague 
to be of any use here.  In fact, I think that there are times that the terms act so elastically 
that one suspects some kind of circularity.  Second, I think that the phrase “structurally 
parallel” contains an unreasonably high standard.  It approaches identity, and this has to 
be false as two things can be structurally parallel without being identical.23  I will first 
                                                 




examine and discuss both being structurally parallel and being dialectically parallel, and 
then give my arguments against the viability of these terms as used by Nagasawa.   
 Nowhere does Nagasawa provide us a clear and precise definition of either 
“being structurally parallel” or “being dialectically parallel.”  It is safe to assume that 
these terms are used in a rough but intuitive way.  Regarding being structurally parallel, 
the structure of an argument might be thought to only be its syntactic properties.  
However, this is too broad for obvious reasons of application.  An argument A being 
structurally parallel to an argument B, at least in the case of parody arguments, is 
supposed to show something important about either the content or the processes used in 
A or B.  If the structural parallel only requires syntactic parallels, though, then 
arguments clearly unrelated to one another would be sufficiently parallel (and thus, 
possibly parodic).  On this understanding, the following two arguments would be 
structurally parallel. 
  1d. If John gets a boo-boo, then John cries.   
  2d. John gets a boo-boo. 
  3d. Therefore, John cries.   
 
And 
1e. If apples turn orange in the winter, then Gore will be elected 
President of the Galaxy. 
  2e. Apples turn orange in the winter. 
  3e. Therefore, Gore will be elected President of the Galaxy. 
 
I am certainly not suggesting that these two arguments do not share some 
structural elements (I doubt that Nagasawa would deny this either).  They both exhibit 
the modus ponens style of argument.  However, if the metric of being structurally 
parallel is to give us some information about whether the content of the argument, as 
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well as its form, is viable or not, or if it is to be of use in a parody style argument or 
objection, then it must be more strict.  1e-3e do not suffice as a parody of 1d-3d.     
 So far, Nagasawa and I are in supposed agreement.  An argument being 
structurally parallel to another will require a high degree of similarity not only in its 
syntactic properties (how many premises is has, the logical structure of those premises, 
etc.) but also in its semantic properties.  For example, recall that Nagasawa objects that 
Millican’s argument is not “structurally parallel” to the ontological argument since it 
either a) 3 in the original argument is concerned with the property of “greatness,” 
whereas 3b is concerned with the property of “effective evilness,” or b) because the first 
part of 3 is about natures full stop, whereas the first part of 3b is about evil natures.24  In 
either case, the concern is not with broad logical structures of the argument, but the 
substitution or replacement of one term with another.   
 The problem here is that the line between two things having the property “being 
structurally parallel” and “not being structurally parallel” is never clearly defined, and 
when the statement is made that something is or is not structurally parallel with another 
thing, Nagasawa gives no defense of this.25  I find it highly implausible that a mere 
substitution of “worse” for “greater” throughout the argument counts as an instance of 
being structurally parallel, but the substitution of “effectively evil” for “greatness” 
throughout the argument is not (in fact, they seem to me to both count as structurally 
parallel).  What could countenance such a judgment?  If Nagasawa has a worked out 
                                                 
24 Disjunct b.) is discussed in Nagasawa 2010, 80, but Nagasawa says “This modification renders the 
parody argument not structurally parallel to Anselm’s ontological argument, but I set this point aside in 
favor of Millican.”  Notice, though, that this does count as an instance of a failure of the parody argument 
to be structurally parallel to the ontological argument, so can aid us in attempting to understand the 
content of the phrase for Nagasawa. 
25 I assume that the property “being structurally parallel” is a two place, relational property.  So, for any 
argument x, any argument y, and the property “being structurally parallel” represented by Z, we would 
have Zxy, or “x stands in relationship Z to y.”   
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system for deciding these things, it is never shared with the reader, explicated, or 
defended.   
 Of course, this judgment looks even more suspicious when every instance of a 
structurally and dialectically parallel parody turns out to be harmless, while the 
potentially unsettling and effective objections are considered too dissimilar to be 
counted as structurally and dialectically parallel.26  Without being given more 
information, and without any additional argumentation on the part of Nagasawa, I think 
we must reject the usefulness of the property  
“being structurally parallel” under Nagasawa’s description on grounds of vagueness 
(and consequently, Nagasawa’s broad criticism of all parodies). 
 Regarding being dialectically parallel, we again are operating on a rough and 
intuitive level.  To be charged with dialectically failing in some way, an argument or 
critique is made without taking into account its place in the dialectical structure.   For 
example, I might have a greater burden to bear in justifying a premise of an original 
argument rather than one involved in a criticism, because if I am making the argument, 
then dialectically my position is such that it is important that I convince you or show my 
argument to be justified.  The critic, on the other hand, is proving a negative rather than 
positive thesis, and so might be considered to be less constrained by the original 
commitments of the argument. 
 In the case of the parodist, they are trying to accept all or the majority of the 
controversial metaphysical assumptions involved in the argument.  Of course, we 
wouldn’t expect the parodist to accept every assumption or consequence of the 
                                                 
26 I am getting a bit ahead of myself in speaking of arguments being dialectically parallel, but for the sake 
of accuracy in this sentence, I must.  The reader will find this statement justified in time.    
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argument, especially if it ruled out the parodists’ own argument.  We might judge an 
argument to be more or less dialectically parallel with another by determine exactly 
how many of the assumptions of the original argument are accepted by the proponent of 
the other argument.   
 Would we expect that the proponents of the original argument would also need 
to assent to every premise of the parody argument in order for it to be dialectically 
parallel?  Nagasawa holds that this is the case, but it strikes me as plausible only in a 
stronger sense.  Perhaps if we want the parody argument to be dialectically identical to 
the original argument, we would require this.  But a things being parallel to another and 
a thing being identical to another are not, with respect, identical.   
 Of course, if we are conscientious parodists we will spend some time motivating 
those premises that bear a structural similarity to the original argument but that the 
proponents of the original argument do not accept.  We might give long, extended 
arguments showing the similarity between the premises (save the necessary crucial 
difference that allows for a parodic conclusion) of the parody argument and the original 
argument.  We might show how the traditional moves made in support of the premise in 
the original argument can also be made for the premise in our parody counterargument.  
Or, of course, we might point out that a premise not argued for in the original argument 
does not commit us to make a long, extended argument for the similar premise in our 
parody argument.  We might, as conscientious parodists, do any of these things.  But, if 
at the end of the day, we found the proponents of the original argument resolute in their 
rejection of our similar but slightly altered premise, should this count as failing to be 
dialectically parallel?  I do not think it should.  Without additional explication of the 
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concept or argument from Nagasawa, I conclude we should reject his account of “being 
dialectically parallel to” as too vague, or (alternatively too strong).    
 An additional difficulty is captured when we reexamine the strength of 
Nagasawa’s final characterization of how parody arguments could possibly overcome 
failure to either be structurally or dialectically parallel.  
To circumvent (i) and (ii), proponents of the parody objection need to 
revise either the no-devil argument or no-devil corollary, by eliminating 
the assumptions which proponents of the ontological argument do not 
endorse, while keeping the structure parallel to that of the ontological 
argument.  However, ironically, once an instance of the parody 
argument is modified in this way, it is no longer a parody: it is the 
ontological argument itself.  Of course one cannot undermine the 
ontological argument by advancing the ontological argument itself. 
(Nagasawa 2010, 91, emphasis mine) 
 
 This characterization, coming at the end of the paper and after the preceding 
arguments, gives us the most penetrating insight into Nagasawa’s notions of “being 
structurally parallel” and “being dialectically parallel” yet.  In fact, this restatement of 
how something would be both structurally and dialectically parallel sounds more like a 
definition of structural and dialectical identity.  If, in order to be structurally and 
dialectically parallel to the ontological argument, parody arguments must essentially 
become the ontological argument, then the concepts we have been discussing are simply 
identity concepts, not concepts of being parallel to.  If this is, true, though, then it begs 
the question against the parodist.  If being structurally and dialectically parallel to the 
ontological argument comes to mean being structurally and dialectically identical to the 
ontological argument, then we should not be surprised that all parodies everywhere 
must always fail.  We don’t even need to argue for this conclusion, rather we should just 
explicitly define the concepts early on in our exploration.   
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 Just as it does not come as a surprise that all parody arguments must fail if the 
properties of “being structurally parallel to” and “being dialectically parallel to” are 
actually properties that require the two arguments to be identical and not merely 
parallel, it will come as no surprise that any parodist worth their salt will reject 
Nagasawa’s account of these notions as not only vague, but also question begging.  Of 
course, I will argue that the parody objections discussed above (especially the AntiGod 
objection) do, ultimately, fail, but not for the reasons that Nagasawa has given.   
Section VI. Conclusion  
 In this chapter, I have argued that parody arguments are stronger than other 
kinds of objections to the ontological argument.  I have modified and expanded Oppy’s 
taxonomy of parody objections to the ontological arguments, and explained the form of 
each.  I have argued that an entire class of parody objections can be safely rejected by 
the proponent of the ontological argument.  I have argued that, with respect to what are 
normally called “devil parodies” should instead be referred to as “AntiGod” parodies.  I 
have argued that, of the remaining possible parodies to the ontological argument, 
AntiGod parodies are the strongest and most effective available.  Finally, I examine 
Nagasawa’s argument that all parody objections necessarily fail.  In doing so, I 
conclude that his global argument against parodies is poorly supported due to the vague 
and elastic nature of the notions of “being structurally parallel to” and “being 
dialectically parallel to”, since these two criteria are the main reasons given by 
Nagasawa to reject all possible parodies. 
 If this chapter as a whole is correct, then the major obstacle to the ontological 
argument will be AntiGod parodies, parodies that purport to prove the existence or 
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necessary existence of a supremely powerful, supremely knowledgeable, and supremely 
evil immaterial being.  Since this kind of objection is as powerful as I claim, a natural 
move towards both understanding its content and understanding whether it does serve as 
a true parody of the ontological argument will require engaging in some metaphysics of 
ethical concepts.  In the next chapter, I examine the convertibility thesis of being and 
goodness (and the related privation theory of evil) held by medieval philosophers.  If 
this account of the relationship between being and goodness, and goodness and evil, is 




Chapter 4: Being and Goodness 
Section I. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will explore the convertibility thesis of being and goodness 
(hereafter CT).  At the beginning of the chapter, I will discuss some details of historical 
treatments of CT.  Since it plays a significant role in the central argument of the 
dissertation (Chapter 5), it will be necessary to discuss CT at length, give possible 
formulations of the thesis, and give some content to the notions of both “being” and 
“goodness,” all of which occur in section III.  Of course, the most pressing concern is 
whether or not CT is viable for a contemporary analytic philosopher who is not 
antecedently convinced of the truth of theism.  In other words, a critic might ask “Why 
should we think CT is itself true or even remotely plausible?"  I will conclude by 
examining this question in some depth and arguing for the reflective plausibility of CT 
even in our own time.  By “reflective plausibility” I mean that CT is plausible on 
reflection, after analysis and argument.  I want to note at the outset that I am not 
attempting a full, robust defense of CT – if that were my aim, then that would be the 
entire focus of the dissertation.  Instead, since so many contemporary philosophers 
believe that CT is so abjectly and obviously absurd as to require almost no 
consideration, I will aim only to demonstrate that CT has some basic level of 
plausibility and that the obvious considerations against it are neither obvious nor 
decisive.  I will also show that there are arguments from Thomas Aquinas as well as 
contemporary writers in support of the thesis.  This is what I mean by saying that I will 
defend the reflective plausibility of CT independently of theistic assumptions. 
Section II. Being and Goodness – Historical Instances and Precursors 
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 The origins of CT are located in a more general view of the relation between 
being and goodness.  It has historically been argued that there must be some kind of 
necessary metaphysical relation between being and goodness, though in different works 
the relationships between particular characteristics are underspecified.  Call this view 
proto-CT (hereafter PCT).   PCT is found in the works of Plato and Aristotle, which 
influenced the views of later philosophers, especially those writing during the medieval 
period.  This view is not as specific as CT, though CT is one particular instance of this 
more general view.   
CT, simply put, is that being and goodness pick out all the same things in the 
world, even though the concepts are not identical.  They are the same in extension but 
differ in intension.   Put another way, they are the same in reference and differ in sense.  
In the next section of this chapter I explain this thesis, but the primary focus of this 
initial section is to give the rudimentary historical context for this view. 
 The first instance of PCT stretches as far back as Plato.2728   For Plato, the world 
can be divided into the categories of material and immaterial entities (for example, the 
Forms).  Insofar as material entities change, degrade, come to be, and pass away, they 
are inferior to entities that are unalterable, incorruptible, and that always are, such as the 
Forms.  We already see that in Plato there are degrees of existence and that it is better to 
have the highest degree of existence rather than a lower degree.  This is intuitively a 
                                                 
27 I'll note that since this dissertation is not focused primarily on engaging in historical scholarship, much 
of what I say here will be rough and general.  There are undoubtedly issues of interpretation and language 
use that would either be too far afield for the topic of this chapter or that would require greater facility 
with ancient languages or scholarship than I possess.  In my defense, I note that the view that idea that 
goodness and being have some meaningful connection in Plato and Aristotle is a common and mostly 
uncontested one in philosophy.  For example, see Baker 2016, MacDonald 1991b, Reeve 2003, Schindler 
2005, and Shields 2011.  
28 All references to Plato are from Plato 1997.  In text citations will follow the traditional citation style 
associated with Plato’s works of Title of Work, passage number and letter (e.g. Republic, 516a7-10).  I 
will follow this same convention for Aristotle’s works, using Aristotle 1984. 
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statement of a relationship between being and goodness.  However, in Plato, this goes 
even further.  Asked how the forms are related to one another, Plato answers that the 
Form of the Good is that which generates all other Forms, that which is the apex of 
existence or being (and by extension, that which generates all other objects) (Republic, 
509b5-10).  So at this point, we have a strong identification of the foundation of all 
being (and the highest being) with the Good.  Although this is a different form of this 
relationship than that advanced by medieval philosophers, it is the basis for much of the 
later development of CT. 
Aristotle, too, held a kind of PCT.   Both goodness and being are 
Transcendentals, according to Aristotle (Metaphysics IV, c. 2, 1003 b 23–4, 
Nichomachean Ethics c. 4, 1096 a 12 sqq).29  This means that they are themselves not 
subject to the categories of substance, quality, quantity, etc.  Rather, everything that can 
be classified by the categories exhibits the Transcendentals.  One of the Transcendentals 
that is exhibited by everything that is, as given in the Metaphysics, is the good.  Further, 
Aristotle says that the good is spoken of in as many ways as being (Nichomachean 
Ethics c. 6 1096 a 23-24).  Insofar as everything that may be categorized is existent or is 
a being, then being or existence transcends the categories.  The same is true of good.30  
 Building upon the works of Aristotle and Plato, CT is developed by several 
medieval philosophers.31  The earliest example is perhaps Augustine of Hippo, who 
argues for CT in the City of God, Confessions, and the Enchiridion.   Insofar as existent 
                                                 
29 These particular passages are cited in Goris and Aertsen 2013. 
30 For more on this connection, see Goris and Aertsen 2013.   
31 Of course, the precise dating of the medieval period has been and continues to be a matter of 
controversy.  For example, someone might object that Augustine is a Church father and not a medieval 
philosopher.  The precise dating is of no importance to the author.  Readers should alter the labeling as 
they see fit for Augustine, Boethius, and pseudo-Dionysius. 
96 
 
things flow from God, which is the First Good, they are good.  Augustine also holds 
that for something to realize its good, it must first exist.  The more fully it realizes its 
good, the more fully it exists.  This is pointedly brought out when Augustine considers 
the nature of evil.  Evil is classified as a privation, as opposed to something with its own 
positive character.  For something to be purely evil, would simply be for that thing to 
not exist at all.  He writes, 
Therefore, if they shall be deprived of all good, they shall no longer be. 
So long, therefore, as they are, they are good; therefore whatsoever is, is 
good. That evil, then, which I sought whence it was, is not any 
substance; for were it a substance, it would be good. For either it would 
be an incorruptible substance, and so a chief good, or a corruptible 
substance, which unless it were good it could not be corrupted. I 
perceived, therefore, and it was made clear to me, that Thou made all 
things good, nor is there any substance at all that was not made by You; 
and because all that You have made are not equal, therefore all things 
are; because individually they are good, and altogether very good, 
because our God made all things very good. (Augustine 1887, 
Confessions VII.xii) 
 
This leads us to a certain view of CT, though it is not the only view.  In fact, it is 
not the only view of CT in Augustine’s own writings.  For example, in City of God, 
Augustine writes of the fallen angels 
And to them it is an evil, solely because it corrupts the good of their 
nature. It is not nature, therefore, but vice, which is contrary to God. For 
that which is evil is contrary to the good. And who will deny that God is 
the supreme good? Vice, therefore, is contrary to God, as evil to good. 
Further, the nature it vitiates is a good, and therefore to this good also it 
is contrary. But while it is contrary to God only as evil to good, it is 
contrary to the nature it vitiates, both as evil and as hurtful. For to God 
no evils are hurtful; but only to natures mutable and corruptible, though, 
by the testimony of the vices themselves, originally good. For were they 
not good, vices could not hurt them. For how do they hurt them but by 
depriving them of integrity, beauty, welfare, virtue, and, in short, 
whatever natural good vice is wont to diminish or destroy? But if there 
be no good to take away, then no injury can be done, and consequently 
there can be no vice. For it is impossible that there should be a harmless 
vice. Whence we gather, that though vice cannot injure the unchangeable 
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good, it can injure nothing but good; because it does not exist where it 
does not injure. This, then, may be thus formulated: Vice cannot be in 
the highest good, and cannot be but in some good. Things solely good, 
therefore, can in some circumstances exist; things solely evil, never; for 
even those natures which are vitiated by an evil will, so far indeed as 
they are vitiated, are evil, but in so far as they are natures they are good. 
(Augustine 1887, City of God XII.iii)32 
 
Thus, as MacDonald has also pointed out, Augustine seems to be inconsistent 
concerning his understanding and treatment of CT, as he either adopts different 
approaches at different times or confusedly merges the two together (MacDonald 
1991b, 9-11).   These different approaches will be discussed briefly at the beginning of 
Section III in this chapter. 
 Boethius is another early proponent of CT.  In fact, the development of later 
medieval thought is particularly influenced by Boethius’ work, as several commentaries 
on De Hebdomadibus (Boethius 1991) show.  In Boethius 1991, we find that author 
pondering the question of how existent things are good, when they are not substantial 
goods.  The answer, it turns out, is that they are good in virtue of the fact that they are 
created and sustained by the First Good, which is God.33  De Hebdomadibus is a short, 
dense, and above all opaque text.  Consider the following passage:  
Therefore, they are said to be good because their being flowed from the 
will of the good.  For the first good, because it is, is good in virtue of the 
fact that it is.  But a second good, because it flowed from that whose 
being itself is good, is itself good.  But the being itself of all things 
flowed from that which is the first good and which is such that it is 
properly said to be good in virtue of the fact that it is.  Therefore, their 
being itself is good, for it is then in it [--that is to say, the first good].  
(Boethius 1991, 302) 
                                                 
32 There are many other accounts consistent with the varied view that Augustine has about CT and its 
corollary, the privation theory of evil.  For example, Chapters III through VI of Augustine 1950 are about 
both CT and the privation theory of evil in different ways.   
33 What MacDonald calls the “Participation Approach” to CT is captured in this account as well as some 
versions of CT in Augustine.  It does make creatures rely on their being sustained by God in order for 





It is difficult to see exactly how Boethius’ argument is supposed to go, but there can be 
no doubt that this work subsequently influenced a great deal of later medieval thought 
on being and goodness.  Boethius’ understanding of CT is allied with some of the things 
that Augustine writes.  Both Augustine and Boethius were heavily influenced by neo-
platonic philosophers, and the emanationism in those philosophers’ approach 
undoubtedly shaped the views of Boethius and Augustine.   A view of emanation where 
creatures and objects participate in God’s goodness and being, and where God sustains 
both their goodness and being, supports this version of CT.     
 The final early medieval philosopher that we will take note of in this section is 
pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite.  Since pseudo-Dionysius, as Augustine and Boethius 
before him, was heavily influenced by neo-platonic thought, it is not surprising that his 
version of CT is also flavored by emanationism.  In The Divine Names (Pseudo-
Dionysius 1987) pseudo-Dionysius asserts CT, or something like it, at several points.  
As with Augustine, the content of CT for pseudo-Dionysius is brought out most 
powerfully when considering evil, its character, and its origin.  In his work, we see that 
the Good is a precondition for existence of any kind.  Good, then, will always be co-
extensive with being, and vice versa as the cases of supposed evil things illustrate.  He 
writes, 
Evil does not come from the Good.  If it were to come from there, it 
would not be evil.  Fire cannot cool us, and likewise the Good cannot 
produce what is not good.  If everything comes from the Good—and the 
Good naturally gives being and maintains, just as evil naturally tries to 
corrupt and destroy—then no being comes from evil.  Nor will evil itself 
exist if its acts as evil upon itself, and unless it does this, then evil is not 
entirely evil but has something of the Good within it which enables it to 




 Finally, as a historical note, I should point out that many other philosophers held this 
view, especially leading up to and continuing after Thomas Aquinas, who will be a 
focal point for the next section of this chapter.  However, the purpose of discussing each 
of these figures is not to give an extensive, detailed account of the history of CT or its 
forebears.  Rather, it is to note some important, influential accounts of CT or PCT that 
influenced Aquinas and later writers, and to give the reader an idea of exactly how far 
back in history this tradition stretches. 
Section III. Being and Goodness – An Exploration of CT in the Thought of St. 
Thomas Aquinas 
 In this section, I describe Aquinas’ influential account of CT in detail.34  In the 
first place, though, we need to examine the two different versions of CT and focus our 
attention on the version that Aquinas adopts.  This is especially important for the 
following purposes of the chapter and the remainder of the dissertation since the Nature 
Approach (most thoroughly developed by Aquinas) is the only viable approach to adopt 
in the dialectical context of the ontological argument.  This is because adopting the 
Participation Approach begs the question and explicitly assumes the existence of God, 
which undercuts its effectiveness as a background conceptual scheme or theory to 
support an argument for the existence of God.35   
III.A The Participation and Nature Approach to CT 
                                                 
34 Aquinas develops this most carefully in ST I, Q 5, A 1.  I rely heavily on secondary sources for my 
understanding of Aquinas’ metaphysics of being and goodness, especially Aertsen 1985, 1991, 1996, 
1999, Elders 1993, Geach 1955, Goris and Aertsen 2013, Kenny 2002, McInerny 1991, Stump and 
Kretzmann 1991, several essays from MacDonald and Stump 1999, as well as the rest of MacDonald 
1991 not already included in this list. 
35 It should be noted that Aquinas rejects the efficacy of Anselm’s ontological argument in ST I, Q 2, A 1, 
ad. 2.  This is not related to his version of CT, but for epistemic and conceptual reasons discussed in the 
passage cited above. 
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 MacDonald argues that the place of CT in medieval thought is complicated by the fact 
that there are two different, yet prominent ways of understanding the relation between 
being and goodness.  On the Participation Approach, favored by Boethius, pseudo-
Dionysius, and (at some points) Augustine, good and being are co-extensive because of 
the relationship between God and created things.  God is the first, foundational good.  
He is the source of all things in existence, and consequently the source of all things that 
are good.  Since God is the ultimate good, and evil cannot come from good any more 
than cold from heat, then the things God creates must be themselves good.  This 
approach draws on a principle by which a created thing relies on its creator for its 
qualities.  As God is good, and all things come from God, then because they are created 
and sustained by the ultimate goodness, they are themselves good.  This approach was 
popular among Neo-Platonist philosophers and accordingly is considered to be a 
development of the thought of Plato.   
Another approach, found in (at times) Augustine, and most powerfully in 
Aquinas, is what MacDonald calls the Nature Approach.  On this view, being and 
goodness are co-extensive because of the relation between a thing and its completed or 
perfected state.  Insofar as being is a prerequisite for the fulfillment of a thing’s nature, 
it is good.  Alternately, insofar as all good things are, they have being.   
The Nature Approach can be traced to Aristotle.  For Aristotle, a thing is a good 
X, in proportion to how far it attains the perfected or completed nature relevant to the 
kind of thing it is.  For example, we call a hammer good in proportion to how well it 
fulfills its specifying function, in this case hammering nails.  We would call a hammer 
bad when it is broken, poorly made, or otherwise deficient in attaining the end 
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distinctive to it, again hammering nails.  Although the story gets more complicated as 
we move from artifacts to natural creatures, the same thesis holds.  Something is good 
just as far as it fulfills the specifying capabilities unique to its kind.   
The preceding discussion of the Nature Approach is rough; however, a detailed 
examination of Aquinas’ and Alexander’s accounts of CT will clarify the approach 
considerably. 
III.B Aquinas and CT 
 Aquinas’ version of CT is one of the clearer examples of the doctrine found 
among medieval philosophers.  However, to discuss Aquinas’ account of being and 
goodness is to wade into the massive, sprawling territory of his metaphysics.  I will not 
attempt a general account of Aquinas’ metaphysics here, both for reasons of brevity and 
competence. 
 First, it will behoove us to discuss some of Aquinas’ arguments for the 
convertibility of being and goodness.36   The first argument occurs in the subsection of 
the Summa Theologiae, Part I, Question 5, Article 1 entitled “Are goodness and being 
the same really?” (Aquinas 1920, ST I, Q 5, A 1).   We will refer to it as the Argument 
from Desire.  Here, Aquinas begins by asking whether goodness differs really from 
being.  He considers this question by way of three initial objections: that to perceive 
goodness and to perceive being are separable, that good has the form of being and that 
nothing can be its own form, and that goodness come in degrees, unlike being.   I will 
give Aquinas’ answer to this question in full, and then move through it step by step. 
                                                 
36 A good, though short, discussion of these arguments can be found in Stump and Kretzmann 1991, pp. 
99 –101.  I am indebted to this work especially in aiding my understanding of Aquinas’ metaethics, as 
well as his arguments for the convertibility thesis. 
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Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is 
clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in 
this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. 
i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable 
only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But 
everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing 
is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, 
as is clear from the foregoing (ST I, Q 3, A 4; ST I, Q 4, A 1). Hence it is 
clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents 
the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present. (Aquinas 
1920, ST I, Q 5, A 1, Co.) 
 
The first premise of the argument repeats a familiar Aristotelian theme.  It is that 
“goodness is desirable.”  To put it better, we might say: “Whatever is good is 
desirable.”  Aquinas then states that "Something is desirable only insofar as it is 
perfect."  We can already see where the argument is going, and Aquinas immediately 
answers the question bound to be on our minds.  He states that "Everything is perfect so 
far as it is actual."  Then, we get Aquinas' conclusion.  "Therefore it is clear that a thing 
is perfect so far as it exists… Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same 
really.  But goodness presents the aspect of desireableness, which being does not 
present.”  More formally, we can state the initial version of the argument as follows. 
1. The good is that which all desire. 
2. Something is desirable only to the degree that it is perfect. 
3. Something is perfect only to the degree that it is actualized.37 
4. Therefore, a thing’s goodness is the same (in reality/in reference) 
as its being.   
 
Aquinas quickly notes that, although goodness and being are really the same (or 
perhaps better, in reality the same) they do differ in conceptual content.  He notes, 
immediately after establishing that being and goodness are the same, that the good 
                                                 
37 In premise 2 and 3, I take it that "insofar as" is synonymous with "to the degree that" and "to the extent 
that."  I think that this is a natural reading of the phrase, but since it does alter the language used by 
Aquinas himself, it should be noted.     
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presents itself as desirable, which is not true of being.  Thus, they cannot be 
conceptualized as identical, even if they are the same really.38   
At first blush, the argument is too quick.  In replying to the various objections, 
though, Aquinas aids our understanding of the argument put together in such sparse and 
straightforward terms.  For example, in the Reply to Objection 1, Aquinas immediately 
makes a significant distinction that is not made explicit in the main text of the argument.  
Substantial being, Aquinas says, is what a thing has once it is actual, as opposed to 
potential.  This is similar in many ways to contemporary accounts of existence, where a 
thing either exists or does not.  Insofar as something is in act, as opposed to in potentia, 
it has being simply.  As another way to put this, we might say that if something is, it has 
being simply.  This contrasts with what Aquinas calls a thing's relative being, which it 
has only as far as it is some thing or another.  Aquinas uses the example of being white.  
To be white is to be in some particular way or mode.  To be white does not bring 
something out of potential, but rather something must already have being simply to 
participate in this more particular or precise mode of being.  Following Jan Aertsen, we 
will call being simply B1, and being relatively B2 (Aertsen 1999).    
 Aquinas makes a similar distinction between good simply and good relatively.  
To be good simply is to have achieved the ultimate perfection that is suitable for a 
thing, determined by its kind.  On the other hand, to be good relatively is characterized 
by being only partially along the way to achieving the perfection suited to the thing in 
question.  Aquinas writes “Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply 
good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far 
                                                 
38 This way of wording the relation expresses the convertibility of being and goodness as opposed to the 
identity of being and goodness. 
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as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good 
simply, but only relatively,” (Aquinas 1920, ST I, Q 5, A 1, ad. 1.).     Here we can see 
that there are different degrees of goodness, and that the apex of goodness for a thing is 
actually labeled differently than its goodness in any degree short of perfection.  Further, 
we may assert (following Aquinas) that simple existence is itself a relative good.  How 
can we assert this?  For Aquinas, a thing must exist simply before it can come to attain 
its full perfection, or its ultimate or simple goodness.  Since a thing’s existence is the 
first step to attaining its perfection, its existence is itself a perfection (though the 
perfection of simple existence does not entail a thing’s ultimate perfection or goodness).  
Again following Aertsen, I will call simple goodness G1, and relative goodness G2 
(Aertsen 1999).    
 Using the distinctions between B1, B2, G1, and G2, we can make Aquinas’ CT 
in this section of the Summa Theologiae more precise.  In fact, such a precisification 
follows what Aquinas says in the rest of the Reply to Objection 1.  Insofar as something 
has B1, it also possesses G2, since G2 is a prerequisite for G1 and is entailed by B1.  
Alternately, insofar as a thing has G1, it will have B2, since for a thing to reach its 
ultimate perfection will require it to be in some specified mode or another (such as the 
specified mode of being human).  So, whether from examining something’s being 
simply, or something’s simple goodness, we arrive at a form of CT.  “To be (B1) is to 
be good (G2),” and “To be good (G1) is to be (B2).”  This specification of the 
differences between simple being and goodness, and their relative counterparts is 
helpful in further fleshing out why being and goodness, though convertible in reality, 
are nevertheless not convertible in conceptual content.   
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 The second argument that Aquinas gives for CT can be found in both Summa 
Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chapter 37 (Aquinas 1955, SCG, Bk. I, ch. 37), and Summa 
Theologiae, First Part of the Second Part, Question 94 (Aquinas 1920, ST I-II, Q 94).  
We will refer to it as the Argument from Preservation.  Aquinas writes  
Furthermore, “the good is that which all things desire.” The Philosopher 
introduces this remark as a “felicitous saying” in Ethics I. But all things, 
each according to its mode, desire to be in act; this is clear from the fact 
that each thing according to its nature resists corruption. To be in act, 
therefore, constitutes the nature of the good. Hence it is that evil, which 
is opposed to the good, follows when potency is deprived of act, as is 
clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics IX. (Aquinas 1955, SCG, Bk. 
I, ch. 37) 
 
And again, Aquinas writes that “Because in man there is first of all an 
inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all 
substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, 
according to its nature,” (Aquinas 1920, ST I-II, Q 94, A 2, co.).   In both of these 
passages, we can make out an interesting connection between being and goodness.   
1. The good is that which all things desire. 
2. Each thing, according to its nature, resists corruption. 
3. Each thing, according to its nature, desires to be completely 
actualized. 
4. To be completely actualized is to be good. 
5. Therefore, a thing’s goodness is the same (in reality/in reference) 
as its being.  
 
 This argument, as well as the Argument from Desire, begins with the 
Aristotelian and Platonic conception of the good.  Next, Aquinas states that all things 
desire to be completely actualized, as we can see from all things resisting their own 
corruption, or attempting to preserve their being.  But if the good is to be identified with 
that which all things desire, and all things desire the complete or entire actualization of 
their nature, then the good must be identified with the complete or entire actualization 
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of a thing’s nature.  Therefore, the good is the same in reality or in reference, as being.  
This argument is more straightforward than the Argument from Desire, and I note that 
Aquinas does not, in giving this argument, make the distinctions between B1, B2, G1, 
and G2 as above.  However, I think that the argument could be modified in this way 
with no loss of meaning.  In particular, I think that keeping these distinctions in mind is 
helpful for understanding Aquinas’ development of CT, even if he does not explicitly 
use this terminology in this argument.     
 The third argument in Aquinas’ vast corpus is to be found in both Summa 
Contra Gentiles, Book III, Chapter 3 (Aquinas 1955, SCG, Bk. III, ch. 3), and in 
Summa Theologiae, First Part of the Second Part, Question 1 (Aquinas 1920, ST I-II, Q 
1).  These sections are longer than the ones previously given, so I will not reproduce 
them here.  Rather, I will give what I take the argument to be as it spans both works.  I 
also note that this argument has significant similarities to the Argument from Desire.  
We will call it the Argument from Ends. 
1. The good is the final end of desire.   
2. Ends are desired for themselves, or for their instrumental value in 
reaching a more significant end, or for both.   
3. Whatever end is desired only for its own sake is whatever the 
desirer perceives to be its final end.   
4. But, whatever is desired only for its own sake is the complete and 
entire fulfillment of a thing’s nature. 
5. The complete and entire fulfillment of a thing’s nature is just its 
becoming fully actualized. 
6. To be fully actualized is desired for its own sake. 
7. The good is desired for its own sake. 
8. Therefore, the good is the same (in reality/in reference) as being. 
 
Again, the distinctions between B1, B2, G1, and G2 are not made explicit here, but we 
can alter the argument to include these terms with no loss of meaning. As I mentioned 
in discussing the Argument from Preservation, I believe that these divisions between 
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different ways of talking about being and goodness are helpful in understanding 
Aquinas' view as a whole. 
 The final argument we discuss here is misleadingly short, compared to the 
others.  It can also be found in the Summa Contra Gentiles Book III, Chapter 3 
(Aquinas 1955, SCG Bk. III, ch. 3).  We can call this the Argument from Being.  He 
writes, 
Besides, every action and movement are seen to be ordered in some way 
toward being, either that it may be preserved in the species or in the 
individual, or that it may be newly acquired. Now, the very fact of being 
is a good, and so all things desire to be. Therefore, every action and 
movement are for the sake of a good.  (Aquinas 1955, SCG Bk. III, ch. 
3.4) 
 
We can put this in premise-conclusion form as follows. 
1. Every action and movement are ordered toward being. 
2. To be ordered toward being is to preserve the being of the species 
of an individual, or that being may be newly acquired. 
3. To be ordered toward X is to desire X. 
4. So all things desire being.   
5. The good is that which all things desire. 
6. Therefore, the good is the same (in reality/in reference) as being. 
 
What do these various arguments demonstrate?  First, the arguments 
demonstrate that CT is of central importance for Aquinas.  It plays a significant role in 
Aquinas’ system, and so spending time developing and arguing for this theory is 
important insofar as it will have widespread ripple effects on other parts of Thomistic 
philosophy.  Second, that instead of merely adopting or positing the view, Aquinas 
gives several arguments for the Nature Approach to CT.  Other ancient and medieval 
philosophers do argue for their version of PCT and CT, but Aquinas' style makes his 
arguments much clearer for present-day readers.39   
                                                 
39 Compare any of the arguments given by Aquinas and De Hebdomadibus, for example. 
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In this section, I have shown that Aquinas thoroughly develops the Nature 
Approach of CT.  I have also given several arguments for this approach as drawn from 
Aquinas.  The next section goes further by examining and explaining CT in a way that 
is not drawn directly from Aquinas, but from my own thoughts on the subject as well as 
how we might understand this view as applied to contemporary analytic philosophy. 
Section IV. CT, Implications, and Formulations 
In this section, I examine the Nature Approach to CT, as drawing from the 
framework developed by Aquinas.  Then, I briefly discuss the distinction between 
metaphysical and moral goodness.  As metaphysical goodness is a broader category 
than moral goodness, I will show that in some cases metaphysical goodness includes 
moral goodness, while in other cases it does not.  Finally, I discuss the idea of degrees 
of being, and of unqualified and qualified being. 
Since CT is central to the argument of the final chapter, and since it is 
notoriously difficult to explain, this section represents my own attempt to explain the 
nuances of CT and some implications.40  I have explained CT at several points in earlier 
sections, and I will assume the reader understands how being and goodness are 
supposed to relate on CT.  In preparation for work completed in later sections, I note 
that qualified and unqualified being and goodness are captured in the G1, G2, B1, B2 
schema used above in the discussion of Aquinas’ arguments for the Nature Approach of 
CT, and taken from Aertsen 1999.     
IV.A Metaphysical vs. Moral Goodness 
                                                 
40 In writing this section, I am deeply indebted to Alexander 2012, and those scholars that aided in my 
understanding of Aquinas’ Nature Approach to CT referred to in footnote 5.  I have not attempted to 
make everything I say here consistent with Aquinas’ particular religious version of CT, but I do believe it 
to be in the spirit of a broadly Aristotelian/Thomistic Nature Approach to CT.   
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There are notions of goodness that seem to be entirely different from the 
familiar notion of moral goodness.  In this section, I will briefly explain how I 
understand metaphysical goodness as it differs from moral goodness.   
Moral goodness is a familiar concept to all philosophers.  When we observe a 
person hurting another, or aiding another, we evaluate these situations in many ways: 
we might talk about praise, blame, intentions, consequences, character, obligations, 
rights, etc.  Moral goodness is a familiar concept with a variety of applications.41  On 
the Nature Approach of CT, this will be analyzed in terms of the fulfillment or 
impediment of any entity’s nature or function, as long as that entity is a proper subject 
of moral consideration.   
Metaphysical goodness, on the other hand, has a strange ring to it.  To 
meaningfully talk about the goodness of nonhuman animals or artificial objects 
concerning their nature or function, we cannot simply use the sense of the phrase "moral 
goodness."  Whether a predator is good at predating, or a thermometer good at 
measuring temperature is not a matter to which moral goodness or its opposite even 
applies. 
By “metaphysical goodness” I mean any kind of goodness that an object or 
creature exhibits in virtue of its fulfilling its function or nature.  A sub-species of this 
goodness will be moral goodness, for human beings (and other suitable objects of moral 
consideration).  As a human being, if I am able to fulfill my function that will consist in 
reaching a certain state of moral as well as non-moral goodness.  The remaining kinds 
of goodness that do not fall under the term “moral goodness” will be called “non-moral 
                                                 
41 Of course, this does not mean it is simple or settled – there are a number of interesting debates 
regarding the source and nature of moral goodness, the objects to which it can be appropriately applied, 
etc.  But the concept is familiar enough for our purposes as to require no further time belaboring the issue.   
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goodness.”  On the view sketched above, non-moral goodness can come in two 
varieties, natural and artificial non-moral goodness.   
For natural non-moral goodness, consider the example of a good oak tree.  The 
things that lead to evaluating an oak tree as a good oak tree are not artificially designed 
by human beings.  Features such as speed of growth, efficiency in drawing nutrients 
from nearby sources, fecundity in dropping acorns, all of these things allow an oak tree 
to fulfill its function to a greater degree.  And yet, it seems bizarre to talk about an oak 
tree’s being morally good in virtue of its having an efficient root system or being 
particularly fecund.  This would count as metaphysical goodness as I’ve described it 
since each of these features allow it to fulfill its function, but would not to count as 
moral goodness.   
For artificial non-moral goodness, consider the example of a good computer.  A 
good computer is one that runs efficiently, has appropriate storage capacity, is free from 
viruses or malware, and has appropriate programs for our purposes, whatever those 
might be.  We could further specify what makes for a ‘good computer,' depending upon 
the function it is designed for (in this case, meeting some specification of human needs 
and/or wishes).  But none of the traits required for the computer to fulfill its artificially 
determined function will count as morally good ones.   As before, to the extent that the 
computer has a function, even if designed by humans, it will be evaluated as more or 
less metaphysically good in virtue of those features that allow it to fulfill its function, 
but this will not count as moral goodness. 
The point here is simply that on the Nature Approach to CT, we can 
meaningfully talk about the goodness of all objects with natures, including analyzing 
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non-moral natural and artificial goodness.  This is a strength of the view – it allows for a 
unified treatment of these varying kinds of goodness.  Next, let us turn to explaining 
degrees of goodness on this view.42   
IV.B Degrees of Goodness, Qualified vs. Unqualified Goodness 
Now, let us turn to an implication of CT.  It is the notion that both being and 
goodness can come in degrees.  For goodness, moral and non-moral, this view needs no 
defense, so I will spend little time on it here. 
Different human beings have different degrees of moral goodness – most of us 
are somewhere in between Pol Pot and Gandhi.  Similarly, we all know people who 
have some moral quality to a greater degree than we do and people who have some 
moral quality to a lesser degree than we do. 
Degrees of non-moral goodness are familiar as well, both in humans and in non-
human natural objects and artificial objects.  When a person upgrades their computer 
after many years, it becomes very obvious very quickly that the new computer has a 
greater degree of goodness related to fulfilling computer functions.  Similarly, insofar as 
the oak tree from our previous example is efficient at extracting nutrients (but not as 
much as it could be) or good at producing acorns (but not as much as it could be), it will 
have some degree of non-moral natural goodness.  All of the preceding is 
straightforward, and I will spend no further time on it.  However, to flesh out the Nature 
                                                 
42 This is an extremely rudimentary sketch of the metaethics of the Nature Approach to CT.  There is a 
whole range of sophisticated metaethical literature on varieties of goodness, moral vs. natural goodness, 
the relationship between them, etc.  It would be an interesting and worthwhile project to further develop 
the Nature Approach of CT as a robust, contemporary metaethical theory that would take into account 
contemporary issues, distinctions, and dilemmas in metaethics. However, I cannot pursue that project any 
further here, both for reasons of space and purpose.   
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Approach to CT, we will examine a distinctly Thomistic notion – qualified and 
unqualified goodness. 
While this distinction borrows from the account of CT in the work of Thomas 
Aquinas, one need not be a Thomist to accept this analysis.  One simply has to find the 
distinction a plausible one.  What does it mean for something to be unqualifiedly good, 
versus qualifiedly good?   
Using Aquinas’ discussion as a starting point, we can call something qualifiedly 
good insofar as it has some degree (but not the highest degree) of the good expected or 
required of it.  Recall that the metaphysical good of something is directly proportional 
to the degree it fulfills its function, or expresses its nature.  However, every actual thing 
expresses its nature to some degree, by virtue of being existent (the first step, we might 
say, on the road to the full expression of one's nature).  So every existent thing is good 
to some degree.  Therefore, being qualifiedly good is just to have some degree of the 
goodness associated with the nature of a thing.  Unqualified goodness is, as might be 
expected, the fully exemplified goodness of something that fulfills its function to the 
utmost degree possible for it.  A human being at the height of fulfilling its function, or 
at the apex of exemplifying its nature, then we can say that human being is an 
unqualifiedly good human being, as we use the term here.   
 As I noted earlier, in some sense even unqualified goodness is qualified.  What 
do I mean?  Well, I take it that the goodness for human beings consists in a different 
kind of goodness than the goodness for cats, chairs, bugs, or spark plugs.  The 
unqualified goodness of a chair will require properties such as sturdiness, 
comfortability, appropriate height or width for seating normal human beings, and 
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durability.  The unqualified goodness of human beings will consist of different 
properties such as bodily health, mental health, rationality, and virtuousness.   In this 
sense, then, the unqualified goodness associated with a human being is not identical 
with the unqualified goodness associated with a chair.  And so on, and so on, for all 
sorts of other artificial and natural objects.  This is what I mean when I say that even 
unqualified goodness is in some sense qualified, as in each case it will be relative to (or 
qualified by) the kind of thing to which it relates.  That does not mean that the 
distinction is unhelpful, but rather that we must have a clear understanding of the 
concepts in order to avoid confusion.   
IV.C Degrees of Being, Qualified vs. Unqualified Being  
Now we turn to the more difficult corollary—showing that being also admits of 
degrees.  On the face of it, this looks preposterous.  Existence, we are told by followers 
of Frege and Russell, is a binary and univocal predicate.  Something either exists, or it 
does not.  What might it mean to talk about degrees of existence?  How can we say, for 
example, that some existent thing x has a greater degree of existence than some other 
existent thing y?  Part of this results from treating existence as Frege, Russell, and their 
followers would, but we have seen in the second chapter that this way of understanding 
existence, as both binary and as univocal, does not exhaust the logical space.  There is, 
however, great intuitive appeal to the idea that there are not degrees of being, but that 
something is, or is not.   
There are all sorts of things that we can safely say do not exist, in the traditional 
sense—winged horses, a golden mountain, 200-foot tall nuclear-fire-breathing saurians, 
satyrs, square circles, Superman, etc.  Some of these entities are mythological, some 
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fictional, some of them contingently fail to exist, while others necessarily fail to exist.  
On the other hand, there are existent entities—the phone on my desk, Barbara Walters, 
my 2000 Dodge Dakota truck, Robert Audi, my roommate’s dog Zoey, etc.  These 
entities all contingently exist, but there might be necessarily existent entities (if the 
ontological argument is sound, or if traditional Platonism is true, or if Platonism 
concerning numbers is true, etc.).  Where are the partially existing entities?  Would 
these pop in and out of existence in accord with some set of metaphysical laws?  Would 
they have a shadowy, slightly translucent appearance?  What would it mean for 
something to have some degree of existence in between existence and non-existence?43   
This question can be answered by proposing a conceptual scheme in which 
degrees of being or existence makes sense, and this scheme will likely involve a 
departure from our everyday, binary notion of existence.  To unpack this substantially 
different way of speaking about being or existence, we will examine qualified and 
unqualified being.  Consider the following way of treating the concept of being or 
existence.   
Following Aquinas, we may distinguish qualified and unqualified being.  
Unqualified being, or what some scholars call “being absolutely” or “being simpliciter” 
is something akin to the binary notion of existence.  Every existent entity has 
unqualified being.  Myself, this table, this computer, the curry I will soon eat, all 
unqualifiedly are, insofar as they exist, or are actual.  The notion of qualified being, or 
relative being, is being in addition to the way in which I am, or the way in which a thing 
is.  My qualified being includes such properties as being human, being male, being 
                                                 
43 While we have explored this distinction as it occurred in Aquinas, I develop it further here to 
demonstrate its usefulness as a contemporary account.   
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white, etc.  The most important qualification of my being is the primary kind of thing I 
am, which is human.  Insofar as I am more or less human, I exemplify my relative being 
to a greater or lesser degree.  Whatever we think is unique to the nature of human 
beings (what we might call human nature) is not evinced equally in all humans.  Insofar 
as I fail to be rational in any area of my life, I show a lesser degree of humanness.  But 
when I fail to instantiate the unique aspect of humanity, I have a lesser degree of 
relative being.  If virtuous conduct is unique to human beings, then at any point that I 
fail to be virtuous, I exhibit a lesser degree of relative being, being human in this case.   
An existent tiger exhibits unqualified being, insofar as it is.  On the other hand, 
it exhibits greater or lesser degrees of qualified or relative being just in case it fulfills its 
nature.  Since a tiger is by nature a predator, we can talk about different tigers having 
greater or lesser degrees of being depending upon how effectively they conform to their 
principal nature.  A tiger that is slow, cannot climb trees, has broken claws or teeth, will 
evince a lesser degree of its qualified being than a tiger that is fast, can climb trees, and 
has sharp claws and teeth.  And so on for other animals, or plants, and (if this view is 
correct) everything in existence.  
Although we have only considered two examples, of human beings and 
nonhuman animals, we can show that this treatment can be extended to all other things.  
My chair, for example, has both a qualified and an unqualified sense of being attached 
to it.  Unqualifiedly, it is, for if it were not I would fall to the floor (more likely I 
wouldn’t be seated in the first place).  But it also has the qualified being of being a 
chair, of having a nature (even if created by us) to fulfill.  When a chair supports me, 
when it is comfortable, when it allows an appropriate seated posture, it exhibits a 
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greater degree of qualified being.  If a chair fails to support me, or is uncomfortable, or 
is such that my knees touch my elbows, it exhibits a lesser degree of its qualified being.   
Now, let us turn to a contemporary account of goodness that allows for both 
metaphysical and moral goodness, and an important and controversial corollary of 
CT—the privation theory of evil (hereafter PE).  
IV.D A Contemporary Nature Account: The Attributive Account of Goodness44 
An account of goodness that meshes nicely with the previous distinction of 
metaphysical and moral goodness, and that is compatible with CT is the attributive 
account of goodness.  Alexander, in Goodness, God, and Evil (Alexander 2012) defends 
and develops a claim first made by Peter Geach, that “good” and “bad” are logically 
attributive adjectives rather than logically predicative adjectives (Geach 1956).  Since 
this is a recently developed account that is consistent with CT in the form of the Nature 
Approach, and since this account also implies PE, a way to understand evil that is also 
implied by CT, it will enrich our understanding of CT.   
According to Geach, there is a distinction to be made between logically 
predicative and logically attributive adjectives (Geach 1956, 33).  Logically predicative 
adjectives pass what Alexander calls the Splitting Test (Alexander 2012, 32).  For 
example, “green” is a logically predicative adjective.  When I say “x is a green turtle” 
                                                 
44 It is obvious why one would find the Nature Approach to CT more plausible, both as a metaethical 
account and as a background conceptual scheme that makes way for the ontological argument, as I have 
previously argued.  Any Participation Approach immediately begs the question with respect to the 
ontological argument or any argument for God’s existence, and this is because at base the view explains 
the relationship between being and goodness by positing God.  Further, many philosophers and biologists 
talk about human beings as well as other forms of life having natures, without expressly positing the 
existence of God.  This suggests that the nature approach will be stronger as both a metaethical theory 
(since its central category, that of a nature, is a familiar and useful concept in contemporary biology and 
philosophy), and as a theory of great-making properties used in the ontological argument (since it does 
not beg the question before the argument gets off the ground).  For examples and explanations of 
accounts of humans and other things having natures, none of which presuppose the existence of a God, 




we can infer from the truth of this statement both of the statements “x is green” and “x 
is a turtle.”  Similarly, when I say “y is a rectangular quilt” we can infer from the truth 
of this statement both that “y is rectangular” and “y is a quilt.”  Logically predicative 
adjectives also pass what Alexander calls the Higher-Order, Lower-Order Kind Test 
(Alexander 2012, 33).  If something is in a class that is itself part of a higher-order class 
(or a lower-order class), then a predicative adjective will hold true for both of the 
classes.  For example, from “x is a green turtle” and “all turtles are animals” we can 
infer that “x is a green animal.”  This works in the opposite way too.  From “y is a 
rectangular blanket” and “y is a quilt” we can infer that “y is a rectangular quilt.”   
On the other hand, logically attributive adjectives fail both of the previous tests.  
“Small” is a good example of a logically attributive adjective.  From “x is a small bear” 
we cannot infer both “x is small” and “x is a bear.”  Even a very small bear is quite 
large as compared to many other things of this world.  Another example would be 
“fast.”  From “y is a fast sloth” we cannot infer both that “y is fast” and that “y is a 
sloth.”  In both of these cases, the logically attributive adjectives fail the Splitting Test.  
Logically attributive adjectives also fail the Higher-Order, Lower-Order Kind Test.  
Using the previous examples, from “x is a small bear” and “all bears are animals” we 
cannot infer that “x is a small animal.”  The point is while logically predicative 
adjectives always pass this test, logically attributive adjectives do not necessarily pass 
this test.   
According to Geach and Alexander, “good” and “bad” are both logically 
attributive adjectives.   From “x is a good writer” we cannot infer both that “x is good” 
and that “x is a writer.”  Similarly, from “x is a bad bowler” we cannot infer both that 
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“x is bad” and that “x is a bowler.”  In addition to failing the Splitting Test, “good” and 
“bad” also fail the Higher-Order, Lower-Order Kinds Test.  From “x is a good writer” 
and “all writers are humans” we cannot infer that “x is a good human.”  Again, from “x 
is a bad bowler” and “all bowlers are human” we cannot infer that “x is a bad human.”   
The point of both Alexander and Geach’s treatment of the attributive adjective 
“good” is, at least in part, that for something to be good is for it to be good in reference 
to whatever kind of thing it is, and that this in turn suggests we need to know its 
function to make such a judgment.  Geach writes 
… if I do not know what hygrometers are for, I do not really know what 
'hygrometer' means, and therefore do not really know what 'good 
hygrometer' means; I merely know that I could find out its meaning by 
finding out what hygrometers were for.  (Geach 1956, 38) 
 
There is, therefore, a connection between a thing’s goodness and its nature.  As 
stated before, the fact that this account of goodness is connected with the idea that 
things have natures is advantageous for our purposes.  Alexander argues that the phrase 
"x is good" is always either incomplete or elliptical for “x is a good being of kind K,” 
following Geach (Alexander 2012, 35).  He also provides an analysis of what it means 
for something to be a good being of a certain kind, and this analysis is compatible with 
the foregoing account of the Nature Approach to CT.      
In fact, the relation between the attributive account and CT is stronger than 
compatibility.  Alexander argues that the attributive account actually implies the truth of 
CT in two ways.  The first way only seems to imply the truth of a certain form of CT, 
the Nature Approach. The second way focuses on PE, which Alexander argues implies 
the truth of CT (this is interesting, as most often the implication relation between CT 
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and PE goes the other way around).  Since our next section is focused on PE, we will 
consider this argument only briefly before exploring that most controversial part of CT.   
The first argument focuses on the way the attributive account links goodness 
with function.  There are two parts to showing the connection between the attributive 
account of goodness and CT.  On Alexander’s account, the goodness of a thing 
necessarily depends upon the nature of that thing, and what the function of that thing is.  
To be a good X is to have certain features that are characteristic of the kind of thing that 
X is, to some specified degree.  What counts as a success or failure in being a good 
member of a certain kind will depend intimately on the nature of the kind of thing under 
consideration.  Insofar as something more fully fulfills its function or more fully 
exemplifies its nature, it is a better member of its kind than one that fails to fulfill its 
function or exemplify its nature.  However, a thing fulfilling its function or 
exemplifying its nature is simply a matter of it having the appropriate characteristics to 
some specified degree.  These characteristics need not, themselves, be normative.  If 
this is true, then being a good X can be translated without loss to being an X with those 
non-normative features or characteristics specified by the kind of thing X is, to an 
appropriately specified degree.  Therefore, goodness can be understood as being 
identical (in some sense) to being for X (Alexander 2012, 91-95).     
The second part of the first argument needs to show the other implication, that 
being is identical (in some sense) to good.  Remember that on the attributive account, 
something is good insofar as it fulfills its function or exemplifies its nature to a 
specified degree.  Many kinds of things in the world go through stages of development 
toward their most full form.  While this argument is not as clear in the case of artifacts 
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and inanimate objects, a great many living things pass through several developmental 
stages on their way to becoming a mature, adult member of their species.  For our 
purposes, let us imagine a first stage of the development of a thing.  Alexander suggests 
that we imagine this as follows. “Now, at stage 1, X is the barest sort of K [or member 
of its kind] possible.  That is, at stage 1, X is an unqualified K.  X is, as it were, a mere 
K,” (Alexander 2012, 95).  When we define goodness as having some characteristics to 
some degree related to the kind of thing X is, we can also break down our account of 
goodness by applying our judgments to entities at relative stages of their development.  
An acorn is not a full-fledged oak tree, but one acorn can be better than another with 
respect to its having characteristic features of that early stage of its development.  
Insofar as an X is a member of its kind, even at stage 1, it possesses those properties 
that are good at stage 1.  So X is good, qualified to its status as a stage 1 X.  This just 
means, though, that X’s having some set of characteristics (whatever those are for the 
kind of thing we pick out) to some degree is identical to X’s being good.  So X’s being 
is identical (in some sense) to X’s being good.   
This first argument should not sound entirely new to readers of the chapter.  In 
fact, it is an updated version of Aquinas’ own arguments (and the arguments of his later 
interpreters) that attempt to show how being and goodness are convertible on the Nature 
Approach (see c-d).  Although Alexander is working in a different framework, he notes 
at several places that his project has affinities with both Aristotelian and Thomist 
metaphysics.45  Similarly, his own arguments (given above) to connect CT and the 
attributive account of good use much of the same language, same concepts, and roughly 
                                                 
45 Most of chapter 4 in Alexander 2012 is focused on defending an Aristotelian-style account of function, 




the same argumentative moves as the arguments Aquinas gives to connect being and 
goodness in the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles, as shown above.    
The second argument that connects the attributive account of goodness and the 
convertibility theory does so indirectly.  The attributive account not only treats “good” 
as an attributive property, but also treats “bad” or “evil” as an attributive property.  So 
on the attributive account, just like nothing is just “good” irrespective of the kind of 
thing it is, but only good relative to its nature or the kind of thing it is, so nothing is just 
“bad” or “evil” irrespective of the kind of thing it is, but only bad or evil relative to its 
nature or the kind of thing it is.  If being virtuous is a good thing for a human being, 
based on the kind of thing she is, then to the degree she lacks virtues she will to that 
degree be a bad or evil human being.  If having appropriate emotional responsiveness is 
a unique characteristic of human nature, then this lack is bad or is an evil, the degree of 
which depends on the severity of the lack.  On this view, a completely evil thing could 
not exist, because only if evil or bad were predicative properties could something be 
labeled completely or wholly bad or evil.  Since the attributive account denies this, it 
denies that anything completely evil could exist.  Further, on the attributive account evil 
is parasitic upon an already existent notion of goodness.  Evil is some lack or absence 
(or something that causes a lack or absence) of a characteristic or a feature fundamental 
to some thing’s pursuit of its fulfilled nature.  Without already having a sense of what a 
thing’s nature is, and what it would be for that thing to fulfill its nature (that is, what 
would count as good for that thing, or a good thing of that kind), we cannot talk about 
evil as a lack or absence of a characteristic or feature, or as failing to fulfill some 
important part of the nature of the thing under consideration.  These results essentially 
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spell out PE.  An extremely simple version of PE is that evil is an absence or lack of 
some kind, where that lack ought not to be there (this is a quick and rough statement of 
the theory, but the next section explores PE in some detail, so this characterization will 
suffice for now).  An implication of PE is that nothing could be completely or utterly 
evil, as for it to exist or be at all it is evincing some goodness.  Another implication is 
that evil is parasitic on goodness.  There could be a universe of all and only good things, 
but there cannot exist an instance of evil without some good existing.   
Alexander argues that if the attributive account of good and evil is true, then PE 
is true.  He then states that PE and CT are related conditionally.  If the attributive 
account of good and evil implies PE, and if PE implies CT, then the attributive account 
of good and evil implies CT.  Accordingly, if CT implies PE, and PE implies the 
attributive account of good and evil, then CT will imply the attributive account of good 
and evil.46 
Section V. The Privation Theory of Evil 
The PE was once a commonly held corollary of CT.  In contemporary circles, 
there are few defenders of a PE, and most of those defenders are neo-Thomists or 
Christian philosophers influenced by scholastic thought.  Our purpose in this first sub-
section will be to explain PE as it relates to the Nature Approach of CT.  To some 
degree, this will depart from Alexander’s treatment of the privation theory (in 
Alexander 2012), but it will give the reader a general sense of the privation theory as 
both a historical artifact and a contemporary, though rare, account of the nature of evil.  
Just as CT’s account of goodness must encompass both a metaphysical and moral 
                                                 
46 Alexander does not go this far, but historically many philosophers thought that CT is what implies PE, 
not vice versa.  Accordingly, I will take it that CT and PE are related biconditionally, though this is 
contentious (see Midgely 1984 and Larrimore 2011 for opposing accounts).   
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account of goodness, so PE’s account of evil must encompass both the metaphysical 
and moral aspects of evil.  It will seem strange in some cases to see the metaphysical 
gaps labeled as evil, but this should strike the reader as not much weirder than the 
metaphysical fullness of objects being counted as good.  In the second sub-section, I 
will argue against the very common objection against PE that pain is a counterexample 
to any PE.  If pain cannot be accounted for in terms of privation, and if pain is an evil, 
then any version of PE that takes pain to be a real-world phenomenon will fail.47 
The main reason to discuss PE in this dissertation is primarily negative.  I 
believe that one of the main objections to CT is its relationship to PE – CT entails PE.  
Most contemporary philosophers hold PE to be obviously false, for the reasons given 
above or for others considered independently (as cataloged by Kane 1980 and Calder 
2007).  I remind the reader that my aim is to defend what I've referred to as the 
"reflective plausibility" of CT.  What I mean by this, as explained earlier in the chapter, 
is that not only is CT is not obviously false, as many have assumed, but it is plausible 
on the metaphysics supported above.  Since PE is taken to be obviously false by most 
philosophers, and since PE and CT are biconditionally related, it is no great leap to 
assume that CT is taken to be obviously false by most philosophers.  In the second sub-
section, I will try to persuade the reader that PE has a certain level of plausibility and 
that the main objection offered to it is nowhere near decisive.  If I succeed, I will have 
shown that the most damning obstacle to positively judging CT’s plausibility is itself 
bereft of needed support. 
                                                 
47 This objection is pressed by Kane 1980 and Calder 2007 and responded to in kind by Anglin and Goetz 
1982, and Alexander 2012.  For a defense of PE on different grounds and a critique of other criticisms 
offered by Calder 2007, see Grant 2015.  For a schema regarding how PE's must account for pain, see 
Swenson 2009.   
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V.A Explaining PE 
For many of the scholastic philosophers, good and evil were seen as opposites.  
This led a young Augustine to be impressed by a dualist, Manichean ontology of good 
and evil.  According to this view, good and evil are both positive qualities in the world, 
and each is produced by separate but powerful good and evil deities struggling for 
dominion over the world.  In many ways, this makes sense of the nature and variety of 
both goodness and evil in our world.  However, Augustine was later influenced by neo-
Platonic Christian thought, according to which evil is not some quality in-and-of-itself, 
but rather a lack or absence or privation in the world.  Augustine did not work this out 
as thoroughly as some later scholastics, but his writings have had significant influence 
in the understanding and debate regarding PE.  Numerous other scholastic writers, such 
as Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Suarez, worked out highly developed accounts of PE, 
including considering counter-intuitive or problematic aspects of the doctrine (see 
Aquinas 2001 and Gracia 1991).  Since the end of the middle Ages, privation theories 
of evil have been by and large forgotten or discarded for other accounts of the nature of 
evil.48  Yet, recently PE has been aptly defended by a number of contemporary 
philosophers as shown throughout the remainder of this section. 
Just as there are two ways to think about CT of being and goodness, there are 
also two ways to think about PE.  On the Participation Approach, where a thing receives 
its goodness by virtue of its participation in God (or God’s substantial creative 
sustaining of that thing), the story about evil as a privation is simple.  A thing or 
attribute is evil insofar as it fails to participate in (or be supported by) God’s goodness.  
                                                 
48 For a recent example, Kane writes “Aside from orthodox Thomists, few philosophers, either theists or 
their critics, accept this theory any more,” in Kane 1980, 43.   
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But I will focus on the Nature Approach to PE for two reasons.  First, just as the 
Participation Approach to CT presupposes the existence of God and is thereby 
unhelpful in supporting an argument for the existence of God, the Participation 
Approach to PE does the same.  The second reason to focus on the Nature Approach of 
the privation theory is that the Participation Approach to PE is very opaque in its 
account of evil.  What, exactly, does it mean that a thing fails to participate in, or be 
supported by, God’s goodness?  How would it be the fault of a person if God has 
chosen not to add his substance to that thing, in moral terms?  How does this shed any 
light on moral responsibility, or even on what we might call natural evils?49  Since the 
approach is obscure as applied to analyzing both moral and metaphysical evils 
(including natural evils), as well as presuming a proposition we cannot take for granted 
in the context of an argument, we will abandon the Participation Approach to evil as a 
privation, and aim at explaining a PE drawn from and consistent with the Nature 
Approach to CT.   
How does one treat goodness and evil as opposites without admitting evil as a 
positive quality of the world?  Since CT states that being and goodness are the same in 
extension but different in intension, then everything, insofar as it is a being is good.  
This looks puzzling, because our initial inclination is to read this as “Evil does not 
exist,” or “There are no evil existent things.”  However, PE does not amount to the 
claim that there are no evils in the world, or that evils are somehow less important due 
to their not being a positive quality, but instead is about the nature of evils we see in the 
world.  Evils are explainable as a privation or absence or lack of some quality or 
                                                 
49 For purposes of clarification, I do not mean “natural evils” as the terminology is often used in the 
literature relating to the Problem of Evil.  Instead, I mean “natural evils” or “natural badness” as that sub-
type of metaphysical evil or badness separate from both moral and artificial evil or badness. 
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arrangement.  This needs to be further modified in order to understand the theory and to 
give it legs.  Evil is not just a lack or an absence of anything relevant to any other thing, 
but a privation or a lack of quality that ought to be in the fulfilled nature of a thing.  It 
would be strange to consider my lack of compound vision or replayability an evil for 
me, though these things might be evils as they afflict other kinds of things.50  It would 
make sense to consider a lack of vision at all an evil for me, or a lack of mobility since 
these are qualities required by the most mature version of my nature.51   
We can also show that this holds true for non-physical (or perhaps, non-bodied) 
qualities characteristic of my nature.  Lust or greed is an evil because of a disorder in 
my valuing those things I ought to value, and their relative importance in my evaluative 
scheme.  This disorder can be analyzed as a lack or an absence of both the appropriate 
ordering in my evaluative scheme, as well as a lack of importance assigned to values 
that ought to be higher in my hierarchy of values.  Note also that this need not 
presuppose anything over and above a naturalistic metaphysics.  As stated earlier in the 
chapter, naturalistic virtue theory accounts not only posit goods for human beings based 
on their natures, but also evils for human beings based on their natures.  We can also 
use this analysis with regard to other animals and objects in nature, without requiring 
any designer (or in the case of artifacts, any designer other than human beings).  
Something is bad for an elephant, or an oak tree, or a computer, insofar as it prevents 
                                                 
50 Some insects and some games, respectively. 
51 This is perhaps the most ethically contentious part of CT and PE, given what it would imply about 
various kinds of disability in general.  I cannot tackle this difficult and sensitive issue here – I only 
mention it to note that this is an important implication that should be dealt with head-on in any full-blown 
defense of CT.   
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them from fulfilling their nature, or causes an absence of a quality they ought to 
possess, for the complete fulfillment of their nature.52,53   
On the privation theory, every evil can be characterized as an absence or a lack, 
not in general, but with regard to the nature of the thing in question.  This is true of 
characterizing how evils affect individuals, as well as how evils are constituted.  This 
also shows how we can characterize certain frustrations of metaphysical goodness being 
fulfilled as metaphysical evils for the object or entity in question.  To show this, let us 
explore three cases. 
A. In one circumstance, we have a person whose leg is completely 
paralyzed and numb.  In another circumstance, we have a person whose 
leg is in terrible pain.  In both cases, the subject’s leg is unusable for 
locomotive purposes or sensory response.54   
B. A person desires to torture and kill another.  That second person is the 
subject of being tortured, and then their life is ended.55   
C. A sapling oak is consumed by a fire.  As it is consumed, a person rushes 
in with a pail of water and puts out the fire.56   
 
In case A, we have a favorite foil for the opponents of PE.  Pain, it is said, is not 
simply an absence (as paralysis or numbness might be) but as a positive, felt quality 
over and above a lack of pleasure.  The proponent of the privation theory, though, can 
                                                 
52 Is this version of PE, based on the Nature Approach, more illuminating than that of PE based on the 
Participation Approach?  There might be thought to be such a significant gap between natural 
goodness/badness and moral goodness/badness that using the Nature Approach does not help.  I think this 
is a good question, but one that I think depends on one’s appraisal of the corresponding CT.  If the Nature 
Approach of CT is correct, then metaphysical goodness will include natural goodness, artificial goodness, 
and moral goodness.  To the extent that people find this treatment implausible for goodness, they will 
likely find it to be implausible for badness or evil as well.  I thank Neal Judisch for this point.   
53 Again, I remind the reader that if one is skeptical about objects having natures, then one will be 
skeptical about the line of reasoning given.  Note, though, that this is a general problem with any account 
that involves natures of things to any significant degree, and not a specific problem with CT or the 
privation theory of evil.   
54 Comparing pain and the absence of pleasure or sensation goes back to at least Aquinas and Suarez, as 
discussed in Aquinas 2001 and Gracia 1991, but contemporary writing on the topic include cases 
specifically comparing pain and paralysis or absence of feeling, such as Alexander 2012, Calder 2007, 
Goetz and Anglin 1982, and Kane 1980.   
55 Analyzing both the evils of vicious traits, as well as the evils of the actions of vicious people is also a 
longstanding feature of the privation theory of evil, in both historical and contemporary writings. 
56 Although the metaphysical usage of the term evil has fallen out of favor for a strict moral conception, it 
can be found in scholastic writers.   
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analyze both instances given in case A as absences.  The person whose leg is paralyzed 
or numb suffers from a lack of motion and sensory perception in the leg.  It is an evil for 
that person, and it consists in a lack of those two qualities which a fully function human 
being ought to have.  The person whose leg is in terrible pain is also on the receiving 
end of an evil.  The pain, as it causes both an inability to use the leg or feel normal 
sensory perceptions in the leg constitutes an evil.  We might judge that the person 
whose leg is in pain is on the receiving end of a greater evil, but we could still appeal to 
the privation theory by showing that in the case of severe pain, several other qualities 
needed for the full function of the person (ability to maintain cognitive focus, a 
sensitivity to important factors around them, etc.) are lacking because of the intense 
pain in the leg.  In both cases, the privation theory can adequately analyze the evil 
occurring.  I will return to the case of pain below.    
In case B, there are several evils available to analyze.  First, there is the evil 
which consists of the character and characteristics of the sadistic torturer/murderer 
themselves.  Second, there is the evil which consists in the effects the torture and 
murder have on the victim.  In both cases, the privation theorist can show that the evil 
consists in privation.  As regards the torturer, what makes this person's beliefs, desires, 
and tendencies evil is their attachment of importance on fulfilling their own desires by 
seeing another suffer and be extinguished, and the lack of order shown in their 
disordered set of values.  If human beings, by their nature, are moral and social beings, 
then something important is missing in a torturer, something important that ought to be 
there to fulfill the human beings nature.  For the tortured and eventually murdered, a 
host of evils occur.  The pain, the suffering, and the end of their lives.  The pain they 
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experience can, as before, be shown to result in the absence of a number of other goods 
for them (tranquility, contentment, ability to maintain cognitive focus, etc.).  Their 
suffering can be characterized as depriving them of various aims they take their life to 
have, as well as a frustration or impediment to their vision of their life.  The end of their 
life, of course, is an evil precisely because it results in their complete lack of being, and 
all of the goods associating with existing.     
Case C is perhaps the strangest of the three cases.  For most contemporary 
philosophers, it is bizarre to talk about evil in relation to trees burning down or water 
extinguishing fire.  The important thing for our current purposes is not to get involved 
in a debate about the appropriateness of a broad conception of evil which includes both 
metaphysical and moral characteristics (as does our earlier conception of goodness).  
Instead, we focus on how an account of evil as a privation of a quality central to a 
thing’s nature can cover even these strange, counterintuitive cases.  If an oak sapling’s 
nature, realized at its fullest level, is to grow into a sturdy, old oak tree, then its being 
burned down can be counted as an evil.  It is the destruction, the rendering into nothing 
and thus preventing the completion of the oak tree’s purpose, which is an evil here.  
Similarly, insofar as it is in the nature of fire to consume, dousing a fire with water 
prevents this, and in fact renders fire nonexistent, the dousing of a fire is an evil, at least 
with regards to the fire.  There are numerous difficult questions here.  How do we 
understand the idea that immobile, insensate living things can have a nature, much less 
that their natures can be frustrated or flouted?  How do we understand a process, such as 
fire, as having a nature at all?  In what way does it make sense to speak of an evil done 
to a tree or to a fire?  In fact, one might regard the entirety of case C as nonsense.  Oaks 
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and fires don’t have natures to be frustrated, an opponent might say, and stretching the 
term evil to cover such frustrations is not really recognizable as evil at all.  I think that 
this can be right and still not bother the privation theorist.  All the privation theorist 
needs to hold is that if a thing has a nature, and if that nature has qualities that can be 
lacked, resulting in the denial or incompleteness of the full fruition of that things nature, 
then it can be analyzed using PE.  If it turns out that oak trees and fires do not have 
natures, then this will not bother the privation theorist.  If, on the other hand, the natural 
entities and processes do have natures, PE can be used to analyze them in metaphysical, 
as opposed to moral, terms.   
V.B Defending PE 
 In this sub-section, I defend the viability of CT by arguing against the most 
famous and obvious objection to PE – the objection from pain.  It is commonly assumed 
that the badness of pain is, without contention, some positive, felt quality that cannot be 
suitably analyzed as a privation.  If this is the case, and if PE requires us to deny this or 
cannot account for it, then that will act as a reductio of PE and consequently of CT.  In 
line with my earlier remarks about "reflective plausibility," my primary objective in this 
sub-section will simply be to throw a wrench in the gears of the obviousness and/or 
decisiveness of this favored line of critique.  Here is the structure of what I imagine the 
argument against the reflective plausibility of CT to be, from the objection from pain.   
1. If PE is false, so is CT.   
2. Pain is a counterexample to PE – pain is both an evil and not a 
privation.   
3. CT is false.   
 
If this is a suitable construal of the implicit reasoning behind casually 
disregarding CT, and I believe that it is, then providing reasons to doubt 2 and to 
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support the idea that pain is not a privation will serve to reduce our confidence in 3.  
Taking on this task will bolster CT by providing a defense for what its critics take to be 
its weakest and most fatally flawed commitment.   
 The idea that pain is obviously evil in a way that goes beyond any absence or 
lack is not only found in scholars wrestling with theology or phenomenology or 
metaethics – instead, it is available and immediately apparent to all of us on the basis of 
little introspection.  Kane writes 
The difficulty is that pain seems clearly to be more than merely the 
absence of its contrary opposite. There is a marked difference between a 
limb which merely lacks feeling - is numb or paralyzed or anesthetized - 
and one which is racked with pain. In the former case it is quite plausible 
to say that there is merely a privation of something, namely normal 
feeling, that under usual circumstances would belong to the limb. But it 
is clearly inadequate to describe a limb aching with pain as suffering 
merely a privation of good health or normal feeling. When pain occurs in 
the body, there is something new and different in a person's experience 
which is not present when the body has simply lost feeling. (Kane 1980, 
49) 
 
Similarly, Calder writes 
… pain is not simply the absence of feeling or pleasure, it is a positively 
bad sensation or feeling.  The absence of feeling or pleasure is numbness 
or experiential paralysis; it is akin to the way a body part feels under 
local anesthetic. Pain, on the other hand, is a felt quality, one that we 
typically try to avoid. (Calder 2007, 373) 
 
Alexander, framing the pain objection before offering a response, writes  
The badness of a pain is something over and above the badness that a 
pain may indicate (say, the badness that brings about the pain).  “The 
pain is caused by the absence, it does not consist in it.”  To repeat, the 
badness of a pain is the feeling of it; its badness lies in its 
phenomenology, and its phenomenology is essential to it or at least 
intrinsic to it.  Thus, pains are essentially, or at least intrinsically, bad. 
(Alexander 2012, 102).   
 
Focusing solely on PE at this point, the objection from pain would go as follows. 
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4. If PE is true, then all evils are privations.  (Definition of PE) 
5. Pain is an evil.     (Common Assent) 
6. Pains are not privations.   (Common Assent) 
7. Therefore, PE is false.    (4-6) 
 
Premises 4 and 5 are fairly straightforward.  4 is simply what PE says about the nature 
of evil.  5 seems deeply rooted in our everyday experience.  6 is also, as noted above, 
seemingly obvious.  However, it is important to examine exactly what might be meant 
by 6, and spelling this out will help us to determine exactly how a proponent of PE 
might respond. 
Calder clearly has in mind the idea that painfulness is a qualitative conscious 
experience, as he notes in Calder 2007, endnote 11.  Kane, too, appears to appeal to the 
positive, felt quality of pain in demonstrating that it is inconsistent with analyzing pain 
as a privation.  In both of these cases, the support for 6 is something like 
8. All sensations are positive, felt qualities. 
9. Pains are intrinsically or essentially sensations. 
10. Nothing that is a positive, felt quality can be a privation. 
11. Pains are not privations. 
 
At this point the question is whether or not the foregoing argument is true – is 9, the 
claim that “pains are intrinsically or essentially sensations” true?  To answer this, we 
would need to examine some contemporary accounts of the nature of pain.    
Alexander takes exactly this line of argument.  He shows that PE is consistent 
with three contemporary accounts of pain; Michael Tye’s strong representationalism 
about pain in “Another Look at Representationalism About Pain” (Tye 2005), Klein’s 
imperative account of pain from “An Imperative Theory of Pain” (Klein 2007) and 
further developed in “What Pain Asymbolia Really Shows” (Klein 2015), and Austen 
Clark’s view that the evil or badness of painfulness is not a sensation but an attitude 
133 
 
towards that sensation, supported by the phenomenon of pain asymbolia57 (cases where 
one has a sensation of pain but does not negatively evaluate it) in “Painfulness is Not a 
Quale” (Clark 2005).  In each case, Alexander argues that the account of pain as a 
privation given by PE is consistent with some other contemporary account (as an 
indicator or representation of some lack of bodily integrity from Tye 2005, or as a 
command that some state or action cease from Klein 2007, or as an affective judgment 
about the badness of pain due to a lack of some positive internal state or external bodily 
integrity from Clark 2005).  I will not rehearse these arguments and interpretations here 
– I bring this to the reader’s attention primarily to show that the seemingly intuitive fact 
that pain must be essentially bad due to its qualitative content is far from a settled 
matter.  If this is correct, then PE (and consequently CT) may retain its status of 
reflective plausibility.   
I want to give a further argument against 9 based on the work done by Don 
Gustafson in “Categorizing Pain” (Gustafson 2005).  In it, he gives a short history of the 
concept of pain and the role it historically played in various societies, cultures, and even 
scientific accounts.  In some cases, pain was conceived of as external, as an issue of the 
body and not a sensation.  In other cases, pain was valuable precisely because of its 
aversive character.  Gustafson argues convincingly that for reasons both scientific and 
historical, we should reject the idea that all pains are intrinsically a simple sensation of 
one type.  Pain is a complex phenomenon with a variety of causes, involving the body 
as well as the mind, involving some motivational content as well as affective 
components, and true to such a varied phenomenon it has, at different times and in 
                                                 




different cultures, been conceived of in competing and even opposing ways.  
Gustafson's closing remarks regarding the recent history of pain concepts are telling 
against the seemingly obvious nature of the qualitative character of pain. 
The conception of wholly subjective objects of introspection became a 
philosophical staple.  Pain, in turn, became the paradigm subjective 
object of secure introspection.  Incorrigibility of pain reports and 
expressions attained the status of a dogma.  This is my story of the 
internalization of pain.  It is a history.  Its episodes are contingent events. 
Our conception of pain is delivered to us by historical, scientific, and 
philosophical contingencies.  If this is plausible, it is also plausible that 
we may wish to reconfigure our conception of pain or the categorization 
of pain if we find another more useful to current interests.  After all, if 
the history just now sketched is possible, then there is no necessity in the 
idea of pain as an essentially hidden or inner subjective condition, 
accessible only by means of self-consciousness. (Gustafson 2005, 231) 
 
If this is true, we have reason to doubt the truth of 9.  It may be that pains are 
sensations, but if our concept of pain, and how we categorize and characterize it, is as 
fragile and historically dependent as Gustafson argues it is, then this gives us some 
reason to doubt the seemingly obvious account of pain as essentially a qualitative state.   
I don’t take either of these considerations to compel assent to the conclusion that 
PE can account for pains – rather, I note them in order to show that a) the nature and 
character of pain is itself a hotly contested issue that is far from obvious, and b) that 
some of these contemporary theoretical accounts of pain are either consistent with PE 
(Alexander 2012) or give reason enough to serve to undermine an important premise in 
the objection from pain (Gustafson 2005).  For these reasons, CT can be said to be 
reflectively plausible – it is not epistemically responsible to casually disregard the 
plausibility of the theory on the basis of obvious pain considerations.58 
                                                 
58 An additional consideration in favor of CT by route of PE is PE's value beyond any theological 
projects.  Grant 2015 attempts to show how this kind of defense might go by not only objecting to several 
critiques against PE, but also by arguing that PE best accounts for evil in the moral sense.  Midgely 1984 
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Section VI. Summary 
 In section I, I introduced the chapter’s structure as a whole.  In section II, I gave 
a short historical background to CT.  This is important because it gives us a sense of the 
importance of this theory in earlier philosophical epochs and it shows that there are 
hundreds of years of development behind CT.  In section III, I examined various 
arguments given by Aquinas for CT.  This is important because Aquinas’ version of CT 
is the most well-developed and worked-out version of CT.  It is also an example of the 
Nature Approach to CT, which I have argued is important for the dialectical purposes of 
this dissertations.  In section IV, I explained the Nature Approach to CT in detail and 
demonstrated how it is possible to meaningfully and coherently talk about artificial 
objects, natural non-human entities, and human beings in terms of this CT approach.  I 
also demonstrated how it is possible to talk about both metaphysical and moral 
goodness and being.  In addition, I demonstrated how it is possible to talk about degrees 
of being and degrees of existence in the same way as it is possible to talk about degrees 
of goodness.  The last part of this section gave an example of a current metaethical 
theory that is consistent with and well-supported by CT.  In section V, I analyzed PE 
and explained how it is possible to meaningfully and coherently talk about pain, 
immoral actions, and the destruction of non-conscious objects in terms of PE.  I also 
defended the reflective plausibility of CT by undermining the confidence critics should 
have in the central objection to PE.  In the next chapter, I argue that all ontological 
arguments that hold that there is an important connection between goodness and 
                                                                                                                                               
similarly suggests that PE is the only viable account of evil – there is little to recommend a kind of 
Manichean, positive account of evil given our nature.  If Grant and Midgely are correct, then adopting CT 
will provide all of the advantages of adopting PE, in addition to those advantages I argue for in the final 
chapter of this dissertation.  Finally, a defender of PE could simply deny that pain is an evil, though this 
would itself be a significant undertaking. 
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existence or being are practically committed to CT.  I further argue that CT as a theory 




Chapter 5: The Central Argument 
Section I. Introduction 
The central thesis of this dissertation is that many historical and contemporary 
versions of the ontological argument depend upon the Convertibility Thesis (CT) for 
their success.  In order to persuade the reader, I break down this argument into five 
sections.  In section II, I will show that a number of historical and contemporary 
ontological arguments contain a premise that links goodness or greatness or perfection 
to existence or necessary existence (hereafter referred to as the Linkage Premise).  I will 
do this by enumerating the premises or sections in each of these arguments that I take to 
involve this tight connection between greatness/goodness/perfection and existence.  In 
section III, I will show that in each case, very little or no argument is given in support or 
justification of this premise, or the argument involves either CT or a close analog.  In 
some cases, no support for the Linkage Premise is given because the premise involves 
stipulative definition.  If the argument already presupposes CT or some close analogy, I 
will not need to go further.  If the argument does not, I will demonstrate this by close 
textual examination.  In section IV, I will show that CT entails the tight connection 
required for the success of the argument.  If CT is true, not only are the various 
premises linking greatness/goodness/perfection to existence true, but they are justified 
by reference to a powerful and well-worked out theoretical background.  In section V, I 
will show that, in the absence of competitor theories, CT is the theory most well suited 
to support the Linkage Premises.  I will also demonstrate how CT rules out the AntiGod 
parody objection, which I have shown in chapter four to be the most powerful objection 
to ontological arguments.  In section VI, I explain the conclusion of the argument, 
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which is that any person committed to the viability of the ontological argument (of a 
certain form) is at least practically committed to the viability of CT.     
 In standard form, the argument would go as follows. 
1. Numerous versions of the ontological argument, both historical and 
contemporary, rely upon a Linkage Premise, that is, a premise that there 
is some tight connection between goodness, or greatness, or perfection, 
and existence (either existence in general or necessary existence).   
2. In the case of many of these arguments, very little or no argument or 
justification is given for this Linkage Premise.  In other of these 
arguments, the Convertibility Thesis of Goodness and Being (hereafter, 
CT) or something close to it is already explicitly or implicitly required 
3. CT entails the Linkage Premise (if CT is true, then the Linkage Premise 
will be true).     
4. In the absence of competitor theories, CT is the most well-suited and 
detailed theory to adopt in order to substantiate the truth of the Linkage 
Premise. 
5. Therefore, proponents of any ontological argument that both a) relies 
upon a Linkage Premise and b) does not include a competitor theory are 
at least practically committed to the viability of CT.  
Section II. The Linkage Premise 
Although it is possible to eliminate the language of greatness, perfection, or 
maximality from ontological arguments, this is rare.59  When we examine arguments 
offered in the literature most do not directly connect existence or necessary existence to 
God without any intermediary.  Instead, notions of goodness, greatness, perfection, or 
maximality are used to connect existence or necessary existence and God.  If existence 
and goodness (or the other relevant notions) are tightly connected somehow, and God is 
                                                 
59 For example, the following are all possible ontological arguments given in Oppy 1995. 
1. It is possible that it is actually the case that God exists. (premise) 
2. Therefore, God exists.  (from 1) 
or 
1. I conceive of an existent God. (premise) 
2. Therefore, God exists. (from 1) 
or 
1. By definition, God is an existent being. (premise) 
2. Therefore, God exists. (from 1) 
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defined as the most perfect being/the greatest conceivable being/the instantiator of 
maximal greatness, then it will naturally follow that God exists or exists necessarily.   
Of course, matters are a bit more complicated than that – if we are appraising the 
argument we can still reject the Linkage Premise itself, or the possibility premise, or 
that S5 (or Brouwer, or whichever logical system in use) is the correct modal logic for 
metaphysics, among other moves.  But one thing we will not be able to object to if we 
have a Linkage Premise is the simple connection between God and existence, as there is 
no longer any simple, direct connection to be had.  Instead, it is the Linkage Premise 
that allows us to connect God and existence (or necessary existence).  We do not 
suggest a brute connection between existence and God as is done in the versions of the 
argument given above, in part because this move seems objectionable even to many 
theists.  We do not attempt to define God into existence by simply adding in “existence” 
to the concept as Kant and others have charged.  Instead, we draw on the deep-seated 
intuition that existence and goodness/greatness/perfection have some type of tight 
conceptual relationship, spelled out differently in different authors.  This would help the 
theist’s case.  If there is some connection between goodness/greatness/perfection and 
existence (or being, or necessary existence), and if the concept of God has long been 
understood to contain some description such as “the greatest conceivable being, the 
most perfect possible being, the ens perfectissimum, the maximally greatest being, etc.” 
then the argument flows more naturally – instead of a jarring attempt to conjoin 
necessary existence to God through brute stipulative force, the inclusion of existence or 
necessary existence in the concept of God is due to the natural and agreeable connection 
between it and the concepts of goodness/greatness/perfection.     
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Because of the preceding considerations, the most natural starting point for our 
investigation is the premise in various ontological arguments that is supposed to link 
existence or necessary existence to God by way of invoking greatness or perfection.  I 
list several examples below, and then examine them further in the following paragraphs.   
1. “For if it were only in the understanding, it could be thought to exist also 
in reality—something which is greater [than existing only in the 
understanding].” (Anselm 2000a, 94) 
2. “For there can be thought to exist something which cannot be thought 
not to exist; and this thing is greater than that which can be thought not 
to exist.” (Anselm 2000a, 94) 
3. “So it is no less repugnant to think of a God (that is, a supremely perfect 
being) lacking existence (that is, lacking some perfection) than it is to 
think of a mountain lacking a valley.” (Descartes 1980, 86) 
4. “Then it is plausible to suppose that the maximal degree of greatness 
entails maximal excellence in every world. A being, then, has the 
maximal degree of greatness in a given world W only if it has maximal 
excellence in every possible world. But maximal excellence entails 
omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection. That is to say, a being 
B has maximal excellence in a world W only if B has omniscience, 
omnipotence, and moral perfection in W -- only if B would have been 
omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect if W had been actual.” 
(Plantinga 1977, 108) 
5. “Necessary existence is positive.  Positive means positive in the moral 
aesthetic sense (independently of the accidental structure of the world)... 
It may also mean pure attribution as opposed to privation (or containing 
privation).” (Sobel, 2003, 145) 
6. “Previously, I rejected existence as a perfection.  Anselm is maintaining 
in the remarks last quoted, not that existence is a perfection, but that the 
logical impossibility of nonexistence is a perfection.  In other words, 
necessary existence is a perfection.” (Malcolm 1960, 41) 
7. “Think of a perfection (P2) as a property that it is necessarily better to 
have than not; and define the property of being supreme (S1) as the 
property that a thing has if and only if it is impossible for something to 
be greater and impossible for there to be something else than which it is 
not greater.” (Maydole 2009, 580) 
8. “(1) God is a being having all perfections. (Definition). (2) perfection is 
a simple and absolute property. (Definition). (3) Existence is a 
perfection. (4) If existence is part of the essence of a thing, then it is a 
necessary being. (5) If it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then a 
necessary being does exist. (6) It is possible for a being to have all 
perfections. (7) Therefore, a necessary being (God) does exist.” (Look 
2013, section 7.1) 
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Examples 1, 2, 4, and 6 require that greatness is linked to either existence or 
necessary existence, that a thing existing or necessarily existing is greater than it failing 
to exist.60  Examples 3, 5, 7, 8 and 9, require that perfection is linked to either existence 
or necessary existence, claiming either that existence or necessary existence is a 
perfection, or that the most perfect thing must exist.   
II.A Anselm 
Anselm’s argument occurs in the context of faith seeking understanding.  For 
him, God is “that than which nothing greater can be thought,” (Anselm 2000a, 93).  In 
the Proslogion 2, Anselm provides a clear and specific link between greatness and 
existence when he states of the idea of God that “For if it were only in the 
understanding, it could be thought to exist also in reality—something which is greater 
[than existing only in the understanding],” (Anselm 2000a, 94).  Here the distinction is 
between existence-in-the-understanding and existence-in-reality, but we need not rely 
on this distinction to get Anselm’s point across.  If an object, greater than which none 
can be conceived, can be merely understood (that is conceived, but fail to exist), we 
could argue that in the act of understanding it we would conclude that it exists, for the 
reasons or similar reasons that Anselm gives.  What we can generalize from this is some 
principle such as “For a thing to exist is greater than for that same thing not to exist” or 
“Existence is a great-making property.”  Anselm gives a similar argument in the 
Proslogion 3 but with regard to necessary existence.  Since both of these arguments 
                                                 
60 Although Gödel’s argument only speaks of positive properties, the definition of a positive property is 
that the property is positive in “the moral aesthetic sense,” or “in the sense of pure attribution” so I think 
this is a suitable interpretation of his work, as I argue in a later section.   
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show a tight link between greatness and existence (or necessary existence) they serve 
our purpose in this stage of the argument.   
II.B Descartes  
Descartes explicitly connects existence with perfection in his version of the 
argument.  For Descartes, God is defined as a supremely perfect being, a being that by 
its nature cannot lack any perfection.  So, Descartes shows that God exists by defining 
existence as a perfection.  After explaining how he comes to have an idea of God, in his 
own experience, Descartes says “So it is no less repugnant to think of a God (that is, a 
supremely perfect being) lacking existence (that is, lacking some perfection) than it is to 
think of a mountain lacking a valley,” (Descartes 1980, 86).  Here, existence is defined 
as a perfection, thus providing the linkage between existence and perfection. 
II.C Plantinga 
Plantinga’s discussion also relies on an explicit connection between greatness 
and existence.  In an initial discussion of the ontological argument and how one might 
modalize it, he says “But now suppose we think a bit more about the being than which it 
is not possible to be greater.  This being possesses a maximal degree of greatness; a 
degree of greatness that is nowhere excelled.  That is to say, its greatness is not 
exceeded by the greatness of any being in any possible world,” (Plantinga 1974, 214).  
This is one point where he explains what maximal greatness might mean, and it seems 
to be a pretty straightforward development of Anselm’s own vocabulary.   Later, he 
argues that God must have those properties that make him an object worthy of worship 
(moral goodness, power, intelligence) essentially – it is not enough for the theist that he 
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have them in this world but is incompetent or stupid in another.  In discussing this 
concept of God, he makes the distinction between greatness and excellence as follows. 
Those who worship God do not think of him as a being that happens to 
be of surpassing excellence in this world but who in some other worlds is 
powerless or uninformed or of dubious moral character.  We might make 
a distinction here between greatness and excellence; we might say that 
the excellence of a being in a given world W depends only upon its (non 
world-indexed) properties in W, while its greatness in W depends not 
merely upon its excellence in W but also upon its excellence in other 
worlds. (Plantinga 1974, 214) 
 Plantinga goes on to argue (and I think, accurately) that if we think of greatness 
this way, perhaps we can get rid of the supposition that existence is not a perfection.  
However, by utilizing this definition, he has explicitly connected degrees of greatness to 
the possession of excellence in other possible worlds (and a precondition of having any 
properties, as he notes, is existing to have those properties in the first place).  
Plantinga’s definition of maximal greatness does require necessary existence, after all. 
II.D Gödel 
Gödel’s own ontological argument is one of the most spare of those on offer.  It 
takes up only 1-2 pages in his notebooks.  It takes the form, for the most part, of logical 
notation with some very brief notes giving definitions of key terms.  The most we get 
about positive properties, which are instrumental to the proof, are as follows.  
“Necessary existence is positive.  Positive means positive in the moral aesthetic sense 
(independently of the accidental structure of the world)... It may also mean pure 
attribution as opposed to privation (or containing privation),” (Sobel 2003, 145).  This is 
not entirely clear (as others have noted) but it does suggest a connection between 
goodness or greatness (a gloss on the moral-aesthetic sense of a positive property) and 




Malcolm’s argument is, as in some previous cases, a development of Anselm’s 
own version of the argument.  In trying to explain Anselm’s argument in Proslogion 3, 
Malcolm says that  
Previously, I rejected existence as a perfection.  Anselm is maintaining 
in the remarks last quoted, not that existence is a perfection, but that the 
logical impossibility of nonexistence is a perfection.  In other words, 
necessary existence is a perfection.  His first ontological proof uses the 
principle that a thing is greater if it exists than if it does not exist.  His 
second proof employs the different principle that a thing is greater if it 
necessarily exists than if it does not necessarily exist. (Malcolm 1960, 
46) 
 Many interpreters of Malcolm have suggested that he relies upon a notion of 
God’s being unlimited to link it to his eternal existence, as opposed to linking greatness 
or perfection to existence of any kind.  He does give this argument in the article quoted, 
but in his own discussion the notion of God’s being unlimited includes the notion of 
greatness.  Again, he writes “God is usually conceived of as an unlimited being.  He is 
conceived of as a being that could not be limited, that is, as an absolutely unlimited 
being.  This is no less than to conceive of him as something greater than which cannot 
be conceived,” (Malcolm 1960, 47).  For Malcolm, then, an absolutely unlimited being 
just is a being of with the highest possible degree of greatness.   
II.F Maydole 
 Maydole’s Linkage Premise occurs in the form of a stipulative definition, and is 
quite a bit different from others.  In fact, Maydole links perfection to existence not 
directly, but through the notion of supremacy.  A being being supreme, and supremacy 
being a perfection results in the beings’ existence.  In fact, the Linkage Premise listed 
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above for Maydole’s argument is perhaps the least clear of all of them, since it is not 
direct (i.e. the linkage between perfection and existence requires an intermediary 
concept, that of supremacy).  That being said, it seems to me that a crucial part of 
Maydole’s argument requires a relationship between existence and perfection, even if it 
occurs at a slight remove.   
II.G Leibniz 
Leibniz is yet another writer who explicitly makes the link between existence 
and perfection.  Defining perfection, he writes that “by a perfection I mean every simple 
quality which is positive and absolute or which expresses whatever it expresses without 
any limits,” (Leibniz 1970, 167).  Leibniz then sets out to show that all perfections are 
compatible with one another, in order to demonstrate that God, defined as “a subject of 
all perfections or a most perfect being,” is possible.  The most relevant part of this 
discussion is at the end, where Leibniz says “Hence it is clear that this being exists, 
since existence is contained in the number of perfections,” (Leibniz 1970, 168).  
Existence is a perfection, according to Leibniz.  
In this section, I have demonstrated that each of our authors is committed to 
some version of the Linkage Premise.  In the following section, I show how such a 
premise is justified for each of our authors.   
Section III. Justification or Support for the Linkage Premise 
I have shown that in the case of each of the arguments discussed above, a central 
premise of the argument requires some tight connection between being or existence, and 
goodness, greatness, or perfection.  In this section, I will demonstrate that either the 
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ontological arguer relies upon CT or some close analog, or they do not.  When the 
arguer does rely upon this, I will demonstrate this by reference to passages of their work 
and secondary literature.  When the argument does not, I will demonstrate not only that 
they do not (in the same fashion, by examining primary and secondary texts), but that 
the arguer also fails to provide the reader with well-developed competitor theory.  I will 
not discuss Maydole since he simply stipulates his definition connecting God to 
necessary existence.  In this section, I will go through those arguments that do not 
simply stipulate a connection, and instead explore what justifications are given by those 
authors. 
III.A Anselm 
Anselm’s argument relies on CT or in a straightforward way.61  Remember, CT 
requires that being and goodness are the same in reference, but differ in sense.  One 
implication of this is that insofar as there are degrees of goodness, there will be degrees 
of being.  A further implication of this is that the opposite of goodness, evil, will be 
characterized as an absence or a lack of the appropriate kind of ordering or being.  I do 
not think that Anselm explicitly discusses this connection in exactly our terms, but that 
it is implied in several of his written works. I will demonstrate this by referring to how 
Anselm speaks about God’s goodness and existence, and how he speaks about degrees 
of being and goodness in other objects.   
Anselm refers to the nature of God in several ways which are suggestive of (or, 
in rare cases explicitly about) a view that both goodness and being come in degrees, and 
                                                 
61 I believe, and think the reader will agree, that this approach is much more akin to the participation 
approach than the nature approach, as defined in Chapter 4.  At this point, that is sufficient – all that is 
being argued is that some form of CT underlies Anselm’s argument.   
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that in God they are united.  In the Proslogion, Anselm writes of God that “Therefore, 
you alone, of all things, exist in the truest and greatest way, for nothing else so truly 
exists and therefore everything else has less being,” (Anselm 2009, 7).  Another 
translation of this passage is “You alone, then, of all things most truly exist and 
therefore of all things possess existence to the highest degree; for anything else does not 
exist as truly, and so possesses existence to a lower degree… You of all things exist to 
the highest degree,” (Anselm 1979, 119). 
In the several different chapters of the Monologion, the operation of the 
convertibility thesis is frequent.  For example, at the end of an argument in chapter 3 
regarding how things exist with respect to other things, Anselm writes.   
Accordingly, that which exists through itself exists most greatly of all. 
Therefore, there is some one thing which alone exists most greatly of all 
and most highly of all. But what exists most greatly of all and [is that] 
through which exists whatever is good and great and whatever is 
anything at all—necessarily, this is supremely good, supremely great, the 
highest of all existing things. Accordingly, there is something which—
whether it is called a being, a substance, or a nature—is the best, the 
greatest, and the highest, of all existing things. (Anselm 2000b, 10, 
emphasis mine) 
In Chapter 31, he writes  
… For just as that is naturally more excellent which, with respect to its 
natural being, more closely approximates what is most excellent, so 
indeed that nature exists more whose being is more like the Supreme 
Being… So without doubt every being exists more and is more excellent 
to the extent that it is more like that Being which exists supremely and is 
supremely excellent. (Anselm, 2000b, 48, emphasis mine) 
In addition to these and other various sections in Anselm’s texts that display the 
convertibility thesis, numerous later philosophers have interpreted Anselm in this way.  
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I believe that this point is fairly easy to establish, so I will not spend further time on 
supporting this thesis here.62    
III.B Descartes 
Descartes’ own ontological argument, as shown above, relies upon a premise 
linking perfection and necessary existence.  Although Descartes is famously interpreted 
as rejecting scholasticism for modern natural philosophy, there are a number of issues 
where Descartes is not nearly as distinct from his scholastic predecessors than generally 
thought.  I will show that Descartes is committed to CT or a close analog by examining 
the Meditations, as well as secondary sources.   
In several places in the Meditations, Descartes discusses perfection as indicating 
greater being or reality, and imperfections as consisting in some kind of negation, 
absence, or non-being.  For example, in discussing making mistaken judgments he 
tellingly writes about perfections, imperfections, and absences in being deceived and 
making correct judgments.  I quote this passage at length;  
I notice that not only a real and positive idea of God (that is, of a being 
supremely perfect), but also, so to speak, a certain negative idea of 
nothing (that is, of what is supremely lacking in every perfection) passes 
before me.  I also notice that I have been so constituted as to be some 
kind of middle ground between God and nothing, or between supreme 
being and non-being, so that, insofar as I have been created by a supreme 
being, there is nothing in me by means of which I might be deceived or 
                                                 
62 There are numerous examples of this, but I will cite two to give the reader an idea of the establishment 
of this thesis.  Brower 2006 argues that Anselm departs from his peers regarding certain views about 
goodness, but that he also holds the familiar medieval view linking goodness and being.  “Anselm’s 
ethical theory shares much in common with that of the medieval eudaimonists. Like them, he admits a 
type of value that supervenes on being: things are good, he says, to the extent that they have being (M 1). 
Like the medieval eudaimonists, moreover, Anselm recognizes two different ways in which things can 
have being, and hence two corresponding types of goodness,” (Brower 2006, 229 – 230).  Campbell 1980 
argues for a similar interpretation of Anselm.  He writes "… in the Monologion Anselm, following 
Augustine, erects an ascending scale— non-living, living, sentient, rational—each of which substances 
are greater than those before it. This scale is ranked in terms of every thing's likeness to that being which 
supremely is and is supremely excellent,” (Campbell 1980, 238, 239). 
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be lead into error; but insofar as I am not the supreme being, I lack quite 
a few things-so much so that it is not surprising that I am deceived.  Thus 
I certainly understand that error as such is nothing real that depends upon 
God, but rather is only a defect… error is not a pure negation, but a 
privation or a lack of some knowledge that somehow ought to be in me. 
(Descartes 1980, 79) 
I think this passage is a central consideration in understanding how Descartes continues 
to hold some medieval or scholastic views.  Similarly, in the third meditation he writes 
Nor should I think that I do not perceive the infinite by means of a true 
idea but only through a negation of the finite, just as I perceive rest and 
shadows by means of a negation of motion and light.  On the contrary, I 
clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite substance than 
there is in a finite one.  Thus the perception of the infinite somehow 
exists in me prior to the perception of the finite, that is, the perception of 
God exists prior to the perception of myself.  Why would I know that I 
doubt and I desire, that is, that I lack something and that I am not wholly 
perfect, if there were no idea in me of a more perfect being by 
comparison with which I might acknowledge my defects? (Descartes 
1980, 74)   
Again, Descartes characterizes deceit as a defect, an absence of something when he 
writes, at the end of the third meditation 
God, I say, that same being that whose idea is in me: a being having all 
of those perfections that I cannot comprehend, but in some way can 
touch with my thought, and a being subject to no defects.  From these 
things it is sufficiently obvious that he cannot be a deceiver.  For it is 
manifest by the light of nature that fraud and deception depend on some 
defect. (Descartes 1980, 78). 
The correct interpretation of these passages is not altogether obvious, but I think an 
argument can be made fairly easily that these passages indicate a version of CT or 
something like it in the background of Descartes ontological argument.63 
 In characterizing deceit (as an example of an imperfection) as a defect, and in 
characterizing a supremely perfect or most perfect being as one that is “subject to no 
                                                 
63 This section on Descartes is the result of my own examination of the text, but my interpretation 
parallels and draws from the work done in Wee 2012. 
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defects” Descartes is making a connection between degrees of perfection and degrees of 
being, insofar as qualities and attributes are real and existent.  How can a thing be 
defective?  In the example of deceit, there might be two general kinds of causes.  The 
first kind of defect that would cause deceit would simply be a lack of the appropriate 
amount of perception or intelligence – I might be deceived because of my own inability 
to accurately perceive the heart of the matter, or I might be deceived because I am 
simply not intelligent enough to realize that a deception is being perpetrated upon me.  
On the other hand, the agent able to engage in deception would have an issue of will – 
either weakness of will that would lead them to perceive (and weakness can be 
characterized as a lack of a suitable degree of power) or a malicious will (and malice 
might be characterized as a lack of certain kinds of virtues combined with a disordered 
hierarchy of values).  In this case, both the deceived and the deceiver suffer from some 
lack or imperfection.   
 Similarly, in discussing how his idea of finitude comes from a previously 
accessible idea of the infinite (and not, as initially suggested, the other way around), 
Descartes explicitly characterizes certain flaws of his own as imperfections and 
absences.  Specifically, the passage “Why would I know that I doubt and I desire, that 
is, that I lack something and that I am not wholly perfect, if there were no idea in me of 
a more perfect being by comparison with which I might acknowledge my defects?” 
(Descartes 1980, 74).  In this passage both doubting and desiring are immediately 
described as “that I lack something and that I am not wholly perfect.”  Doubt is most 
easily characterized as an absence of knowledge and/or a certain degree of justification 
accessible to oneself.  In order for me to doubt some belief of mine, some person’s 
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character, or that some state of affairs obtains, I must not possess a full certainty with 
regard to the truth of these beliefs or the propositions that represent the various states of 
affairs.  When we think about certainty with respect to beliefs, the most obvious and 
straightforward way of attaining a greater degree of certainty (in either the truth or 
falsity of a belief) is to increase ones knowledge of surrounding details.  If I doubt 
whether a person is trustworthy, I could in principle gather enough knowledge 
regarding the persons past activities and experiences, their dispositions, their track 
record as a friend, and so on in order to either become certain that the person is 
trustworthy, or certain that they are not.   
Desire can also be characterized as a general kind of absence or lack.  Desire 
only occurs in the case where one does not have an object, attain a state, or are in a 
situation that they wish to have, attain or be in.  If an individual had that object, or were 
in that state or situation, they would have no desire – their desire would have been 
satisfied, and would no longer exist.  Cecilia Wee, in discussing the meditator’s 
understanding of desire as a lack is to couple desire as a lack of an object in addition to 
the lack of the degree of power necessary to obtain that object (Wee 2012, 30).  
Although this is a dialectical move for the meditator (or Descartes) to bring out that it is 
the idea of the infinite that is primary, I think that one need not add in omnipotence to 
bring out the way in which desire can be thought of as a lack or as an imperfection.  
When I desire a peach, it is because I both a) have a want for it and b) do not currently 
have it.  Insofar as desire is rooted in a kind of volitional or emotional absence, 
omnipotence would only change the duration of one’s desire.  So perhaps God would 
have a desire and then immediately bring about the state of affairs that filled it, but there 
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would be a duration where God did not possess the feeling of satiety or satisfaction 
accompanied by a lack of desire – otherwise he would not have brought the state of 
affairs about in the first place.  The only way for there to not be desire, at all, is for a 
certain mental or emotional state to be existent and ever-present – the state of being 
content with the way things are.  Desire can only occur in the absence of this state.   
Finally, the first passage quoted contains the idea of degrees of perfection 
correlated with degrees of being.  God is described as “a being supremely perfect” and 
nothing is described as “what is supremely lacking in every perfection.”  He also writes 
“I also notice that I have been so constituted as to be some kind of middle ground 
between God and nothing, or between supreme being and non-being,” (Descartes 1980, 
79).  Here, God is not just the summit of perfection, but also the summit of being, and 
nothing is likewise the nadir of not only perfection, but being as well.  Wee agrees, 
writing of this section that  
She now posits a hierarchy with God, as supremely perfect being, at the 
top, herself as finite and lacking the perfection of God in the middle, and 
‘nothingness’ (nihilum) or the complete absence of perfection at the 
bottom. Significantly, nihilum – utter absence – is not only utter lack of 
perfection: nihilum or nothingness is also an utter absence of being. 
Thus, the meditator re-states her hierarchy in terms of being: she herself 
(insofar as she is ‘lacking in countless respects’) is now in the middle 
between God, the highest being, and utter non-being. The meditator in 
this passage clearly equates perfection with being. On the metaphysics 
postulated in Passage C, any form of perfection is being and is a reality 
of some sort (whether objective or formal). Again, any imperfection is a 
lack, an absence of being. Thus, GOC1, which states that ‘All 
imperfections are absences of being’, would hold. (Wee 2012, 36-37)   
 It is unclear whether goodness and perfection can be substituted in this passage 
or others, but I want to press a final point on this.  Wee argues that in this passage, two 
general ontological claims are shown and believed by Descartes (or, alternatively, the 
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meditator); GOC 1 is that “All imperfections are absences of being” and GOC 2 that 
“All forms of being are perfections,” (Wee 2012, 33).  Note that these two general 
claims parallel CT and one of the implications of CT.   GOC 1 corresponds to the 
inverse of CT, which is that “No beings, insofar as they are beings, are evils.”  GOC 2 
corresponds to one formulation of CT, that “All beings, insofar as they are beings, are 
good.”  I hold that it is either CT or some very close analog at work in Descartes 
argument.   
III.C Plantinga  
Plantinga’s discussion of maximal greatness and great-making properties is a 
staple of many contemporary discussions of the ontological argument.  Because of this, 
I think it is surprising how little time Plantinga spends giving evidence or support for 
the Linkage Premise in his argument.  In Plantinga, the Linkage Premise is given as 
follows; 
(34) The property has maximal greatness entails the property has 
maximal excellence in every possible world. 
(35) Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral 
perfection.” (Plantinga 1974, 214) 
Why should we think that maximal greatness requires necessary existence?  
Plantinga writes “the greatness of a being in a world W depends not merely on the 
qualities it has in W; what it is like in other worlds is also relevant.”   
Directly after giving a version of Anselm’s argument, Plantinga writes 
What could St. Anselm have meant?  He takes it for granted that some 
beings are greater than others… Such qualities as life, consciousness, 
knowledge, wisdom, moral excellence, power, courage, and the like are 
what we might call great-making properties; the more of these properties 
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a being has and the greater degree to which it has them, the greater, all 
else being equal, it is.” (Plantinga 1974, 199)     
 This is somewhat helpful, although at this point it is merely an appeal to 
intuitions supported by reference to some very brief cases – that a human being with 
courage and wisdom is greater than one without, that a human is greater than a cat 
because of greater degrees of intelligence and knowledge.  He continues, regarding the 
subject of comparing and weighting of different properties (a centrally important part of 
any account of greatness and great-making properties)  
Of course, there will be appropriate weightings; perhaps the modest 
degree of wisdom displayed by your average candidate for public office 
counts for more than the cheetah’s singular locomotive swiftness; and no 
doubt moral excellence outweighs power.  Further, there may be cases 
where comparison with respect to greatness is difficult or impossible; 
how shall we compare a really splendid inanimate object—the Grand 
Teton, let us say—with a fairly undistinguished living thing—an 
earthworm, perhaps?  Or how to compare the latter with a number? 
(Plantinga 1974, 199) 
 The most important point throughout is in discussing that greatness is supposed 
to be contrastive.  In determining a things greatness (in addition to relying on the 
heretofore unspecified account of great-making properties and whatever counts as a 
great-making property) you compare it with some other version of itself in another state 
of affairs. 
This path leads to mostly mistakes and accidents in terms of thinking about 
maximal greatness.64  It is after this series of dead ends that Plantinga begins developing 
a conception of greatness where the greatness of a thing is not simply world indexed, 
but that the greatness of a thing is indexed to the degree to which it exists – the 
                                                 
64 The next several sections in this chapter of The Nature of Necessity explain how thinking about 
greatness only in this way leads to invalid or infelicitous versions of the argument.  See especially pp. 
201-213.   
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robustness of its existence, as expressed by how many possible worlds it exists within.  
This is my terminology, as Plantinga puts it a different way.  Nonetheless, it follows 
from what Plantinga says.  Greatness of an object or being is necessarily related to not 
only the number of possible worlds it exists within, but also the degree to which it 
obtains those properties excellent for it in specific possible worlds.  As he says earlier, 
“The limiting degree of greatness, therefore, would be enjoyed in a given world W only 
by a being who had maximal excellence in W and in every other possible world as 
well.”  The highest degree of greatness also correlates with the highest degree of 
existence across possible worlds – necessary existence.  To summarize – greatness 
involves degrees of excellence of a thing, allows comparison of degrees of greatness 
relative to different kinds of things, and is directly tied to both the presence and the 
relevant qualities of a thing in other possible worlds.   
 This is all fine and good as far as it goes, but notice that most of what has been 
on offer in this discussion is a series of intuitions and stipulations – that moral 
excellence ranks above power, that a human being is greater than a non-sapient living 
animal, that a modest degree of certain great-making properties count more (in terms of 
greatness overall) than a high degree of other great-making properties, and that degrees 
of existence (captured by the number of possible worlds in which a being exists) are 
directly relevant to an evaluation of the greatness of an entity.  No real argument has 
been presented, no detailed theory accounting for why greatness has a specific 
connection to moral traits, or degrees of existence has been given.  Although I will 
spend more time on this in the next section, I note that some version of CT would 
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explain and undergird these claims that Plantinga makes connecting greatness to modes 
of existence.   
III.D Gödel 
Gödel’s argument is only a couple of pages of handwritten notation saved by his 
student, Dana Scott.  As such, there is precious little information from Gödel himself 
about the structure of his argument, fully worked out definitions of his terms, reasons to 
accept specific axioms, etc.  Because of the relative paucity of information given in 
Gödel’s own discussion, any full account of what exactly Gödel means in his discussion 
of positive properties will require looking at the interpretations of secondary sources.  
Therefore, although I mention Gödel’s own discussion in the beginning of this section, 
the majority of my textual evidence drawing out some important implications of 
Gödel’s terms will be secondary sources. 
As I stated before, Gödel’s own discussion of how he means to link necessary 
existence to goodness or perfection is quite simple.  A primitive definition in Gödel’s 
argument is that of a positive property.  Regarding a positive property, he writes 
(transcribed from handwritten notes and annotated by Jordan Howard Sobel)  
Positive means positive in the moral aesthetic sense (independently of 
the accidental structure of the world).  Only then is the ax. true.  It may 
also mean pure ‘attribution’* as opposed to ‘privation’ (or containing 
privation).  This interpret. Simpler proof…. *i.e. the ‘disj’ normal form 
in terms of elem. prop. contains a member without negation. (Sobel 
2003, 145)   
 Gödel has two parts of what is meant by a positive property – it is positive in the 
moral/aesthetic sense, and it is positive in the sense of pure attribution as opposed to 
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privation.  Even without using the terms “good” or “perfection” Gödel’s definition of a 
positive property should already be ringing some familiar bells in the readers head.   
 My own gloss on positive properties in Gödel’s sense is that they must mean 
something in the realm of goodness described by CT.  A property’s being positive 
simply by being positive “in the moral/aesthetic sense” wouldn’t show that by itself – 
after all, people can meaningfully talk about goodness in both morality and in aesthetics 
without holding CT or a variant.  Similarly, a property’s being positive in the sense of 
pure attribution as opposed to privation need not lead to any view requiring CT.  After 
all, CT is not a commonplace in discussing qualities of temperature fluctuation, but 
meaningful talk about heat being a positive property and cold being one of privation (or 
light and dark, for example) would not be out of place.  However, when we take a 
positive property to be both “positive in the moral/aesthetic sense” and “positive in the 
sense of pure attribution as opposed to privation” it is difficult to see how the end result 
could end up not looking something like CT.  Ultimately, interpreting Gödel this way is 
tentative and must be – the only version of the argument that exists is a page or so of (at 
times hardly legible) handwritten notes.  Gödel never made a more formal, extensively 
argued and rigorously defined version of this argument, and so interpreting this piece of 
work at all requires looking at Gödel’s correspondence, conversations with students, 
and other remarks in his diaries.   
 Fortunately, I am not alone in holding this interpretation of a Gӧdelian positive 
property.  Though some authors either interpret Gödel differently or do not make any 
explicit mention of this one way or another (see Anderson 1990 and Look 2006), a 
handful of commentators have proposed that Gödel’s positive property is similar (or 
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identical) to understanding being and goodness convertibly.  For example, Jordan 
Howard Sobel argues this explicitly in Logic and Theism (Sobel 2003, 119).  Robert 
Koons also interprets Gӧdel this way in “Sobel on Gödel’s Ontological Proof,” (Koons 
2006).  Others have suggested, based on conversations with Gödel, that he saw his own 
project as either a continuation or a vindication of Leibniz’s argument.65  Since Gödel’s 
actual notes and the sparse notes of Dana Scott contain almost nothing as explanatory 
support for these definitions of positive properties, showing that several other 
philosophers interpret Gödel’s talk as being explicitly connected with CT suffices for 
the purposes to be served in this section.   
III.E Malcolm 
 Norman Malcolm, alongside Plantinga and Maydole, does not attempt to give an 
entire theory that would provide justification or support for his own Linkage Premise.  
Here, I explore exactly how Malcolm tries to support the relationship between 
necessary existence and perfection.   
 In Malcolm’s view, Anselm actually has two arguments for God’s existence in 
the Proslogion.  The first relies upon the idea that existence is a perfection, but 
according to Malcolm (along with several other scholars), Anselm’s second ontological 
argument requires that necessary existence is a perfection (or is a great-making 
property).   
 Malcolm fleshes this out by thinking about the connection between contingent 
objects and necessary ones.  When we make judgments about whether or not a given 
                                                 
65 For example Look, although he does not explicitly suggest that Gӧdel is committed to CT, gives reason 
to think that Gӧdel saw himself as continuing Leibniz’s work by referring to Wang 1987, in Look 2006.   
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object is greater than another (or more perfect than another) one of the many criteria we 
might use is that of dependence of the object for its continued existence.   This does not 
exhaust our evaluative system, nor is it the most overriding factor in judgments of 
greatness; it is obvious that making a comparative judgment between a necessarily 
existing pair of scissors and a contingent moral saint is not as simple as determining 
which kind of thing exists necessarily.  However, when we compare two copies of the 
same entity or object, and make one of them (in terms of the concept) a necessarily 
existing object or entity, Malcolm suggests that we will make the judgment that the 
necessarily existing copy is greater than the contingent copy.  For example, he writes 
that  
If a housewife has a set of extremely fragile dishes, then as dishes they 
are inferior to those of another set like them in all respects except that 
they are not fragile.  Those of the first set are dependent for their 
continued existence on gentle handling; those of the second set are not. 
There is a definite connection in common language between the notions 
of dependency and inferiority, and independence and superiority. To say 
that something which was dependent on nothing whatever was superior 
to (‘greater than’) anything that was dependent in any way upon 
anything is quite in keeping with the everyday use of the terms ‘superior’ 
and ‘greater.’ (Malcolm 1960, 47) 
 In Malcolm there is not so much a theory of great making properties as there is 
an examination of how our patterns of language work.  In saying that the judgments 
about superiority and inferiority are connected to ideas of dependence and 
independence, Malcolm is making a point about how we understand the relationship 
between these concepts.  All other things being equal, two exactly similar items are 
judged differently when we examine their degree of dependence on or independence 
from other factors.   
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 Although there is a direct route from independent existence to necessary 
existence, Malcolm instead focuses on how the concepts of dependence and 
independence relate to the concepts of limited and unlimited entities.  When we talk 
about an object or entity’s dependence we mean that it is limited in specified ways.  If 
we think again of the fragile dishes, we’ll note that one of its limits is its brittleness, its 
fragility.  For Malcolm, this is just another way to talk about dependence and 
independence.  “It is the same thing to say that an engine's operation is dependent on as 
that it is limited by its fuel supply.” (Malcolm 1960, 47). 
 Greatness is connected to independence/being unlimited, which is (on 
Malcolm’s view) one way to spell out what it would mean for God’s existence to be 
necessary.  Critics have taken Malcolm to task about the connection between necessary 
existence and eternality or unlimitedness, but that is not important for our purposes 
(Oppy 1995, 73).  The point here is to show that there are sparse resources for a great-
making theory – a few pages reflecting on linguistic usage patterns and linking together 
judgements of superiority to independence, independence to unlimitedness, 
unlimitedness to not being able to have a beginning at a point in time and not being able 
to have a beginning point in time to necessary existence. 
III.F Leibniz 
Leibniz’s views on the relationship between being and goodness (or existence 
and goodness) are quite complex – any attempt to talk about them with any brevity will 
inevitably fall short of capturing even a fraction of Leibniz’s metaphysics or the way his 
thought changed over time.  Nonetheless, I think there is good evidence that Leibniz 
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held some version of CT or an analog, although that may only have been a part of his 
view on the relationship between existence and perfection.   
There are two major strands in Leibniz’s body of work that suggest that Leibniz 
commits himself to CT.  First, at several places he explicitly identifies existence with 
perfection.  Second, he explains evil (and other imperfections) as a lack or absence of 
existence.  Although he does not, at any point, refer to the convertibility thesis by name, 
these two strands in his work show that he is committed to it.   
In support of the thesis that Leibniz, at several points identifies existence as a 
perfection, refer to his remarks about existence being a perfection in “Two Notations for 
Discussion with Spinoza” (Leibniz 1970, 167 – 170), in his summer 1667 “Letter to 
Arnold Eckhard” (Leibniz 1970, 177 – 181), a lemma given in 1678 from Samtliche 
Schriften und Briefe (Adams 1998, p. 163), annotations to that lemma a page later in the 
same volume (Adams 1998, p. 164), as well as in a statement Opuscules et fragments 
inedits de Leibniz (Adams 1998, 166, footnote 16).  From the other way, perfection is 
defined as the degree of reality an entity contains or evinces in “The Monadology” 
(Leibniz 1970, 643 – 653), in his summer 1667 “Letter to Arnold Eckhard” (Leibniz 
1970, 177 – 181), in “On the Radical Origination of Things” (Leibniz 1970, 486 – 491) 
and in several other places throughout his work (Blumenfeld 1994b, 393).  Furthermore, 
Loemker says that “That degrees of perfection and degrees of reality correspond is the 
common neo-Platonic assumption of Leibniz and Spinoza,” in footnote two of his 
translation of “Two Notations for Discussion with Spinoza.” 
The other reason to suppose that Leibniz is committed to CT or some close 
relative is his understanding of evil as an imperfection.  In the Theodicy he writes  
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20. …the formal character of evil has no efficient cause, for it consists in 
privation, as we shall see, namely, in that which the efficient cause does 
not bring about. That is why the Schoolmen are wont to call the cause of 
evil deficient.   
21. Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically and morally. 
Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection, physical evil in 
suffering, and moral evil in sin. (Leibniz 1985, 136, italics mine) 
 Donald Blumenfeld writes that Leibniz “adopts the old Scholastic view that evil 
is a limitation, i.e., a privation of being or perfection… this account of metaphysical evil 
accords with his identification of perfection with quantity of essence, or positive 
reality,” (Blumenfeld 1994b, 399).   
Leibniz eventually developed a different view of both existence and perfection 
rather than those proposed (e.g. his understanding of perfection comes to be much more 
complicated than simply “a degree or quantity of reality” as demonstrated by 
Blumenfeld 1994b, Adams 1998, Seeskin 1978, and Webb 1989).  Because of this 
change, it could be argued that the full, mature thought of Leibniz requires no Linkage 
Premise for the ontological argument.  I will note two reasons that this evolution of 
thought in Leibniz should not count against my argument that he is committed to CT or 
a CT analog of some kind, drawn directly from secondary work on Leibniz.  The 
argument here will proceed as follows – I will first show that Leibniz is committed to 
the truth of the claim that “existence is perfection” even when he offers other definitions 
of existence.  Then, I will show that one can accept the claim that “perfection is variety 
in simplicity” since, On Leibniz’s view, this claim can be made equivalent to the claim 
that degrees of perfection correlate with degrees of reality or being.   
First, after considering a passage where Leibniz defines existence as what would 
please or displease the most powerful mind, Adams argues that  
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Leibniz says that this alternative definition ‘comes to the same thing as’ 
the definition in terms of perfection which we have been examining… 
the two definitions are complementary, each encapsulating elliptically, 
with different omissions, the same causal account of the nature of 
existence. (Adams 1998, 168) 
For Adams, the most consistent interpretation of Leibniz’s late assertions that 
existence is a perfection even after it seems that he has abandoned this notion is to hold 
that Leibniz takes the two to be incomplete but true parts of the definition of existence.  
If he is right, then we can argue that the statement “existence is a perfection” is true 
albeit incomplete – while it does not get at the whole of what existence is, it does get at 
some important truth about the nature of the relationship between existence and 
perfection.     
Second, in order to substantiate the claim that Leibniz holds CT, we must 
examine whether or not his concept of perfection and its relationship to existence or 
reality is the same as (or close to the same as) what CT requires regarding the 
relationship between perfection and existence/reality.  One of the definitions of 
perfection in Leibniz is the variety/simplicity thesis – a thing is the more perfect just in 
case it is a harmonious blend of simplicity and variety.  In Leibniz’s own words, “God 
has chosen that world which is the most perfect, that is to say, which is at the same time 
the simplest in its hypotheses and the richest in phenomena,” (Leibniz 1970, 306).  
Although this is not clearly related to the definition of perfection as consisting in the 
degree of reality an entity possesses, Blumenfeld hold that these two formulations 
equally true.  For example, Blumenfeld writes 
Leibniz equates a world’s perfection, or harmony, with its quantity of 
essence, and he thus understandably regards the best world as the one 
with the greatest quantity of essence.  But he also thinks the world with 
the most harmony has the largest number of phenomenal things and the 
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largest number of monads.  It follows that the most harmonious world is 
at once the one with the most phenomenal entities, the most monads, and 
the greatest quantity of essence.  This brings together in a simple way a 
variety of Leibnizian theses: the best possible world = the most 
harmonious one = the one that satisfies the variety/simplicity criterion = 
the one with the most phenomenal individuals and the most monads = 
the one with the most reality or essence.” (Blumenfeld 1994b, 394) 
In the case of both Adams and Blumenfeld, there is a way to trace the path from 
viewing existence as a perfection to the path that perfection is simplicity in variety.  For 
Adams, the connection is that these differing views reflect the way our language and 
concepts are not complete – even though it is not clear, on his view, how we can make 
the connection between these two different views of perfection.  For Blumenfeld, 
Leibniz’s views on perfection, differ though they may, ultimately come to the same 
thing.   
I would not desire to contest the idea that Leibniz’s views changed over time, or 
even that there are distinct formulations of the ontological argument in his work.  In 
particular, I want to note that while Leibniz’s own metaphysics may actually be more 
complicated than CT, it at the very least contains CT as a proper part.  If this is correct, 
as I’ve argued above, then at the very least, some form of Leibniz’s ontological 
argument required a Linkage Premise, and that the Linkage Premise is supported by CT 
or some similar analog.  
In this section, I have demonstrated that each of these prominent authors have 
either a) attempted to justify the Linkage Premise with CT or some close analog, or b) 
attempted to try to justify the Linkage Premise without CT or anything like it.  In either 
case (with the exception of Maydole as his argument simply stipulates this connection) 
all authors were at pains to show that the basic idea of the Linkage Premise, that there is 
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some strong and meaningful connection between existence or being, on the one hand, 
and goodness, or greatness, or perfection on the other, is justified by reflection on the 
nature of these concepts and their relationship with one another.  In the next section, I 
will show that CT entails the Linkage Premise. 
Section IV That the Convertibility Thesis of Being and Goodness (CT) Entails the 
Linkage Premise 
 CT, the subject of the entire preceding chapter, is a well-worked out, detailed, 
and powerful theory.  The conclusion of the Central Argument is that the authors we are 
considering ought to, at least practically, adopt CT, insofar as they are committed to the 
soundness of the ontological argument, and insofar as they have not already done so 
(recall that some of our authors are already committed to CT or something close to it).  
Each author relies on some version of the Linkage Premise for the success of their 
ontological argument.  If CT entails the Linkage premise, then adopting CT into their 
conceptual framework would ensure that the Linkage Premise they give is true – it 
would justify the assumption of the Linkage Premise.     
 In previous paragraphs, I have left the Linkage Premise vague in order to ensure 
that it is applicable to numerous different ontological arguments.  A premise in an 
argument is a Linkage Premise if and only if  
L1. It specifies some tight connection between judgements of value such 
as, but not limited to, goodness, greatness, and perfection, and the status 
and/or strength of an entity’s being or existence. 
L2. It requires that the connection in L1 is, at least in part, a conceptual 
connection (loosely defined).   
L3. It requires that the connection given in L1 is correlative – the 
strength of the judgment of a thing’s goodness, greatness, or perfection is 
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in some way correlated to the status and/or strength of an entity’s being 
or existence.   
Given this definition, each of our previously considered arguments contain Linkage 
Premises, as demonstrated in section I of this chapter.   
 The Convertibility Thesis holds that being and goodness are convertible.  While 
much of the last chapter is devoted to explaining exactly what this might mean, I will 
give a shorter definition of CT below.  CT holds that 
C1. “Goodness” and “being” refer to all of the same things, or have the 
same extension – they are coextensive. 
C2. “Goodness” and “being” are necessarily coextensive – it is not a 
lucky accident that the classes of objects referred to by each of these 
terms is identical.   
C3. “Goodness” and “being” while not identical in sense or in intension, 
are nonetheless conceptually related – while they both refer to the same 
class of referents, it is also the case that unpacking the nature of each 
concept allows us to understand how goodness and being could correlate 
in virtue of their conceptual content. 
C4. Both goodness and being are matters of degree, and the degree of 
one is correlated to the degree of the other. 
If the definition given above of CT is correct, we can examine the relationship 
between CT and the Linkage Premise.  CT is a much stronger thesis about the 
connection between goodness and being than the Linkage Premise.  The Linkage 
Premise does not require that goodness and being are coextensive, much less 
necessarily coextensive – just that they have some unspecified but tight relation.  The 
Linkage Premise does require something like a conceptual relationship between 
goodness and existence or being, though it leaves this underdetermined in a way that 
CT does not (for a fuller statement of the conceptual relationship between the two 
concepts, see chapter 4).  Finally, the Linkage Premise does not require that goodness 
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and being/existence come in degrees, but only that judgments made of the one are 
somehow correlative with judgements made about the other.   
Now that we have demonstrated that CT is a stronger relation than the Linkage 
Premise requires, I will show how CT entails the Linkage Premise.  Remember, a 
premise is a Linkage Premise  
L1. It specifies some tight connection between judgements of value such 
as, but not limited to, goodness, greatness, and perfection, and the status 
and/or strength of an entity’s being or existence. 
L2. It requires that the connection in L1 is, at least in part, a conceptual 
connection (loosely defined).   
L3. It requires that the connection given in L1 is correlative – the 
strength of the judgment of a thing’s goodness, greatness, or perfection is 
in some way correlated to the status and/or strength of an entity’s being 
or existence.   
 If C1-C4 are true (that is, if CT is true), then L1 is true, for CT is a very specific 
and tight connection between these two concepts and judgments made using these 
concepts – the connection of convertibility.  What does it mean to say that a connection 
between two concepts is tight?  I am operating here with a fairly intuitive notion of 
“tight conceptual connection.”66  I am confident of the judgment that convertibility is 
properly categorized as a tight connection.   
                                                 
66 On one end of the spectrum, that two concepts are identical would mean they are tightly connected – in 
fact, connections simply do not get much tighter, in this sense, than the identity relationship.  Nearer the 
other end of the spectrum, we might imagine a kind of artificially drawn mereological summation or 
Cambridge property – though a mereological summation occurs among objects and not concepts, strictly 
speaking, we can imagine its conceptual analog in thinking of various Cambridge properties.  Suppose 
that I define “trit” as “a trit is any object that either exists, or is blue, or is good, or is evil, or is red, or is 
shaped, or is abstract, or is coffee-flavored, or is illuminated, or is intentionally designed, or is in the 
region of space-time we call the Earth.”  In this definition, there is a connection between goodness and 
existence – the connection is that they are both defining possible properties of a trit.  However, this is a 
very loose connection, and the concepts themselves aren’t related to one another at all except through 
being included in tritness.  Convertibility is pretty far away from this kind of connection, and in fact is 
much closer to identity than it or many other connections.   
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But if it is true to say “being and goodness are convertible” and that “the 
convertibility relationship is a tight connection between two concepts,” then it will be 
true to say that there is “some tight connection between judgements of value such as, 
but not limited to, goodness, greatness, and perfection, and the status and/or strength of 
an entity’s being or existence.” So CT entails L1. 
CT also entails L2.  While the concepts of being and goodness in CT are not, 
themselves, identical, it is also the case that they do not merely happen to be 
coextensive.  It is the relationship between a things goodness and degree of goodness, 
and a things being or existence and its degree of being or existence that ensures that the 
two concepts have the same extension.  Compare this to the coextension of the two 
terms “chordate” and “renate.”  It is a matter of fact that all biological creatures on earth 
with kidneys (renates) also have hearts (chordates).  So the terms “chordate” and 
“renate” are coextensive, but not necessarily so.  Things might have turned out 
differently in our evolutionary timeline (or they may yet, in the future, turn out 
differently).  In the case of CT, it is the conceptual connection between being and 
goodness that explains their necessary coextension.  Even aside from what feature of 
these two things ensues their joint extension, CT holds that there is a conceptual 
relationship between these two central concepts (again, the reader is requested to refer 
to Chapter 4).  But if the connection between goodness and being is conceptual on CT, 
then L2 is true.  Therefore CT entails L2. 
Finally, CT entails L3.  CT holds that goodness and being admit of degrees, and 
further that the degree of one is correlated to the degree of the other.  This is just a 
specific way for the two concepts to be correlated with one another.  Since L3 simply 
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requires that the two concepts be correlated in some way, the truth of CT suffices for 
the truth of L3, and therefore CT entails L3.   
I have demonstrated that CT entails each proper part of the Linkage Premise.  
Since CT entails both the necessary and sufficient conditions of the Linkage Premise, it 
entails the Linkage Premise. 
Section V. The Superiority of the Convertibility Thesis 
 In this section, I argue that in the absence of any well-developed competitor 
theories, CT is the best theory to adopt in order to substantiate the truth of the Linkage 
Premise.  I argue this in two distinct ways.  First, I argue that a holistic and detailed 
theory is preferred to unconnected or tenuously connected series of intuitions, 
observations and chains of reasoning as support for a premise.  Second, I argue that 
even in considering CT among other possible theories, it ranks highly enough on 
numerous theory-decision criteria to give us a prima facie reason to accept it in order to 
substantiate the Linkage Premise.  If this theory would be competitive with other 
theories, then in the absence of well-developed competitor theories we have some 
reason to adopt it.  I also show how adopting CT rules out the AntiGod parody. 
V.A The Theory Superiority Principle 
The Theory Superiority Principle – A holistic, systematic theory is 
always preferable to an unconnected or tenuously connected series of 
intuitions, observations and chains of reasoning (ceteris paribus).   
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 In this section, I give reasons to show that the Theory Superiority Principle, as 
given above, is plausible.  If that is true, then it is reasonable to conclude that CT is 
preferable as a way to substantiate the Linkage Premise.67   
 The Theory Superiority Principle seems uncontroversial at first blush – if I have 
a bunch of data to explain and/or make sense of, then a holistic theory will be preferred 
to intuitions or observations that are only loosely connected, if at all.  Philosophy is, 
after all, a system-builder’s discipline, so that endorsing the Theory Superiority 
Principle looks like an implication of doing philosophy at all.  Furthermore, if I am in 
dialogue with an interlocutor, I would hold that the Theory Superiority Principle also 
holds for each of our arguments and counterarguments.  I would be more impressed 
with the support given to a premise by a detailed and well-worked out theory than if the 
premise is supported by some minimal reflection or a single intuition – and I would 
expect that my interlocutor would make the same judgment.  One reason for adopting 
this principle is that it, or something like it, is already at play in the standards of 
argument and dialogue most of us are familiar with. 
 In order to support this point (aside from the evidence given explicitly below 
and in the readers’ own experience), I invite the reader to think about David Lewis’ 
philosophical system (Lewis 1986).  In Lewis, metaphysical, linguistic, logical, and 
ethical theses are all supposed to holistically mesh with one another.  Motivations for 
                                                 
67 Though my focus in this section is justifying this principle in philosophy, it is also the case that this 
principle is generally accepted in a number of other fields, including almost every branch of the hard and 
soft sciences.  Physics, biology, geology, psychology, sociology – all of these fields presume something 
like the Theory Superiority Principle, and for good reason.  This is not simply a theme only in science 
and/or philosophy.  Literary theory, communications, leadership, history all have such a background 
principle as well.  This reflection on the nature of human theorizing might lend even more support to the 
acceptance, in philosophy, of such a principle – if we do accept such a principle, we are in fairly good 
company, and our acceptance of the principle will not reflect anything unique to philosophy or the 
philosophical method.   
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nominalism, for possible worlds realism, for Lewis’ ethical views, for his view of 
causation and counterfactuals, are all tied together in one intricate and well-developed 
theory (or, truly speaking, set of inter-related theories).  Setting aside whether or not 
one thinks that Lewis’ theoretical framework is true, there is much to be admired and 
valued in such a system simply as a detailed, organically connected way of 
understanding the world.  Many of us hold this to be a valuable enterprise – it is much 
more difficult to do in the contemporary environment for numerous reasons, but doing it 
at all (and, in particular, doing it well) is to be lauded.  It is difficult to think of any 
prominent, recent philosophical figure that does not have in mind holistic, systematic 
relationships between their various views and projects as evidenced by their written 
work.  Of course there are other individuals whose intellectual labor tends to be narrow 
and disconnected from other views – scientists that specialize in niche areas are 
examples of this.  Perhaps, in philosophy, there is also a kind of observational selection 
effect, as a philosopher that is prominent is likely to have, by virtue of their being 
prominent, published and held views on a number of philosophical areas.   
There are also prominent, 20th century philosophers that changed their mind to 
some degree or other over time: Roderick Chisholm, Bertrand Russell, and Hilary 
Putnam, as examples.  However, these philosophers changed their mind due to rational 
pressure exerted on them by others and by their own intellectual commitments in other 
areas.  In the end, even the philosophers we think of as having an evolving opinion are 
examples to be brought to bear in support of the Theory Superiority Principle.   
 Another reason to adopt the Theory Superiority Principle is that theories are 
better able to resist certain kinds of dialogical charges than mere intuitions, 
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observations, or addendums.  In reflecting on the dialogical back and forth of argument, 
critique, response, etc., interlocutors often request justifying information.  If I am to 
accept a premise, I want to know what reason I have for accepting the premise.  What 
considerations, reasons, arguments, etc. can be brought to bear in support of a premise?  
Similarly, when I am evaluating a critique of an argument, I am interested in asking 
roughly the same question – what considerations, reasons, arguments, etc. can be 
brought to bear in support of this criticism?  This concern for justification occurs at 
every level of argument and counterargument, of thesis and response.   
 The Theory Superiority principle simply states that having a theory at one’s 
disposal during this dialogical process is superior, all other things being equal, to having 
to simply rely on an intuition, observation, or some otherwise disparate piece of 
reasoning.   
 As an example, let’s consider a compatibilist view of free will.  When I ask the 
compatibilist about their definition of free will and the justification for accepting it, for 
example, they might point to how it is part of a larger theory about motivation, human 
psychology, and the nature of the physical world.  The compatibilist might attempt to 
show that this usage of the term has a long history, and is interwoven with other 
relevant theses that all hang together just so.  All of this provides more rational 
grounding for the definition than simply a stipulated definition, or even a mere 
reflection about what our intuitions are when we use such a word.  Situating the 
definition within a broader theory of human psychology and motivation, and situating 
this theory in history, are both positive considerations in favor of adopting the 
definition.  Additionally, if the definition is part of some larger theory or holistic view 
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then that will likely have other implications in other areas of the free will debate – and 
if this is the case, these implications (whatever they may be) will not be able to be 
simply shrugged off as ad hoc maneuvering on the part of the compatibilist.   
 As another example, let’s take neo-Aristotelian virtue theory.  If the answer to 
“How should I think about the structure of ethical judgments and theory?” is a focus on 
character and virtue, I will want some explanation for preferring this over some other 
view.  In particular, for an Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian view I will want to know the 
answer to “What counts as human flourishing?”  As a proponent of the view, I could 
simply rely on some vague intuitions, thought experiments, or minimally connected (if 
at all) observations to support my thesis about the content of the phrase “human 
flourishing.”  However, this response is rationally inferior to a neo-Aristotelian account 
that is rooted in a full-blown theory of human nature and function.  At the very least, the 
theory of human nature itself might give me a principled and motivated reason to adopt 
some specific picture of human flourishing without opening me up to the charge of 
special pleading or that my definition of human flourishing is, in some way, ad hoc.   
 In the context of the ontological argument, an opponent might reasonably ask 
for justification for our Linkage Premise.  Just what is it, exactly, about greatness and 
existence (or perfection and existence) that would explain their being linked together in 
such a manner as is given in the argument?  Many contemporary philosophers will have 
short responses to this question – as we’ve seen, Maydole simply stipulates a 
connection between perfection and supremacy, and supremacy and necessary existence, 
whereas Plantinga and Malcolm both give quick, reflective musings that are supposed 
to support this connection, but they give us little more than that (Maydole 2009, 
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Plantinga 1974, Malcolm 1960).  On the other hand, if the Theory Superiority Principle 
is correct then CT is a more rationally supportive ground for the Linkage Premise, and 
ought to be preferred if it meets the required conditions.   
 In examining the ontological argument from the other direction, the Theory 
Superiority Principle also comes into play when evaluating critiques and responses.  
Why reject existence as a first-order predicate or property?  One answer is that this is 
because viewing existence this way is strictly inconsistent with a larger theory about 
existence, quantification, logic, and being.  How might an opponent evaluate the 
concept of God if, as many believe, the proponent of the argument is simply adding on 
necessary existence to the concept of God in an ad hoc way, reminiscent of special 
pleading?  Why is the Linkage Premise true for God and not for other objects (if it is not 
true for other objects)?  An answer to these questions that relies upon a holistic, 
systematic theory will be given higher rational appraisal than a series of intuitions, 
reflections, and observations (it will also cancel out the possibility of charging the 
arguer or argument itself with ad hoc additions or special pleading).  Of course, the 
opponent will want to examine the viability of the theory itself, but that is another 
matter entirely.   
 In short, the Theory Superiority Principle is to be preferred for 3 reasons.  First, 
it is tacitly assumed in our picture of philosophy and our evaluation of philosophical 
projects.  The entire process of philosophical back and forth and dialogue can be seen as 
a search for a holistic, well-developed theory within which to situate specific beliefs and 
views or sub-views.  Although there is less great system building going on now than in 
the past, this valuing of theory and the role it plays in philosophical dialogue remains.  
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Second, theories are positively judged in dialogue for justifying premises or corollaries 
by giving substantial, principled, and systematic support.  Theories are better because 
they are more powerful, rich, and broad than mere intuitions or reflections, and the 
implications of and correlations to various theories arise out of an organic unity.  Third, 
theories are positively judged in dialogue by ruling out certain negative charges such as 
ad hoc reasoning or special pleading.  One advantage to a view supported or implied by 
a theory is that a simple challenge of ad hoc reasoning or special pleading holds no 
weight.  Whether a theory’s implications are correct or incorrect, true or false, or 
whether the theory as a whole is justifiable or unjustifiable, one thing that cannot be 
said of a theory’s implications is that it is simply a disconnected proposition meant only 
to respond to some criticism or challenge.  Similarly, a theory gives us a principled 
reason to defend its implications, so charges of special pleading for a given object or 
connection are unmotivated.   
Of course, the Theory Superiority Principle does not say simply that any theory 
of any kind is better than any set of intuitions, observations, and loosely connected 
chains of reasoning of any kind.  All other things being equal, the one is to be preferred 
to the other.  This suggests that adopting the Theory Superiority Principle will prima 
facie support endorsing CT, although the proponent would be required to spell out 
whether or not CT is itself plausible due to its other philosophical and metaphysical 
commitments.  I have argued in the previous chapter that CT is a plausible thesis even 
for contemporary philosophers, and I will argue in the next section that CT ranks 
comparatively well on the basis of theory selection criteria.     
V.B The Superiority of CT on the Basis of Theory Criteria 
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 When we think about exactly what makes one theory preferable to another, a 
number of considerations come to mind.  We might think of the depth and breadth of 
the theory – how deep and rich is its content, and how widely might the theory be 
applied?  We might think of the completeness of a theory – is it the beginning of a 
theory but not yet fleshed out, or is it complete and detailed?  We might think of 
simplicity – how simple, how elegant, is the theory?  Finally, we might think of holistic 
fit – how well does the theory fit with the other things I believe and/or hold to be true?  
In general, these criteria are used when deciding between two or more competing 
theories.  In the following, I will argue that CT scores highly on each of these criteria. 
 When judging the depth of the theory, CT must be weighted considerably.  CT is 
a view about the nature of metaethics, and the metaphysics of ethics, as well as a view 
about the nature of existence, of being.  Further, it is a view that has been developed and 
worked out in several forms by a number of philosophers spanning hundreds of years.  
A competent philosopher of history, proficient in the various required languages, would 
be able to produce a veritable tome on the history and different forms of CT during the 
Early Patristic and Medieval period.68  This doctrine has had an influence on various 
philosophical and theological figures of the 19th and 20th century.  There are even 
philosophers who are yet today working out this theory in the context of contemporary 
analytic philosophy.  The degree of richness, detail, and depth in CT must be 
recognized as high (for further defense of this claim, the reader is referred to chapter 4).   
 When it comes to breadth, CT ranks highly on that scale, as it applies to every 
existent object.  If a thing exists, CT has something to say about it.  There is not much 
                                                 
68 Many scholars are even now doing this – MacDonald 1993 contains a representative sample of 
historical and contemporary scholarship of CT.   
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more that a theory could even cover when it comes to breadth.  CT also tells us 
something important about certain kinds of absences, lacks, or privations, making its 
applicability even broader. 
 Another of the great virtues of CT as a theory is that it explains the connection 
between two realms that are often taken to be completely independent if not 
dichotomous – the realm of facts and the realm of values.  Many of 20th century 
philosophers, taking on-board an insight from David Hume, have treated it as a mystery 
how facts and values are related.69  They thought Hume had simply proven that there is 
no connection at all between facts and values.  The aftermath of that argument and its 
acceptance was that, because people often accepted it, they found the connection 
between facts and values mysterious, a potent problem to be solved.  Much of 20th 
century meta-ethics and metaphysics of ethics have had trouble connecting these two 
realms together.  CT, though, allows and even requires the connection between facts 
and values at a most basic level.  To be is to be good, and to be good is to be.  Though 
this idea is stunning to contemporary philosophers, it has historical roots that go back to 
Aristotle and Plato in some form.  Ancient and medieval philosophers would be 
perfectly comfortable with such a view and thus with no significant fact/value 
dichotomy.  CT is a way of looking at reality that brings these two realms together, and 
this is significant because while we know facts and values are connected many of us 
cannot demonstrate or analyze this connection.  This is just further support to show that 
CT has the advantage over other theories on offer in terms of comprehensiveness.70 
                                                 
69 Most scholars trace this to a view represented in the very last paragraph of Book 3, Section 1, Part 1, of 
Hume 2000. 
70 I owe the considerations expressed in this paragraph to conversations with Linda Zagzebski.   
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 By virtue of having been developed over hundreds of years by many different 
scholars and philosophers, CT is detailed and nearer to completeness than to its 
beginning form.  While we might wonder whether any theory is ever really complete, 
we do often make a distinction between a young theory and a provisional theory, as 
compared to a more established, detailed, rich theory.   
 Simplicity is a notoriously difficult criterion to make use of – there are 
numerous formulations of it, and different philosophers find themselves disagreeing in 
terms of how exactly to use this criterion (and what fits this criterion).  Further, 
simplicity itself contains a ceteris paribus clause – simplicity is only a good criterion if 
the two theories being compared are otherwise equal.  I cannot provide a full defense of 
the simplicity of CT – indeed, it requires some substantive metaphysical commitments 
that at least some other worldviews might rule out.  That being said, there are things to 
be said in favor of the simplicity of CT.  While it is complex in its implications, it 
unifies two otherwise quite distinct phenomena in goodness (moral and metaphysical) 
and existence.  In fact, CT is a smaller subset of an older view, the Doctrine of the 
Transcendentals which begins in Aristotle and is further developed by various medieval 
philosophers.71  While its internal workings are complicated, the Doctrine of the 
Transcendentals is itself a doctrine of simplification – it reduces the categories of “one” 
“true” good” and “beauty” to “being,” at least (as with CT) in terms of extensionality.  
Another piece of support for CT is that it is on the same footing as moral realism, 
insofar as anyone that thinks goodness is a real thing will have to have a theory that is 
ontologically as parsimonious as the CT theorist.  Another relevant consideration is that 
                                                 
71 See Goris and Aertsen 2013 for further information on this theory and its permutations.  
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CT is a powerful theory with a variety of implications, which is not true of other 
possible competing theories (and thus, making relevant the ceteris paribus condition of 
the simplicity criterion).   
 Perhaps the most challenging criterion for CT is the criterion of holism – given 
what most of us now think to be true about the world and about all of the relevant 
concepts that CT touches on (goodness, evil, existence, etc.), can CT adequately fit 
within this framework, or is it simply another detailed, rich theory that, as unfortunately 
happens with many detailed, rich theories from earlier historical epochs, has turned out 
to be false or unjustifiable?  I have endeavored, at the end of Chapter 4, to persuade the 
reader that on this criterion the downfall of CT has been much overstated.  I have 
argued that its plausibility ought to be evaluated more positively, even given our 
contemporary world, than many philosophers have been willing.  If the arguments given 
at the end of Chapter 4 are successful, then CT ranks more highly on this criterion than 
opponents of the argument might think.   
 Even if there were competing theories that would explain and justify the 
Linkage Premise along with a host of other phenomena, how many of them would rank 
as highly on each of these criteria for theory selection than CT?  Leibniz’s theory, while 
containing CT or some close analog, also requires a number of other metaphysical, 
ethical, and epistemic theses that might be too far for some theorists to go – surely one 
need not adopt Leibniz’s entire metaphysics if that persons believes the ontological 
argument to be valid and sound!  On the other hand, when considering the scattered, 
brief remarks of Plantinga and Malcolm as theories, which we might simply for the sake 
of comparing them here, neither of these will rank as highly on breadth, depth, 
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completeness.  They may or may not count as simpler, depending on what we mean by 
simplicity and how we judge different things to be simple.  Finally, each of these views 
might be found to be objectionable to our contemporary world-view insofar as they 
require some substantial ethical and metaphysical commitments that we are hesitant to 
adopt without further.   
 Of course, simply calling the meager and chaotic reflections on the relationship 
between greatness and existence in Plantinga or Malcolm theories is to badly stretch the 
word.72  By definition, neither of these will count as theories and so will not be proper 
objects of comparison to CT.  However, I am arguing that even if they were so counted, 
CT would remain superior overall as a theory in support of the Linkage Premise and on 
its own merits.   
 As a final consideration in favor of CT as compared with other theories as 
supporting the Linkage Premise, note how adoption of this background theory would 
affect other arguments, critiques, or concepts surrounding the ontological argument.  CT 
completely rules out the possibility of Antigod Parodies of the argument – if simply 
existing requires any amount of goodness, then a perfectly evil being will simply be one 
that completely fails to exist.  If a perfectly good being is the apex of being on this 
view, then a perfectly evil being would not be, and in fact would be nothing.  For it to 
exist at all it would be good to some degree, and thus not perfectly evil.  Other parodies 
                                                 
72 I do not take this to be an indictment of those philosophers, just that they believed that this connection 
between existence and greatness (or maximality or perfection) is so commonly held at an implicit level 
that a short amount of reflection and intuition pumping would suffice to persuade their readers of the 
rational acceptability of considerations in support of their Linkage Premise.  However, since I believe this 
to be a lynchpin of the argument as a whole, and since I believe that their own considerations are not 
sufficient to ground this thesis, I have chosen to use the language given above as an accurate, if not 
wholly flattering, view of their accounts of being and goodness and their relation.   
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might be more effective against an ontological argument with the backing of CT, but 
they have other assorted problems as explained in chapter three.   
CT may also undercut the longstanding critique of the ontological argument that 
existence is not a perfection or a property.  Existence is a perfection or great-making 
property in a straightforward way if one accepts CT.73   Far from being univocally 
radical in this way, CT is consistent with a number of theories of existence, even if it 
rules out or is inconsistent with one of the major, mainline theories of existence.  CT 
may also, if accepted, lend some support to the possibility premise of the argument.  
While metaphysical modal judgments do not depend on our given set of concepts and 
ideas, it is a psychological fact about human beings that adoption of differing 
worldviews will lead to differing appraisals of claims and statements.  Were we inclined 
to accept CT prior to appraisal of the argument, I believe that we would find the 
possibility premise much less objectionable.  Finally, CT gives some credence to the 
idea of God as the ens realissimum, and as the apex of being.  This is not simply a 
boldly stated assertion or an ad hoc modification of the concept, but is the natural 
implication of theory of the relationship between reality and goodness.74   
 In conclusion, I have given a three-pronged argument in this section that CT is 
to be preferred in the absence of competitor theories.  First, I have shown that 
philosophers ought to accept the Theory Superiority Principle.  If this principle is 
accepted, it goes a long way in supporting the view that CT ought to be adopted instead 
of considerations given by many contemporary proponents of the ontological argument.  
                                                 
73 On at least some interpretations.  Alexander 2012 argues that CT does not require treating existence or 
goodness as properties of objects. 
74 Alexander 2012 suggests that his attributive account of goodness, which seems to entail CT, provides a 
way to give further rational support to Aquinas’ Fourth Way.   
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Second, I have shown that even if we were comparing CT to the other available theories 
(which is, again, to badly stretch the word) CT would have a higher aggregate ranking 
on various theory selection criteria than those competitor theories.  Third, I have shown 
that simply by itself, CT has certain advantages over other theories, not only but 
especially in the case of the ontological argument.  If this is true, it gives us reason to 
adopt CT in order to substantiate the Linkage Premise in ontological arguments.  If my 
arguments in this chapter are correct, then CT ought to be adopted by proponents of the 
ontological argument.   
Section VI. Conclusion 
VI.A Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown that various representative versions of the 
ontological argument rely upon a Linkage Premise of some kind.  In section II, I have 
demonstrated that in many cases, these arguments require CT or something very similar 
to it in order to provide justification and support for the Linkage Premise.  Those 
versions of the argument that do not explicitly rely on CT either stipulate the truth of the 
Linkage Premise, or they justify the Linkage Premise without any well-developed 
competitor theory to CT.   In section III, I have shown that CT entails the Linkage 
Premise.  Finally, in section IV, I gave a two-pronged argument for adopting CT in the 
absence of well-developed competitor theories.  If the foregoing sections are correct, if 
the arguments, reasons, and considerations given are valid and sound, then proponents 
of any version of the ontological argument that both a) contains a Linkage Premise, and 
b) that does not include a well-developed competitor theory, are practically committed 
to CT.  To put this another way – if the proponent of the argument is interested in 
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making their version of the ontological argument as strong as possible, as justified and 
well-supported as possible, and if their version of the ontological argument meets those 
two conditions given above, they will have little choice other than to affirm CT.   
 Of course, this should not worry the proponent of the argument.  I have shown 
that CT is a plausible account of the metaphysical relationship between being and 
goodness.  If this is correct, then proponents of the argument have added a powerful and 
distinguished tool to their philosophical toolkit.  On the other hand, this should give 
pause to critics of the ontological argument.  If the argument contained in chapter 2 
about the weakness of one major and traditional critique of the ontological argument 
(that existence is not a predicate) is correct, then critics will have fewer places to attack 
than previously thought.  If the argument contained in chapter 4 is correct, then the 
strongest kind of objection to ontological arguments is a kind of parody objection.  
Since CT rules out this objection, accepting CT would rule out the strongest objection 
to the ontological argument.  If this is true, then critics will have to acknowledge CT as 
part of the conceptual background of the ontological argument.  They must wrestle with 
this theory of the metaphysical relationship between two of our most important ethical 
and metaphysical concepts.  All of this is a much more complex, in-depth task than 
most critics of the argument have considered it to be.   
VI.B Dissertation Conclusion 
This dissertation has spanned a number of significant topics in metaphysics and 
philosophy of religion.  In the first chapter, I gave a brief overview of those arguments I 
discuss in this chapter, as well as noted other contemporary versions of the ontological 
argument.  In the second chapter, I examined a number of existence concepts, and noted 
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which do and do not seem to be required and/or ruled out for ontological arguments to 
be successful.  I believe the second chapter contains the required backgrounding of 
certain common ways of objecting to the ontological argument – indeed, in discussing 
the ontological argument with any professional philosopher who does not specialize in 
philosophy of religion, this is the most common form of criticism.  It is often thought to 
be so persuasive that after it is lodged, little remains to be said.  In the third chapter, I 
argue that parody style arguments are actually the most powerful objection to the 
ontological argument, and I develop an account of the AntiGod objection that I argue is 
the most persuasive form of parody objection available.  In the fourth chapter, I 
examine and develop the nature approach of the Convertibility Thesis of Being and 
Goodness (referred to throughout this chapter as CT), in both historical and 
contemporary work.  This chapter also includes a defense of the initial plausibility of 
CT in contemporary philosophical work.  In this final chapter, I have argued that those 
typical ontological arguments I consider in earlier chapter are either directly or 
practically committed to the truth of CT, as well as arguing that CT is superior to other 
theories on offer 
If the foregoing research and series of arguments are correct, then we may 
conclude a number of interesting things.  First, if my arguments in the third chapter are 
correct, the most persuasive objection to the ontological argument is some form of 
parody objection, especially and in particular the AntiGod or Devil-like-being 
objection.  This is certainly not the consensus in the field at this time – specialists often 
think that parody objections are easily refuted and betray a misunderstanding of the 
structure of the ontological arguments.   It seems that in some form, Gaunilo’s original 
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intuition and objection lives on to be a gadfly at Anselm’s argument.  Extending this 
intuition to the form of the AntiGod parody (or other devil parodies) is not entirely new, 
but its force has long gone under acknowledged and underappreciated.  Despite 
Nagasawa’s arguments, parody objections are not destined to fail – if I am correct, they 
are the most forceful and most persuasive kind of objection to ontological arguments.  If 
this is true, then CT has, as previously argued, another significant advantage – it 
completely rules out these kind of parody objections.   
Second, for CT being a central and important feature of a number of important 
ontological arguments, the contemporary philosophical world has been almost entirely 
silent about this.  It has not, for the most part, even been noticed as a significant feature 
of a number of ontological arguments, much less argued against, analyzed, or 
incorporated into contemporary research into the argument.  Even contemporary 
philosophers who give their own versions of the argument seem to think it is entirely 
unimportant how or to what degree the Linkage Premise so often included in 
ontological arguments is supported by anything other than a brief series of reflections or 
outright stipulation.  Part of this lack of attention is likely simply a matter of the more 
widespread lack of attention paid to medieval philosophy in the contemporary 
philosophical world.  Unlike the works of Plato and Descartes, whose concepts and 
terminology every professional philosopher is steeped in since their very first 
philosophy class, the concepts, terminology, and arguments of medieval philosophers 
are absent or extremely rare in most courses of contemporary philosophical education.  
This might explain why we often fail to notice the medieval influences in Leibniz or 
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Descartes, or why concepts and theories that were mainstays of swaths of medieval 
philosophy are so foreign to the contemporary philosophical world.   
However, if this dissertation is correct, it will no longer be sufficient to ignore 
CT, especially and in particular in discussions of the ontological argument.  If my 
foregoing arguments are correct, CT is lurking behind every ontological argument that 
includes a Linkage Premise and that does not contain a competitor theory to CT.  
Contemporary philosophers of religion (including atheologians) will be required to be 
explicit about their background metaphysics in a more thorough way than they 
previously have.  They will be required to grapple with the powerful and taxing 
Convertibility Thesis of Being and Goodness.  This will not be an easy task on either 
side – simply understanding CT and its odd notions about goodness, perfection, being, 
and existence requires a great degree of careful study and reflection.  No one, to my 
knowledge, has made this claim about ontological argument before now, so if I am my 
arguments are correct, this will require a shift in the contemporary field.   
Of course, the more significant take-away is that if CT is minimally plausible, it 
may be worth researching and incorporating into areas far beyond the ontological 
argument.  It would be the project of another work entirely to attempt to justify CT as a 
theory consistent with the contemporary philosophical world.  All that I have tried to do 
in this dissertation is to show that instead of quickly writing off this metaethical and 
metaphysical theory with a passing reference to pain or the privation theory of evil, 
much more critical engagement will be required.  If CT were accepted as a legitimate 
metaethical and metaphysical theory, there would be implications for general ethical 
theory, theories of existence, theories of the good, theories of function, etc.   
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Finally, just as the CT of being and goodness has proven to be important and 
useful in this contemporary philosophical debate (in addition to its wide-reaching 
implications in metaethics and basic metaphysics), other concepts and theories from 
medieval philosophy may shed light on other areas of contemporary philosophy.  In 
particular, it may be a useful exercise to see how a defense of CTs of other 
transcendental categories might inform contemporary philosophy.  A CT of being and 
oneness would prove provocative in basic metaphysics as regards the debate between 
pluralism and monism.  A CT of being and truth might require revisions or alterations in 
logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics.  A CT of being and beauty might alter 
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